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Abstract. This work is concerned with the issue of applications of the
semi-definite programming (SDP) in the field of quantum information sci-
ence. Our results of the analysis of certain quantum information protocols
using this optimization technique are presented, and an implementation
of a relevant numerical tool is introduced. The key method used is NPA
discovered by Navascues et al. [Phys. Rev. Lett. 98, 010401 (2007)].
In chapter 1 a brief overview of mathematical methods used in this
work is presented. In chapter 2 an introduction to quantum information
science is given. Chapter 3 concerns the device-independent (DI) and
semi-device-independent (SDI) approaches in quantum cryptography. In
chapter 4 our results regarding quantum information protocols which we
developed using SDP are described. The results include a new type of
quantum key distribution protocol based on Hardy’s paradox; several pro-
tocols for quantum random number expansion; a method of formulation
of SDP relaxations of SDI protocols; and a DI Santha-Vazirani source of
randomness amplification protocol. In chapter 5 an introduction to in-
terior point methods is given. In chapter 6 the implementation of our
numerical tool dedicated to problems occurring in chapter 4 are discussed
and compared with other solutions.
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Preface
This work concerns the interdisciplinary issue of applications of the semi-
definite programming in the field of quantum information science. In partic-
ular the results cover the analysis of certain quantum information protocols
using this optimization technique. The key tool we use is the Navascues-
Pironio-Ac´ın method (NPA) method discovered by Miguel Navascues, Ste-
fano Pironio and Antonio Ac´ın [150]. Contrary to the majority of works
employing this method, our aim is to deal not only with the results obtained
with it, but also to investigate some aspects of the implementation issues.
In general the NPA method may be viewed as a definition of certain sets
of probability distributions which are interesting on their own [149], and
are possible to be formulated as solutions to semi-definite problems. If the
classical computer science can be viewed as considerations of capabilities of
Turing machines supplied with certain probability distributions, the quan-
tum information tries to answer the question what happens if we consider a
wider family of probabilities. It reveals that semi-definite programming is an
excellent tool for this analysis.
The task of this work is two-fold, namely we use the semi-definite program-
ming model of a certain set of probability distributions to investigate some
aspects of random number generation and cryptography, and we develop a
suitable numerical tool for this task. To be more precise, we
• Formulate models based on semi-definite programming for analysis of
the reliability of quantum random number generation and quantum
key distribution protocols.
• Implement some variants of interior point method for semi-definite
programming and compare their performance in the inquiry of quan-
tum probability distributions.
The considered types of protocols are currently of particular interest. Al-
though the efforts in construction of quantum computers [52] find more inter-
est among laity, quantum cryptography is the field which is more probable to
find applications in everyday’s life in the coming years. There already exist
commercial devices implementing quantum randomness generation, e.g. the
device Quantis produced by id Quantique[223], or qStream by Quintessence
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Labs[225]. Such devices are available by PCI-express or USB interface. Also
quantum key distribution devices are present on the market, e.g. Cerberis
QKD by id Quantique, or solutions by MagiQ [224].
The aim of the SECOQC project (2004-2008) was “evolving quantum cryp-
tography into an instrument that can be operated in an economic environ-
ment” [226]. In October 2008 they performed the first live demonstration
of a working network with quantum key distribution in a metropolitan en-
vironment. Other institutions involved in the development of quantum key
distribution include NIST [128] and Toshiba [70]. A collaborative work by
NEC, Mitsubishi Electric, NTT, Toshiba and other institutions reported in
2011 [187] a first implementation of TV conference secured with quantum
cryptography over a distance of 45 kilometers. A spectacular implementation
milestone was an experiment with quantum teleportation [127] and entan-
glement swapping [92] at a distance of 143 kilometers over Canary Islands of
La Palma and Tenerife.
The work is organized as follows. The two main chapters of this work are
chapter four and six. These chapters contain our contribution to the investiga-
tion of quantum protocols and implementation of semi-definite programming
method tools involved.
In the first chapter we start with a brief overview of mathematical methods
which will be useful in this work. Next we introduce some basic notions
regarding semi-definite programming. In particular we formulate the primal
and dual problems, show some of their properties and give examples not
related to the main topic to demonstrate that this optimization technique
finds a wide range of applications.
In second and third chapters we give a brief introduction to quantum
information science which is needed to understand our results. The former
deals with general methods of this discipline, and the latter concentrates on
the so-called device-independent approach in quantum cryptography.
In chapter four we describe our results regarding quantum information
protocols which we developed using semi-definite programming. We start
with a discussion of a new type of quantum key distribution protocol which
uses the so-called Hardy’s paradox in order to certify its security. Then we
move to the task of certification of the credibility of random numbers obtained
with several quantum protocols. This analysis is conducted with minimal as-
sumptions about the reliability of devices used for randomness generation.
Such an approach is called device-independent when we do not assume any-
thing about the internal working of the device, or semi-device-independent
when we limit a communication between different parts of the device. We pro-
pose a number of randomness certification protocols of both of these kinds.
We finish this chapter with a discussion of a quantum protocol performing
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the so-called randomness amplification, i.e. a kind of improvement of the
quality of some biased source of randomness. We show how these protocols
can be investigated using semi-definite programming relaxations of the set of
quantum probability distributions.
The fifth chapter deals with interior point methods. This is one of the
methods of solving semi-definite programming problems. Other methods in-
clude the spectral bundle method [90] and the augmented Lagrangian method
[232]. We have chosen to concentrate on this particular approach for several
reasons. First of all, interior point method had an enormous impact on the
field optimization [220]. Secondly, most of the state of the art implemen-
tations use this method, including solvers already popular in the quantum
information community. Thirdly, interior point methods seem to have the
most extensive literature.
In chapter six we discuss the issues related to the implementation of inte-
rior point methods suited for the form of problems occurring in chapter four.
First we investigate the performance of two popular implementations of semi-
definite programming solvers, SDPT3 and SeDuMi, for these problems. Then
we introduce a new method of calculation of the Schur complement equation
occurring in each iteration of interior point method. Next we discuss a warm-
start strategies, i.e. methods of finding a starting iterate for interior point
method. Then we analyze a number of strategies for perturbing the iterates
in order to prevent a semi-definite programming solver from failure. We fin-
ish with our proposal of semi-definite programming solver dedicated for the
problems from chapter five. We compare its performance with other solvers.
To sum up, the premises of this thesis are the following:
(1) Semi-definite programming can be employed to evaluate the amount
of randomness generated in quantum protocols, and the security of
a new kind of quantum key distribution protocols.
(2) The form of problems occurring in the analysis of the discussed quan-
tum protocols can be exploited in order to improve the performance
of dedicated solvers.
Readers will notice that the content of this work covers many different
fields. The scope includes quantum information, which itself employs mathe-
matical theories of, among others, Hilbert spaces, probability theory, theory
of information, and cryptography. We look at the themes from the point of
view of numerical optimization. Thus our toolbox requires also elements of
matrix analysis and numerical optimization.
We tried to make this work self-contained to the greatest possible extent.
Nonetheless, it seems to be impossible to cover this range of topics in an elab-
orate and concise way. For this reason some issues are addressed only briefly,
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to provide general background to explain why some tasks were met in a par-
ticular manner. On the other hand, readers not interested in details may skip
several more technical sections, like sec. 3.1.3 describing the topic of random-
ness extraction, or sec. 3.4 dealing with experimental estimation of physical
quantities. We assume the knowledge of the basics of linear programming
and familiarity with the bra-ket notation of Hilbert spaces. Nonetheless, we
review some basic notions of these fields below.
This work is not dealing with physical aspects of the considered protocols.
In particular we do not consider the issues related to physical realizations of
the protocols.
May-July 2015
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
In this chapter we give a concise introduction to several topics used in
further parts of this work. We start with some mathematical background
regarding matrix analysis. Then we formulate the task of semi-definite pro-
gramming (SDP), discuss some of its properties, and give examples of appli-
cations. We finish this chapter with the discussion of the Newton’s iterative
method of finding roots of functions, and theory of information.
1.1. Preliminaries
In this section we first state the notation. Then we briefly overview some
mathematical background we will be using further in the work. This includes
the notion of the symmetric Kronecker product and discussion of selected
properties of positive semi-definite matrices.
1.1.1. Notation. R is the set of real number, and C is the set of complex
numbers.
Sets of integer numbers are denoted with upper case letters, e.g. A, B, X,
Y . Sets of other objects are denoted with calligraphy upper case letters, e.g.
S. Multidimensional array, like joint probability distributions are denoted
with blackboard bold upper case letters, e.g. P(A,B|X, Y ).
Matrices are denoted with upper case letters, e.g. A,C,M,X,Z, whereas
vectors with lower case letters like b, v, x, y, z. Mk,l refers to the element in
k-th row and l-th column. For a vector v its k-th element is vk. Vectors are
represented by one column matrices. Matrix elements are numbered from 1.
The set of real k × l matrices is denoted by Rk×l, and of real n × n
symmetric matrices by Sn×n. We refer to the pair of value k and l (for
matrices of arbitrary size) or n (for square matrices) as size of the matrix.
The sets of real and complex vectors with k elements are denoted by Rk
and Ck, respectively.
The function vec(·) defines a vector containing the elements of the given
matrix in the column-wise order. Mat(·) is the inverse of this function. This
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conversion will be used further in this work very often. For example we have
vec
([
a c
b d
])
=

a
b
c
d
 .
We will also use the following standard convention in which upper-case
letters denote matrices, and lower-case letters denote vectors of elements of
the matrices, e.g.
(1.1)
x = vec(X) ∈ Rn2 ,
X = Mat(x) ∈ Rn×n.
For two matrices A,B ∈ Rm×n we define the relation A ≤ B to hold if
and only if
∀i=1,...,m∀j=1,...,nAi,j ≤ Bi,j.
We define relations A < B, A ≥ B and A > B in an analogous way.
We denote the real part of a complex number of matrix by Re, and the
imaginary part by Im.
For bits we define the negation ¬0 ≡ 1 and ¬1 ≡ 0.
The symbol · is used to separate expressions in those places in which it
(in our opinion) improves readability of formulas, and has no special mathe-
matical meaning.
1.1.2. Matrix products. We will now introduce two matrix products,
namely the symmetric Kronecker product and the Frobenius product. The
result of the former is a matrix, and of the latter it is a number.
1.1.2.1. The symmetric Kronecker product. The symmetric Kronecker
product has been introduced in [5] (see also [204])1. Below we show its
several properties.
Let A,B,C ∈ Rk×k.
We define the operation ⊗S by the equation
(1.2) A⊗S B ≡ 1
2
(A⊗B +B ⊗ A) ,
where ⊗ denotes the ordinary Kronecker product.
It is easy to check that
(A⊗B) vec(C) = vec (BCAT ).
1We note here that [5, 204, 207] use a different notion of symmetrized Kronecker
product, which allows to represent symmetric matrices with only the unique entries. We
do not use this form of the Kronecker product in this work, since it would not allow for
the techniques from sec. 6.2.
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From this we get
(A⊗S B) vec(C) = 1
2
vec
(
BCAT + ACBT
)
.
We also have
(A⊗S B) (C ⊗S C) = AC ⊗S BC.
Obviously A⊗S A = A⊗ A and A⊗S B = B ⊗S A.
1.1.2.2. The Frobenius product. The Frobenius product of two real ma-
trices, A,B ∈ Rk×l is defined as Tr(ATB).
It can be easily shown that
(1.3) Tr(ATB) = Tr(ABT ) =
∑
i=1,...,k
∑
j=1,...,l
Ai,jBi,j = vec(A)
T vecB.
Thus the Frobenius product is the sum of the elements of the element-wise
product of entries of two matrices.
The symmetry of this product comes directly from (1.3). One can also
show that for symmetric A and antisymmetric B we have
Tr(ATB) = Tr(AB) = 0.
The Frobenius product introduces a Frobenius norm of a matrix, | · |F .
We define
|A|F =
√
Tr(ATA).
This norm is called also a Hilbert-Schmidt norm. This is a direct generaliza-
tion of the vector Euclidean norm, as can be seen from (1.3).
1.1.3. Properties of positive matrices. In order to formulate semi-
definite programming problems let us introduce the notion of positive-definite
(PD) and positive semi-definite (PSD) matrices. A symmetric or hermitian
matrix M is called PD (PSD), denoted M  0 (M  0), if all its eigenvalues
are positive (non-negative). Equivalently, a symmetric matrix M ∈ Rn×n is
PD (PSD) if and only if
∀x∈Rn
x 6=0
xTMx > 0
(
∀x∈Rn
x 6=0
xTMx ≥ 0)
)
,
and a hermitian matrix M ∈ Cn×n is PD (PSD) if and only if
(1.4) ∀x∈Cn
x 6=0
x†Mx > 0
(
∀x∈Cn
x 6=0
x†Mx ≥ 0
)
.
In our opinion the former definition is more intuitive, but the latter is more
common in the literature on the subject. A more detailed treatment on the
properties of PD and PSD matrices may be found in [95, 138]. We note
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that a real PD (PSD) matrix satisfies (1.4), and thus is a complex PD (PSD)
matrix. On the other hand, for a complex PD (PSD) M we have that
∀x∈Cn
x 6=0
x†
1
2
(M +M †)x = x†Re(M)x ≥ 0,
and thus the matrix Re(M) is a real PD (PSD) matrix.
The relation  introduces the so-called Lo¨wner’s partial order of semi-
definite matrices. For two symmetric or hermitian matrices A and B we have
A  B, if A−B  0.
It can be easily shown that if A,B  0, then A + B  0. It is also easy
to see that if we multiply a PSD matrix by a non-negative constant, we get
another PSD matrix. Thus the set of PSD matrices forms a pointed convex
cone. It also follows that Tr(AB) ≥ 0, for A,B  0, and that A 12 exists and
is PSD.
One may prove the following theorem [216, 138]:
Theorem 1.1. For a symmetric matrix M ∈ Rn×n we have that M  0
is equivalent to each of the following statements:
• For all x ∈ Rn we have xTMx ≥ 0.
• There exists L ∈ Rn×n such, that M = LTL (L is the Cholesky
decomposition of M).
• There exists v1, . . . , vn, vi ∈ Rn such, that Mi,j = vTi · vj.
Let B ∈ Cn×n be a hermitian matrix, BR and BI its real and imaginary
parts, respectively. Then B  0 if, and only if
(1.5)
[
BR −BI
BI BR
]
 0.
Indeed, for any complex vector w = u+ iv ∈ Cn we have
w†Bw =
(
uT − ivT ) (BR + iBI) (u+ iv) =
=
(
uTBRu+ vTBRv − uTBIv + vTBIu)+
+ i(uTBRv − vTBRu+ uTBIu+ vTBIv) ≥ 0
if, and only if [
uT vT
] [BR −BI
BI BR
] [
u
v
]
 0.
This is because uTBIu = vTBIv = 0 and uTBRv = vTBRu. Thus any SDP
problem defined in terms of complex vectors and hermitian matrices can be
stated as a problem involving only real vectors with symmetric matrices.
One may prove a very useful result, namely the Sylvesters Criterion. This
criterion says that a real symmetric matrix is PD if and only if all its leading
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principal minors are positive. It is PSD if and only if all the principal minors
are non-negative.
Further in this work we will omit the explicit statement that a matrix is
(real) symmetric, if the notion of  or  is used.
1.2. Basics of semi-definite programming
In this section we discuss some basic notions related to SDP. We start
with a discussion of the formulation of the problem, and compare it to LP.
Then we briefly mention norms of the so-called infeasibility which are used
further in this work. We finish with a discussion of the duality of SDP.
1.2.1. Real linear- and semi-definite problems. Let m and n be
positive integers, m ≤ n(n+1)
2
.
A semi-definite programming problem in a primal form is the following
optimization task in a variable X ∈ Sn×n:
minimize Tr(CX)
subject to Tr(AiX) = bi, for i = 1, · · · ,m
X  0,
(1.6)
where C ∈ Sn×n and A1, · · ·Am ∈ Sn×n are symmetric2 matrices. The ma-
trices Ai, C and vector b ∈ Rm define the SDP problem. We assume that
A1, · · ·Am are linearly independent (otherwise we can reduce this set).
Recall that the primal form of linear programming (LP) problems is the
following optimization task in variable x:
minimize cT · x
subject to ATx = b, x ≥ 0,(1.7)
where A ∈ Rn×m, b ∈ Rm, x, c ∈ Rn.
Obviously LP problem may be written in the form of SDP, if X is con-
strained to be a diagonal matrix, with the diagonal entries used as the x
variable. Thus LP can be considered as a particular case of SDP.
2The fact that these matrices are symmetric is not restrictive. For a symmetric matrix
X and a matrix C we have Tr(CX) = Tr
(
1
2 (C + C
T )X
)
, and thus we may always take a
symmetric matrix 12 (C + C
T ) instead of C.
6 Introduction
A dual SDP problem for (1.6) is the optimization task in variables y ∈ Rm
and Z ∈ Sn×n of the following form
maximize bT · y
subject to C −
m∑
i=1
yiAi = Z.
Z  0,
(1.8)
In case of LP the dual problem is
maximize bT · y
subject to c− Ay = z,
z ≥ 0.
(1.9)
In the above problems, the variable X or x is called the primal variable,
y the dual variable, Z the dual slack variable, A and {Ai} are linear
constraint matrices, b is the RHS linear constraint, and C or c is the
linear coefficient.
IfX,Z ∈ Rn×n and y ∈ Rm satisfies conditions specified by (1.6) and (1.8),
then they are called a feasible solution. Feasible variable X is called a pri-
mal solution, and feasible variables Z and y a dual solution. An optimal
solution is expected to be feasible. The values of Tr(CX) and bT · y are
called the values of the primal and dual solutions, respectively. We have
Tr(CX) ≥ bT · y. Usually an SDP solver is expected to find both primal and
dual solutions.
The fact that primal formulation refers to minimization, and dual to max-
imization problems, is not restrictive. We can always change the sign of the
matrix C or the vector b to get the desired optimization problem fitting into
the standard form in (1.6) and (1.8).
What is more, a problem formulated in one of the forms given by (1.6)
and (1.8) may be reformulated in the other one. The issue of choosing the
proper formulation is not always obvious, and can have a very significant
impact of the difficulty of the problem to a solver [120]. This can be illus-
trated by the example in tab. 2.3 showing the sizes of some SDP problems
in dual and primal formulations. See sec. 2.3.1 for a discussion of this is-
sue in the context of problems considered in this work. One should choose
the formulation which leads to a smaller number of constraints, given by the
number m (unless the structure of the problem can be exploited in the other
formulation).
If either C = O or b = 0, then such a problem is called feasibility
problem and refers to finding whether any solution of given, primal or dual,
problem exist.
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The key property of SDP problems is the fact that they may be efficiently
solved numerically using interior point algorithm described further in chap-
ter 5.
Further in this work we often use the following notation for SDP problems.
Let us introduce the matrix
(1.10) A ≡ [a1; . . . ; am] ∈ Rn2×m,
where
ai = vec(Ai).
Thus ai is i-th column of A. Then we have
vec
(
m∑
i=1
yiAi
)
= Ay,
Tr(AiX) = (ATx)i,
where (ATx)i is the i-th element of the vector ATx and x = vec(X). These
expressions allow reformulation of the problems given in (1.6) and (1.8) in a
form similar to LP formulations in (1.7) and (1.9).
1.2.1.1. Primal and dual infeasibility norms. We note here that practical
implementations of SDP solver usually find solutions which are not feasible in
a strict sense. Instead, the solutions satisfy the condition from (1.6) and (1.8)
only with some accuracy. Here we discuss the expressions we use further in
this work to evaluate primal and dual infeasibility. See [143] for more details
on the issue of infeasibility norms.
Let c ≡ vec(C), x ≡ vec(X) and z ≡ vec(Z). Let us define the following
terms, viz. the residuals for feasibility conditions in (1.6) and (1.8) (cf. (5.2a)
and (5.2b) below)
(1.11a) rp ≡ b−ATx ∈ Rm,
(1.11b) rd ≡ c−Ay − z ∈ Rn2 .
The primal infeasibility norm we use in this work is given by
(1.12) P ≡ 1
1 + |b|F |b−A
Tx|F .
The dual infeasibility norm is defined in this work as
(1.13) D ≡ 1
1 + |c|F |c−Ay − z|F .
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1.2.1.2. Complex semi-definite problems. One can also consider problems
(1.6) and (1.8) in complex variables. In such case C, {Ai} ∈ Hn×n, and
b ∈ Rm. Then X and Z are complex PSD matrices, and y is a real vector.
It is easy to see that if C ∈ Sn×n, and X ∈ Hn×n, XR ≡ Re(X) and
XI ≡ Im(X), then
Tr(CX) = Tr(CXR) + iTr(CXI) = Tr(CXR),
since XI is antisymmetric, and the Frobenius product of symmetric and an-
tisymmetric matrix is always equal to 0. From the above considerations it
follows that if C is real and we are interested only in finding the value of the
solution, then we can neglect the imaginary part occurring in the problem3.
1.2.2. A note on mixed linear and semi-definite problems. We
briefly note that one often considers the so-called mixed cone. The primal
problem in variables (xL, XS) ∈ RnL × SnS×nS is the following:
minimize cTL · xL + Tr(CSXS)
subject to (ATL)i,: · xL + Tr(ASiXS) = bi, for i = 1, · · · ,m
xL ≥ 0,
XS  0.
where AL ∈ RnL×m, (ATL)i,: denotes i-th row of the matrix ATL, b ∈ Rm,
xL, cL ∈ RnL , CS ∈ SnS×nS and AS1, · · ·ASm ∈ SnS×nS .
The dual mixed problem in variables (y, zL, ZS) ∈ Rm × RnL × SnS×nS is
of the following form
maximize bT · y
subject to cL − ALy = zL,
CS −
m∑
i=1
yiASi = ZS,
zL ≥ 0,
ZS  0.
Since any LP can be reformulated as SDP, the mixed problems are not
more general than the SDP problems. It suffices to place linear variables
on the diagonal of an SDP variable of size nL + nS. The reason why mixed
problems are considered is that the numerical methods needed to solve SDP
are more expensive in terms of computational effort that LP. If a problem is
stated in the mixed form, then it is possible to reduce this complexity.
3If C is hermitian, we still may reformulate the complex problem as a real problem
with the construction in (1.5).
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1.2.3. Duality of semi-definite problems. An important property of
primal and dual formulations is the fact, that the solution of the primal
problem is an upper bound on the solution for the dual problem:
Tr(CX)− bT · y = Tr((Z +
m∑
i=1
yiAi)X)− bT · y =
Tr(ZX) +
m∑
i=1
yi Tr(AiX)− yT · b = Tr(ZX) ≥ 0.
This property is called a weak duality . In the case of LP, the values of primal
and dual solutions are always equal, if the solution exists, such property is
called a strong duality .
Let p∗ be the value of the optimal solution of the primal problem, (1.6),
and d∗ the value of the optimal solution of the dual problem, (1.8). It can be
shown [157, 179, 213] that for p∗ = d∗ to hold, it is sufficient if one of the
following conditions is satisfied:
• There exists X  0 such that Tr(AiX) = bi, for i = 1, · · ·m (strict
primal feasibility).
• There exists Z  0 such that C −∑mi=1 yiAi = Z (strict dual feasi-
bility).
If both conditions hold, then the optimal values can be obtained for both
primal and dual problems, i.e. both primal and dual solutions exist. Their
values are then equal and finite. Thus these conditions are sufficient for strong
duality to hold for an SDP problem.
Further the expression Tr(ZX) is referred to as the gap. Note that strong
duality of an SDP problem implies that the optimal primal and dual variables
are orthogonal, i.e.
(1.14) Tr(ZX) = 0,
meaning that the gap is equal to 0.
1.3. Examples and overview of applications of semi-definite
programming
In this section we show a few examples of SDP problems. The aim of
the first of them is to give an illustration of how they are formulated. The
remaining examples were chosen because of their importance.
A more comprehensive overview of applications of SDP may be found,
e.g. in [213, 28]. These include a famous MAX-CUT and MAX-k-SAT
relaxations by Goemans and Williamson [81], maximum eigenvalue, matrix
10 Introduction
norm minimization, and combinatorial optimization problems [86, 6, 163,
144, 4, 80, 89, 23].
1.3.1. Primal and dual formulation. Let us consider the following
problem
minimize x˜
subject to
[
x˜ 1
1 x˜
]
 0.
Using the Sylvester’s Criterion one may infer that the solution reads x˜ = 1.
Beginning with the primal formulation, we have
minimize x11
subject to x11 = x22, 2x12 = 2,
X =
[
x11 x12
x12 x22
]
 0
In this case C =
[
1 0
0 0
]
, A1 =
[
1 0
0 −1
]
, A2 =
[
0 1
1 0
]
, and b =
[
0
2
]
. Indeed,
these matrices give the following primal problem equivalent to the initial one:
minimize Tr(CX) = Tr
([
1 0
0 0
] [
x11 x12
x12 x22
])
= x11
subject to 0 = Tr(A1X) = Tr
([
1 0
0 −1
] [
x11 x12
x12 x22
])
= x11 − x22
2 = Tr(A2X) = Tr
([
0 1
1 0
] [
x11 x12
x12 x22
])
= 2x12
X  0.
It is less obvious that the dual of this problem, viz.
maximize bT · y = 2y2
subject to Z ≡
[
1− y1 −y2
−y2 y1
]
 0(1.15)
gives the same value.
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The dual formulation of the initial problem gives C =
[
0 1
1 0
]
, A1 =[−1 0
0 −1
]
, and b = [−1], namely
maximize bT · y = −y1
subject to Z ≡ C − y1A1 =
[
y1 1
1 y1
]
 0,
but since we have replaced minimization with maximization of an expression
of the opposite sign, we have to negate the sign of the obtained result. Writing
this problem in the primal form we get
minimize Tr(CX) = 2x12
subject to Tr(A1X) = −x11 − x22 = b1 = −1
X  0.
This formulation gives the result −1, i.e. exactly the negation of the desired
solution.
From the above example we see that both formulations give the same
result. Moreover, if we start with a primal formulation, and take its dual, we
get the same value. Similarly if we start with a dual formulation, and take
its primal, we also get the same result. Thus, we have four formulations of
the same problem. This illustrates also the importance of a careful choice of
the formulation. For this case the primal seems to be more natural, but the
dual results in a smaller number of constraints.
1.3.2. Eigenvalues of matrices. The problem minimization of maxi-
mal eigenvalue of a linearly constrained matrix can be formulated as SDP.
More detailed treatment of this topic can be found in [144].
Let the set of matrices S be parametrized by yis, i.e.
S =
{
M(y2, · · · , ym) ≡ −C +
m∑
y=2
Aiyi : yi ∈ R
}
,
where C and Ai are symmetric matrices. Then the problem of minimizing
the maximal eigenvalue over yis can be written as the following dual SDP
problem:
minimize y1
subject to y1I−M(y2, · · · , ym)  0.
We have changed the maximization of −y1 to minimization of y1 in this form
and set A1 = I.
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Indeed, when the optimum is attained, the variables y2, · · · , ym parame-
trize such a matrix which can be subtracted from y1I, and the result is PSD.
Thus y1 represents the maximal eigenvalue of M(y2, · · · , ym), with y2, · · · , ym
chosen in such a way that this maximal eigenvalue is as small as possible
within the set S.
1.3.3. Shannon capacity of a graph. The notion of a capacity of a
channel represented by a graph was introduced by Shannon in [193], which
is defined below. Unfortunately this entity is difficult to be calculated. In
[121] Lovasz formulated an SDP relaxation of this problem called Lovasz θ
function. This function had a strong impact both on classical and quantum
information theories [51, 40, 58], and also on other disciplines, like graph
theory [107, 100].
For a pair of graphs, G and H, let us define G · H in the following way.
Let V (G · H) = V (G) × V (H), where V (·) is the set of vertices of a graph.
The vertex (x1, y1) is adjacent to (x2, y2) if and only if one of the following
holds:
• x1 is adjacent to x2 in G, and y1 is adjacent to y2 in H, or4
• x1 = x2, and y1 is adjacent to y2 in H, or
• x1 is adjacent to x2 in G, and y1 = y2.
This is the so-called strong product of graphs [183]. Using the notion of the
strong product we define G1 = G and Gk+1 = Gk ·G.
Let us consider an n letter alphabet, and a graph G with vertices labeled
with the letters, and edges between the letters which are possible to be con-
fused with each other for a given model of communication via a channel.
Obviously the number of one letter messages which are impossible to be con-
fused is equal to the size of the largest independent set of the graph, denoted
α(G).
It is easy to see that the number of k-letter messages which are possible
to be send without confusion is α(Gk) ≥ α(G)k, viz. if using one letter
message we are able to formulate l = α(G) different messages impossible to
be confused, then with k letters we can encode at least lk different messages
without the risk of confusion. For example we have α(C5) = 2, and α(C
2
5) = 5.
The Shannon capacity of a graph G is defined by
Θ(G) = sup
k
α(Gk)
1
k
Lovasz’s relaxation has the property that Θ(G) ≤ θ(G). The θ(G) is
defined as follows.
4The original paper [121] states explicitly only this condition.
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Let us consider a set S of all symmetric matrices A satisfying the following
condition. For two nodes i and j of G, if i = j or i and j are not adjacent
in G, then Aij = 1. Other entries of these matrices are unconstrained. θ(G)
is defined to be the minimum of largest eigenvalue of matrices from S. The
problem can be formulated as SDP with the method described in sec. 1.3.2.
One may show that θ(G ·H) ≤ θ(G)θ(H).
1.4. The Newton’s method
The Newton’s method, called also the Newton-Raphson method, is a tech-
nique of finding approximations roots of differentiable functions. Here we only
sketch this method in an intuitive way. Readers interested in a more rigorous
treatment are referred to the wide range of literature on the subject, e.g.
[93, 28].
Let f(x) = [f1(x) · · · fk(x)]T be a real vector valued differentiable function
of many variables, x = (x1, · · · , xl). The Jacobian matrix is the following k×l
real matrix containing all first order derivatives of the function:
(1.16) J(x) ≡

∂f1
∂x1
(x) · · · ∂f1
∂xl
(x)
...
. . .
...
∂fk
∂x1
(x) · · · ∂fk
∂xl
(x)
 .
The method is iterative. We start at some point x(0). The Newton step
∆x is calculated with the following equation:
J
(
x(i)
)
∆x(i) = −f (x(i)) .
Afterward we iterate with
x(i+1) = x(i) + α(i)∆x(i)
for some (α(i))i, till the desired accuracy is attained. The sequence (α
(i))i
depends on the variant of the method. In many cases one takes α(i) = 1 for
all iterations (cf. sec. 5.2.2).
The convergence of this method can be proved under certain assumptions
[162, 177]. In particular the sequence
(
x(i)
)
i
converges to a root (if a root
exists) for convex functions with the properly chosen x(0) [196].
The intuition behind this method is that we have
f(x+ ∆x) ≈ f(x) + J(x)∆x
and thus we expect that f(x+ ∆x) ≈ 0.
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1.5. Measures of information
One of the basic notions of the theory of information is entropy. It for-
malizes the notion of a measure of information.
Let PX = (p1, . . . , pN) be a discrete probability distribution of a random
variable X.
The most commonly used entropy is Shannon entropy, or simply en-
tropy, introduced by Shannon in 1948 in a revolutionary paper A Mathemat-
ical Theory of Communication [194]. For a random variable X it is defined
by
(1.17) H(X) ≡ −
N∑
i=1
pi logb pi,
with b = 2, and 0 log 0 = 0. A unit of this entropy is called the bit (or, rarely,
the shannon). If b = e then the unit is called nat, and for b = 10 it is called
hartley. These units are defined in an international standard IEC 80000-13.
One usually omits b if it is equal to 2, or if its value is obvious from the
context.
A commonly used measure of randomness in cryptographic context is
min-entropy [110, 38, 45, 46], denoted H∞. It is defined as
H∞(X) ≡ − log2
(
max
i
pi
)
.
Min-entropy is directly related to the guessing probability of the value of a
particular variable with distribution P with the strategy in which one guesses
the most probable result. As specified by the National Institute of Standards
and Technology, in the context of guessing cryptographic keys, min-entropy
is a measure of the difficulty of guessing the easiest single key in a given
distribution of keys [38].
Entropy is related to the widely understood uniformity of a probability
distribution. The maximal value of both entropies is attained by uniform
probability distributions, and the minimal value by deterministic variables
(with pi = 1 for a certain i).
These two entropies are additive, i.e for a random variable
X = (X1, . . . , Xk),
where Xi are independent random variables, we have
H(X) =
∑
i
H(Xi),
and similarly for min-entropy.
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Both Shannon entropy and min-entropy are particular cases of a more
general concept of Renyi entropy [178] defined by
Hα(X) ≡ 1
1− α logb
(∑
i
pαi
)
.
The Shannon entropy is obtained when we take the limit of α tending to 1,
and the min-entropy with α tending to infinity.
Another important quantity is the conditional entropy, H (PX |PY ).
This is defined as
H(X|Y ) ≡ −
∑
x,y
PX,Y (x, y) log2 PX|Y (x|y),
where PX,Y is the joint probability distribution of random variables X and
Y , and PX|Y is their conditional probability distribution.
The conditional min-entropy is given by
H∞ (PX |PY ) ≡ − log2
(∑
y
PY (y) max
x
PX |Y (x|y)
)
.

CHAPTER 2
Basics of quantum information science
In this chapter we provide a brief introduction and overview of a few top-
ics in quantum information science (QI). QI is an interdisciplinary field. It
concerns the topics of computer science, the theory of information in partic-
ular, like data communication or processing. This field provides a broader
view on these topics, since it covers not only the tasks possible to be treated
by machines governed by the law of classical physics, but it considers devices
which are allowed by the laws of the quantum mechanics.
From the point of view of this work, a fundamental paper by John Bell
from 1964, On the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen paradox [18], which explicitly
stated the notion of the later called Bell inequalities, is of particular impor-
tance. Bell considered there a problem stated by Einstein, Podolsky and
Rosen in their revolutionary paper, Can Quantum-Mechanical Description of
Physical Reality be Considered Complete?, published in 1935 [60].
The field of QI covers, among others, the issues of construction of the
so-called quantum computers [56, 197], possibility of quantum dense coding
[21], quantum computational complexity [24, 44], quantum communication
complexity [30, 36], and quantum error correction [20, 118]. Recently the
idea of quantum internet has emerged [105]. The QI partially conveys also
issues related to physical realizations of quantum devices, like quantum logical
gates and registers [184], quantum routers [111], or quantum repeaters [185].
The most spectacular successes of quantum information science are in
the field of quantum cryptography [79, 189]. These include famous BB84
[19] and E91 [61] quantum key distribution protocols. Further in this work
we will deal with a modern approach to quantum protocols, called device-
independent, which lessens the assumptions on the internal workings of cryp-
tographic devices significantly.
The key role in our numerical calculations will play the NPA method in-
troduced by Navascues, Pironio and Ac´ın in paper [150, 151]. These authors
define an infinite hierarchy of conditions which are satisfied by any quantum
probability distribution (see the definition (2.3) below). Each level of this
hierarchy determines a semi-definite optimization problem. We give a more
detailed description of this method in sec. 2.3.
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We introduce the formalism of Hilbert spaces for quantum mechanics in
sec. 2.1.1 only to define the set of quantum probability distributions, Q, in
the definition 2.3 and to justify the SDP relaxation in sec. 2.3 regarding the
NPA method. Readers familiar with the notion of quantum information or
uninterested in the details may skip sec. 2.1.1, and only remember that the
NPA method provides a relaxation of some set Q describing quantum devices.
In our further considerations we will employ the so-called device-independent
approach (described in details in chapter 3) which abstracts from physical
realizations and considers only sets of probability distributions.
2.1. Hilbert space formalism and multipartite probability
distributions
Since the details of physical aspects of QI are far beyond the scope of this
work, we give in this section only a short review of topics which are necessary
for our further considerations. Readers interested in details of the formalism
of QI should refer to other works. A standard textbook in QI is a work of
Nielsen and Chuang [160]. A more concise overview is contained in a paper
by Keyl [103]. Another review, with more emphasis on physical realizations,
is [165].
2.1.1. Hilbert space formalism. The formulation of quantum mechan-
ics is based on a formalism of Hilbert spaces developed by von Neumann in
1930s [159]. Further we restrict our considerations to systems described by
finite dimensional Hilbert spaces. This is justified because all systems we are
dealing with can be considered as finite state systems.
Formally a Hilbert space is an inner product space (i.e. a vector space
with a defined inner product), such that the metric space with a norm induced
by the inner product is complete. A simple example of a Hilbert space is a
complex linear vector space Cd with inner product of vectors x and y defined
by x† · y, where x† is the Hermitian conjugate of x. In quantum mechanics
and QI one usually denotes a vector by |x〉 and its conjugate by 〈x |. This is
the bra-ket notation1.
The computational basis, or simply basis, of a Hilbert space of di-
mension d is denoted by kets | 0〉, · · · , | d − 1〉. We may identify | i〉 =[
0 . . . 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
×i−1
1 0 . . . 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
×d−i
]T
and use the standard basis as the computational basis.
For two vectors |ψ〉, |φ〉 we can write their inner product as
〈φ ||ψ〉 = (〈ψ ||φ〉)∗ .
1Strictly speaking the conjugate vectors {〈x |} belong to the dual Hilbert space.
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The vectors are orthogonal if 〈φ ||ψ〉 = 0. We can also consider |φ〉〈ψ |,
which defines a linear operator Cd → Cd of rank one. Such an operator is
represented by a square, real or complex, matrix.
In this work we treat the quantum mechanics as a statistical theory. This
means that we are interested only in probabilistic descriptions of the physical
systems, in particular of the quantum devices employed for solving the tasks
of computer science. This statistical nature of the theory means that the
behavior of the considered device can be observed only in a sequence of
experiments starting with the same state and observing the same property of
the device. This leads us to the problem of defining the quantum state and
the observable. We discuss this below.
The state (pure) is represented by a unit vector on a Hilbert space called a
state space. This space depends on the physical system we want to describe.
A state is denoted as a ket vector, e.g. |ψ〉.
A second basic component of the formalism is the idea of observables, i.e.
measurable operators, which are represented by self-adjoint linear operator
acting on the space. The behavior of the device is the result of performing
measurement on a state. A particular case of measurement is projective
measurement (PM) which is represented by projectors. A projector is an
idempotent observable, i.e. for the projector P we have PP = P . Projectors
are represented by matrices with spectrum contained in the set {0, 1}.
A set of projectors {Ei}i is called PM if they sum to the unit matrix,∑
iE
i = I. It follows that for a PM we have the orthogonality property,
EiEj = δi,jE
i. The probability of a given result i of a measurement {Ei}i on
a state |ψ〉 is given by
(2.1) P (i) = 〈ψ |Ei|ψ〉 = Tr (Ei|ψ〉〈ψ |) .
The indices i of operators within a PM refers to relevant possible results of a
performed experiment. We may consider many different experimental setups
given by PMs,
{{Eij}i}j. In such a case j refers to the setup, and i to a
measurement result of the setup. Each set {Eij}i for given j is a PM.
We say that a projection succeeded if PM is given by {E0, E1}, with
E0 of rank one, and the result of the measurement is 0.
Statistical mixtures of pure states are represented by the so-called density
matrices, which are self-adjoint operators trace 1 operators on the space.
They are represented by Hermitian PSD matrices. The mixture of states
{|ψi〉} with probabilities of occurrence pi,
∑
i pi = 1 is represented by a
density matrix
ρ =
∑
i
pi|ψi〉〈ψi |.
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The probability of the result i is for this mixture given by
(2.2) P (i) = Tr (Eiρ) =
∑
j
pj Tr (Ei|ψj〉〈ψj |) .
A Hadamard basis for a two dimensional computational basis is defined
by the following two vectors:
|+〉 ≡
√
2
2
(| 0〉+ | 1〉),
| −〉 ≡
√
2
2
(| 0〉 − | 1〉).
A key property of this basis is that if one measures the state | 0〉 or | 1〉, with
PM defined by projectors on the vectors |+〉 and | −〉 (and vice versa), then
the probability of each result is 0.5, e.g. for E+ = |+〉〈+ | and ρ = | 0〉〈0 | we
have Tr(E+ρ) =
1
2
.
General measurement is described by the so-called POVMs (positive oper-
ator valued measure). These are represented by sets {Ei}i of PSD Hermitian
matrices, not necessarily idempotent (and thus not orthogonal), which sum
to the unit matrix. The probabilities of different results of a given POVM are
given by the same formulas, (2.1) and (2.2), as for PMs. Any POVM may
be equivalently replaced with a PM on a space of higher dimension using the
so-called Gelfand–Naimark–Segal construction [76, 191].
Quantum mechanics considers also the evolution of quantum states in
time. The evolution is a unitary transformation of quantum states and is de-
scribed by operators called Hamiltonians2. These issues will not be considered
in this work.
We briefly mention an important property of quantum states, comprising
of more that one part, called entanglement. Without going into details, en-
tangled states are these states which reveal some non-local properties. The
most prominent examples are the so-called maximally entangled states,
or singlets. Such states comprise of two parts. For a given dimension d of
the Hilbert space, these states are defined by
1√
d
d−1∑
i=0
| i〉 ⊗ | i〉.
Eq. (6.7) shows the singlet state on a product of two Hilbert spaces of dimen-
sion 2 in density matrix form.
For the sake of completeness, we also mention that states in a space of
dimension 2 are of particular interest, especially in relation with computer
2The evolution operator, or propagator, U after time t for Hamiltonian H is given by
U = exp(−itH).
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science applications. Such states are called qubits, as a direct quantum
generalization of bits. Qubits are usually parametrized using the so-called
Bloch sphere. The parametrization is given by
(2.3) |ψ〉 = cos
(
θ
2
)
| 0〉+ exp iφ sin
(
θ
2
)
| 1〉.
We note that if the above formula is multiplied by a phase factor exp iω,
ω ∈ R, then the probabilities observed on the state will not change.
2.1.2. Multipartite probability distributions. Let us consider a case
in which two parties, Alice and Bob, are separated (e.g. spatially) and con-
duct an experiment on two subsystems which had previously interacted.
Suppose that Alice in her part performs a measurement x from a set
X of her possible measurement settings (e.g. possible positions of a knob
on her apparatus), and obtains a result labeled as a from a set of possible
results A (e.g. a set of characters on the display). Similarly Bob performs a
measurement y ∈ Y with a result b ∈ B. The assumption of separation means
in particular that the information of the choice of x does not reach Bob, nor
y to Alice. The situation is depicted in Fig. 2.1. In this work we consider
only the case when these sets, A, B, X and Y are finite and non-empty. We
refer to those four sets as an experimental scenario, or simply scenario.
Figure 2.1. A measurement scenario with two parties.
Below we denote by P (a, b|x, y) a joint probability of outcomes a and b
for settings x and y. We define PA(a|x, y) as the probability that Alice gets
outcome a if she chooses the setting x, and similarly we define PB(b|x, y) for
Bob:
PA(a|x, y) ≡
∑
b∈B
P (a, b|x, y),
PB(b|x, y) ≡
∑
a∈A
P (a, b|x, y).
The probability distribution
P(A,B|X, Y ) = {P (a, b|x, y)}a∈A,b∈B
x∈X,y∈Y
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gives the complete characterization of the behavior of the quantum device.
In general we may consider P(A,B|X, Y ) as a vector in R|A|·|B|·|X|·|Y |+ sat-
isfying standard Kolmogorovian conditions, and possibly some other con-
straints. One may also ask a question which joint probability distributions
for fixed scenario under interest are allowed by physical theories? In other
words, we ask about the set,
P(A,B|X, Y ) ⊂ R|A|·|B|·|X|·|Y |+ ,
containing all allowed probability distributions satisfying constraints imposed
by some theory, cf. sets L ⊂ Q ⊂ N defined below. Below we consider several
theories, for each of them the set of all allowed probability distributions is a
convex set3, i.e. the convex combination of probabilities in a given set belongs
to that set.
A common-sense, i.e. classical, approach to the description of the state
and measurement has the following properties:
• The whole system at the beginning is in one of possible internal states
λ ∈ Λ with probability P (λ) given by distribution P(Λ). This state
is shared by both subsystems.
• a ∈ A is some (possibly random) function of x ∈ X and λ ∈ Λ, and
similarly b ∈ B depends on y ∈ Y and λ ∈ Λ. Thus we have proba-
bility distributions PA(A|X,Λ) and PB(B|Y,Λ). The measurements
are performed locally.
Motivated by these considerations we introduce the following definition:
Definition 2.1. The joint probability distribution P(A,B|X, Y ) for which
there exist conditional probability distributions
P(Λ),PA(A|X,Λ),PB(B|Y,Λ)
satisfying
(2.4) P (a, b|x, y) =
∑
λ
P (λ) · P (a|x, λ) · P (b|y, λ)
is called a local or classical probability distribution.
The intuition behind the local probability distributions is the following.
The device consists of two parts which possibly were initially connected. The
parts share some random variable λ. When the experiment is performed on
this device, the behavior of both parts is completely local, meaning that the
measurement and its result on one part does not influence the result in the
second part.
3In general, this does not need to be true.
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The set of all local distributions (for fixed scenario) is denoted by L. This
set of probabilities is of interest of the “classical” computer science. As noted
in the preface, the main step leading from computer science to QI is in taking
into account a wider class of probability distributions.
One may consider the so-called no-signaling probability distributions.
These are bounded by a condition that an immediate communication is for-
bidden. This is formalized by the no-signaling principle, which is commonly
considered as a fundamental property of Nature. The principle imposes the
following definition.
Definition 2.2. We say that a joint probability distribution
P(A,B|X, Y )
is no-signaling if and only if there exist marginal probability distributions
PA(A|X) and PB(B|Y ) satisfying the following conditions for all a, b, x and
y:
(2.5)
PA(a|x, y) = PA(a|x),
PB(b|x, y) = PB(b|y).
These constraints are formulated in abstraction to any underlying phys-
ical theory. The set of such probability distributions (for fixed scenario) is
denoted by N . Thus for no-signaling probability distribution we may define
the marginal probability distributions PA(A|X) and PB(B|Y ). The intuitive
description of this condition is that the setting on one part of the device does
not influence the second part of the device (or that the information cannot
be sent immediately over the distance).
For our further considerations it is crucial to define a set of probability
distributions which are allowed by quantum mechanics [151]. In this defini-
tion the projective measurements are given by operators {Eax} for Alice, and
{F by} for Bob.
Definition 2.3. We say that a joint probability distribution
P(A,B|X, Y )
is quantum if and only if there exists a Hilbert space H, on which it is possible
to define a state (a unit vector) |ψ〉, and a set of projective measurement
operators
(2.6) {Eax, F by}a∈A,b∈B,x∈X,y∈Y ,
for which the following conditions are fulfilled:
(1) Eax = E
a
x
† and F by = F
b
y
†
(operators are Hermitian),
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(2) EaxE
a′
x = 0 and F
b
yF
b′
y = 0 for a 6= a′ and b 6= b′ (orthogonality of
different results with the same setting),
(3)
∑
a∈AE
a
x = I and
∑
b∈B F
b
y = I (sum of probabilities of all outcomes
for each setting is equal to 1),
(4) [Eax, F
b
y ] = 0 (measurements of Alice and Bob commute, i.e. their
results do not depend on the time order in which they were performed,
which is justified by the no-signaling principle),
(5) P (a, b|x, y) = 〈ψ |EaxF by |ψ〉 = Tr
(|ψ〉〈ψ |EaxF by) (the probability dis-
tribution is given by measurements on the quantum state).
We say that |ψ〉 and {Eax, F by}a,b,x,y realize P(A,B|X, Y ).
We denote this probability by
P
[{{Eax}a∈A}x∈X , {{F by}b∈B}y∈Y ] .
We call |ψ〉 together with the set in (2.6) a quantum realization, or
realization, of a quantum probability distribution.
If A = B = {0, 1}, then P(A,B|X, Y ) is called binary.
The set of all quantum probability distribution (for fixed scenario) is de-
noted as Q.
This definition formalizes the intuition that all bipartite quantum proba-
bility distributions are realized by a physical scenario in which Alice and Bob
share some quantum state and perform independent measurements on it.
From the conditions
∑
a∈AE
a
x = I and
∑
b∈B F
b
y = I we see that for
a0 ∈ A, and A˜ ≡ A \ {a0} we have
Ea0x = I−
∑
a∈A˜
Eax,
and for b0 ∈ B, B˜ ≡ B \ {b0}
Eb0y = I−
∑
b∈B˜
F by .
Thus to define a realization it is enough to specify the set
{Eax, F by}a∈A˜,b∈B˜,x∈X,y∈Y .
The sets A˜ and B˜ are called reduced outcome sets.
We have the following inclusion relation L ⊂ Q ⊂ N . These inclusions are
strict. This is schematically depicted in Fig. 2.2. All the above considerations
are easily generalized for cases with more than two parties.
If we abstract from the physical implementation of some scenario, and
consider only the probability distribution P(A,B|X, Y ) generated by it, then
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Figure 2.2. Relation between sets of probability distributions
allowed by different theories.
we call this probability distribution a behavior, and refer to the physical
object as a box or device.
For joint probability distributions one often introduces the correlation
function. In considered distributions the correlation is usually defined for
outcomes if given settings are chosen. For the case with two outcomes, i.e.
A = B = {o1, o2}, we define the following expression as the correlation of
outcomes for settings x ∈ X and y ∈ Y :
(2.7) C(x, y) ≡ P (o1, o1|x, y)−P (o1, o2|x, y)−P (o2, o1|x, y)+P (o2, o2|x, y).
In particular for binary outcomes this expression reads
C(x, y) ≡ P (0, 0|x, y)− P (0, 1|x, y)− P (1, 0|x, y) + P (1, 1|x, y).
2.1.2.1. Examples of deterministic and quantum boxes. We will illustrate
the above definitions by an explicit example of a scenario with two settings
and two outcomes on Alice and Bob side, i.e. the case A = B = X = Y =
{1, 2}.
A simple box from the set L is shown in tab. 2.1. This box is obtained
when both Alice and Bob always give the result 1. We contrast it with an
example of a box from the set Q shown in tab. 2.2. In sec. 2.2.1 we give
an example of a game which can be won with the deterministic box with
probability 0.75 and with the quantum box with probability about 0.851.
2.1.3. White noise. We note here that in practical realization of ex-
periments some noise occurs. We model this with the so-called white noise
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Table 2.1. An example of a deterministic box.
y = 1 y = 2
b = 1 b = 2 b = 1 b = 2
x = 1 a = 1 1 0 1 0
a = 2 0 0 0 0
x = 2 a = 1 1 0 1 0
a = 2 0 0 0 0
Table 2.2. An example of a quantum box. In the table we
use q = 1
4
(
1 +
√
2
2
)
≈ 0.427. These probabilities are obtained
when Alice and Bob share a two dimensional singlet state, Alice
performs measurement in the basis given by (2.3) with angles
φ = 0 for x = 1 and φ = pi
2
for x = 2, and Bob measures in the
basis specified by angles pi
4
and −pi
4
for y = 1 and y = 2, respec-
tively.
y = 1 y = 2
b = 1 b = 2 b = 1 b = 2
x = 1 a = 1 q 1
2
− q q 1
2
− q
a = 2 1
2
− q q 1
2
− q q
x = 2 a = 1 q 1
2
− q 1
2
− q q
a = 2 1
2
− q q q 1
2
− q
parametrized by η. Let us consider a probability distribution P(A,B|X, Y ).
In this model the experimentally observed probabilities are
(1− η)P(A,B|X, Y ) + ηPU(A,B|X, Y ),
where PU(A,B|X, Y ) is the uniform probability distribution for each x ∈ X
and y ∈ Y .
Another useful parameter is purity, denoted by p. For the purpose of
this work we define it to be equivalent to white noise with η = 1 − p. Thus
the value p = 1 refers to the case when there is no noise.
From this we get that, for binary outcomes, the correlations in this case
are given by p · C(x, y), where C(x, y) are the correlations in the noiseless
case.
2.2. Bell operators and inequalities
In this section we give a short introduction to the topic of Bell inequalities
and Bell operators [18]. Intuitively, a Bell inequality is the limit on some
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expression of probabilities not possible to be violated in a world governed by
classical physics, but possible in the quantum mechanics.
A violation of Bell inequalities may be observed experimentally, and give a
conclusive evidence that the world is not governed by the laws of the classical
physics. The famous experiments were conducted in 1980s by Aspect et al.
[11, 12, 10]. A Bell experiment involves at least two separated parties who
share a quantum state and perform subsequent measurements with different
settings without any communication between them. After series of such mea-
surements, the collected data are used to estimate the joint probabilities of
the outcomes conditioned on the settings.
In fact further in this work we will look at Bell experiments in a more
general way. Namely we do not make any assumptions on the experimental
setup, apart from the condition that parts of the setup are separated. Thus
we consider only the information theoretic property, i.e. the probability dis-
tribution generated in the setup, and ignore the physical realization4.
The quantum maximum of a Bell operator is called the Tsirelson bound.
This notion has been introduced by a Russian-Israeli mathematician, Boris
Semyonovich Tsirelson, in 1980 in the revolutionary paper [42].
For the purpose of this work we define a Bell operator as a linear func-
tional defined on a multipartite probability distribution P. More formally, a
bipartite Bell operator
I(A,B,X, Y, {αa,b,x,y}, CI)[P(A,B|X, Y )]
is a linear function defined, in particular, for probability distributions
P(A,B|X, Y ).
It is of the form:
(2.8)
I(A,B,X, Y, {αa,b,x,y}, CI)[P(A,B|X, Y )] ≡
=
∑
a∈A
∑
b∈B
∑
x∈X
∑
y∈Y
αa,b,x,yP (a, b|x, y) + CI ,
where αa,b,x,y, CI ∈ R. Further in this work we omit P if it is obvious which
probability distribution is considered. A Bell operator of a particular interest,
Iˆ(X, Y, {αx,y}, CˆI)[P({o1, o2}, {o1, o2}|X, Y )], is of the following correlation
form for binary probability distribution P(A,B|X, Y ) with A = B = {o1, o2}:
(2.9)
Iˆ(X, Y, {αx,y}, CˆI)[P({o1, o2}, {o1, o2}|X, Y )] ≡
=
∑
x∈X
∑
y∈Y
αˆx,yC(x, y) + CˆI ,
4To be strict, we retain a hidden assumption that the setup obeys the laws of quantum
physics, or some of its relaxations described in sec. 2.3.
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with αˆx,y, CˆI ∈ R, and C(x, y) defined by (2.7). Obviously, the form (2.8)
conforms the form (2.9) if and only if
αo1,o1,x,y = αo2,o2,x,y = −αo1,o2,x,y = −αo2,o1,x,y = αˆx,y.
A Bell operator I may possess a property that its maximal value allowed
on the set Q, IQ, is strictly larger than its maximal value on the set L, IL.
The fact that such operators exist is a result of the Bell’s theorem [17]. A
Bell inequality is the relation B[P] ≤ IL stating the limit on the value of this
operator under local theories. We say that a Bell’s inequality is violated if
given quantum probability distribution PQ we have I[PQ] > IL.
The constant term CI in a Bell inequality does not change its properties.
Still, we retain this general form, both for Bell inequalities, and dimension
witnesses in sec. 2.4.
Below we give a short overview of Bell operators which are important for
the further discussion of our results. In most of the cases we are not interested
in the relevant Bell inequality, since it is not needed in the analysis of the
protocols further in this work.
2.2.1. CHSH. The most prominent example of Bell inequalities is the
so-called CHSH inequality, which stands for the names of its authors, John
Clauser, Michael Horne, Abner Shimony, and Richard Holt [43].
In this scenario we have A = B = X = Y = {1, 2} The CHSH operator
has the correlation form, (2.9):
(2.10) C(1, 1) + C(1, 2) + C(2, 1)− C(2, 2).
The maximal value of this operator in L is 2, whereas in Q it is 2√2.
There are many different formulations of this operator. Another impor-
tant one is a game formulation. Let us consider Alice and Bob playing a
cooperative game in which they are not allowed to communicate. We take
A = B = X = Y = {0, 1}, Alice gets bit x, and Bob gets bit y (they do not
know the bit of the other party). They win the game if the bits they return,
a and b, satisfy
(2.11) a⊕ b = x · y.
The probability distribution P(A,B|X, Y ) determines the strategy of Alice
and Bob which is allowed in the given theory. The maximal success proba-
bility if P(A,B|X, Y ) is in the set L, Q and N , is 0.75, 1
2
(
1 + 1√
2
)
≈ 0.851
and 1, respectively.
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2.2.2. I3322. The I3322 stands for: three settings for the first and sec-
ond party, and two outcomes for the first and second party. The inequality
related to the I3322 operator is sometimes called the Froissard inequality [71].
It has been reintroduced in [48].
The I3322 operator is given by the following formula
(2.12)
I3322 ≡ −PA(1|1)− 2PB(1|1)− PB(1|2) + P (1, 1|1, 1) + P (1, 1|1, 2)
+ P (1, 1|1, 3) + P (1, 1|2, 1) + P (1, 1|2, 2)− P (1, 1|2, 3)
+ P (1, 1|3, 1)− P (1, 1|3, 2),
where PA(a|x) and PB(b|y) are marginal probability distributions of Alice and
Bob, see Eq. (2.5). The relevant Bell inequality is I3322 ≤ 0.
The exact Tsirelson bound on this operator is not known precisely. Using
SDP (the NPA method discussed further in sec. 2.3, and the so-called see-saw
[164] SDP method) one may get that this bound is close to 0.25089.
2.2.3. Braunstein-Caves family of chained Bell operators. The
Braunstein-Caves family of chained Bell operators was introduced in 1988
in the paper [34]. The members of this family are parametrized by an odd
number n ≥ 2. This parameter gives the number of binary measurement
settings for two parties. For these operators the sets of settings are X =
Y = {1, · · · , n}. Operators from this family consist of chains of operators
of correlation between subsequent measurement settings of Alice and Bob,.
They fit into the correlation form, (2.9).
The most commonly used member of this family is the Braunstein-Caves
operator with three settings for each of the two parties, BC3. BC3 is defined
as
(2.13) BC3 ≡ C(1, 1) + C(1, 2) + C(2, 2) + C(2, 3) + C(3, 3)− C(3, 1),
The general formula for nth Braunstein-Caves operator is
(2.14)
BCn = C(1, 1) + C(1, 2) + C(2, 2) + C(2, 3) + C(3, 3)
+ C(3, 4) + . . .+ C(n− 1, n− 1) + C(n− 1, n)
+ C(n, n)− C(n, 1)
The Tsirelson bound for n-th Braunstein-Caves operator is given by the
formula [218]
2n cos
( pi
2n
)
.
In particular BC3 is limited by 6 cos
(
pi
6
) ≈ 5.19.
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2.2.4. Modified CHSH. Now let us consider the following Bell opera-
tor, which we have considered in the paper [139]. We have called it a modified
CHSH because it is a CHSH operator with one additional correlation term.
Four terms of this operator form a CHSH operator. The properties of this
operator have been further investigated in [112].
Modified CHSH is an operator of the following form:
(2.15) C(1, 2) + C(1, 3) + C(2, 1) + C(2, 2)− C(2, 3)
Its Tsirelson bound is 1 + 2
√
2.
2.2.5. Tn Bell operators. In the paper [114] we have introduced a
family of Bell operators, Tn, with n ∈ {2, 3, . . . }. They are obtained from a
family of dimension witnesses introduced in [115] using our method described
in sec. 4.3. Both of these families are denoted by Tn.
This family of operators is given by the following formula
(2.16) Tn ≡
∑
x,y
(−1)xyC(x, y),
where x = (x1, x2, · · · , xn), with x2, · · · , xn ∈ {0, 1} and x1 = 0 (i.e. |X| =
2n−1), and y ∈ Y = {1, · · · , n}. Their Tsirelson bounds are √n2n−1.
The member of this family T3 is of particular interest further in this work.
The Bell operator in this case is
(2.17)
T3 =C(1, 1) + C(2, 1) + C(3, 1) + C(4, 1) + C(1, 2) + C(1, 3)
+ C(2, 2)− C(2, 3)− C(3, 2) + C(3, 3)− C(4, 2)− C(4, 3),
where we have used labels 000 ≡ 1, 001 ≡ 2, 010 ≡ 3 and 011 ≡ 4 for the
setting of Alice.
2.2.6. CGLMP. The CGLMP operator has been introduced by Collins,
Gisin, Linden, Massar and Popescu in [49]. In this case both Alice and Bob
have two measurement settings with three outcomes,
A = B = {0, 1, 2},
and
X = Y = {1, 2}.
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The operator has the following form:
(2.18)
CGLMP ≡
P (0, 0|1, 1)− P (0, 2|1, 1) + P (0, 0|1, 2)− P (0, 2|1, 2)
− P (1, 0|1, 1) + P (1, 1|1, 1)− P (1, 0|1, 2) + P (1, 1|1, 2)
− P (2, 1|1, 1) + P (2, 2|1, 1)− P (2, 1|1, 2) + P (2, 2|1, 2)
− P (0, 0|2, 1) + P (0, 1|2, 1) + P (0, 0|2, 2)− P (0, 2|2, 2)
− P (1, 1|2, 1) + P (1, 2|2, 1)− P (1, 0|2, 2) + P (1, 1|2, 2)
+ P (2, 0|2, 1)− P (2, 2|2, 1)− P (2, 1|2, 2) + P (2, 2|2, 2).
This operator in L can obtain at most value 3, giving the Bell inequality
CGLMP ≤ 3,
which may be violated in Q.
2.2.7. Other inequalities. Now we describe two Bell operators which
we have introduced in [114]. These two were taken as examples from wider
groups of inequalities, which use at most 4 measurement settings of Alice and
3 of Bob, and consist of 7 and respectively 10 correlations. Operators from
the first group are similar to these from Braunstein-Caves family.
The operators are defined by the following equations:
(2.19)
I1 ≡C(1, 2)− C(1, 3)− C(2, 1)− C(2, 2)+
C(3, 1) + C(3, 3) + C(4, 1)
with Tsirelson bound 1 + 6 · cos (pi
6
) ≈ 6.19, and
(2.20)
I2 ≡ −C(1, 2) + C(1, 3) + C(2, 1) + C(2, 2)
+ C(2, 3) + C(3, 2)− C(3, 3)
+ C(4, 1) + C(4, 2) + C(4, 3)
with Tsirelson bound 2 + 4 · √2 ≈ 7.66.
The maximal values of the operators occurring in the inequalities are
possible to be obtained with qubits.
2.2.8. Mermin game. The last important Bell operator considered in
this work is the one introduced by Mermin in 1990 [136]. This scenario differs
from the previous cases in that it involves three parties, instead of two.
The standard formulation of this scenario is the following game. Alice,
Bob and Charlie each receive one input bit, x, y and z, respectively. There is
a promise that
x⊕ y ⊕ z = 1.
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Each of the players returns a single bit denoted a, b and c. They win if
a ⊕ b ⊕ c = xyz, or, using the promise, a ⊕ b ⊕ c = xy. In the unbiased
(i.e. with a uniform distribution of x and y) version of this game the classical
success probability is 3
4
, whereas quantum mechanics allows to reach 1.
2.3. Navascues-Pironio-Ac´ın method
From definitions 2.1 and 2.2 of local and no-signaling probability distri-
butions, it follows that for given A,B,X, Y these two sets of probability
distributions, L and N , are described by a finite set of linear constraints.
In consequence the task of optimization of expressions linear in probabilities,
e.g. Bell operators, is solved by LP, and thus is easy.
Indeed, the no-signaling constraints in the definition 2.2 are explicitly
linear constraints. If we treat joint probability distributions as non-negative
vectors with proper normalization constraints, then it is easy to see that we
get an LP problem. The LP formulation of L takes advantage of the fact that
any local joint probability distribution can be written as a convex combination
of deterministic probability distributions [66], i.e. such distribution for which
a ∈ A is a (deterministic) function of x ∈ X, and b ∈ B is a deterministic
function of y ∈ Y .
The task of optimization of such expressions, in particular Bell operators,
over Q is NP-hard, as shown by Kempe et al. in 2008 at FOCS [102]. Fortu-
nately, as mentioned above, in 2006 Navascues, Pironio and Ac´ın proposed a
method of relaxation which allows to formulate the task of optimization with
expressions linear in probabilities as an SDP.
The NPA allows to analyze the scenario shown in Fig. 2.1, i.e. the situ-
ation in which two parties, Alice and Bob, perform some measurements on
a possibly entangled system and obtain some joint probability distribution.
For the sake of simplicity we assume that each measurement setting gives
outcomes from the same set, namely Alice gets a result a ∈ A, and Bob a
result b ∈ B, for some sets A and B.
The sequence of operators, or sequence, is a concatenation of the pro-
jective measurement operators, e.g. S = E12E
3
2F
2
1E
1
1 is a sequence of four
operators. Using the fact that any operator of Alice, Eax, commutes with any
operator of Bob, F by , we can reorder this sequence to get
E12E
3
2F
2
1E
1
1 = E
1
2E
3
2E
1
1F
2
1 .
Recall that EaxE
a′
x = 0 and F
b
yF
b′
y = 0 for a 6= a′ and b 6= b′. Using this and
the commutation property we get for example
E21F
3
3E
1
1 = E
2
1E
1
1F
3
3 = 0
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since E21 and E
1
1 are orthogonal. From the fact that E
a
x are projectors, we have
(Eax)
k = Eax for any k ≥ 1, and similarly for F by . The length of a sequence of
operators S is the minimal number of projectors needed to formulate it. A
null sequence is the identity operator, I. We define its length to be 0.
The idea of this method is as follows. Suppose that a given joint prob-
ability distribution P(A,B|X, Y ) is quantum, which by definition 2.3 means
that there exists a realization with a state |ψ〉 and projective measurements
{Eax, F by} such that, for all settings x ∈ X and y ∈ Y and outcomes a ∈ A
and b ∈ B, it satisfies
(2.21) P (a, b|x, y) = 〈ψ |EaxF by |ψ〉.
Let us consider an n-element set S of sequences of operators, e.g.
(2.22) S1+AB =
{
I, Eax, F by , EaxF by
}
a∈A,b∈B
x∈X,y∈Y
.
For Oi, Oj ∈ S let us define
(2.23) ΓOi,Oj ≡ 〈ψ |O†iOj|ψ〉.
By this equation we have that ΓEax ,Eby = P (a, b|x, y), and ΓI,I = 1. This
equation defines a n × n matrix, in which rows and columns are indexed by
elements of S.
Now we show that Γ  0. Let v ∈ Cn. For V = ∑j vjOj we have
(2.24)
v†Γv =
∑
i,j
v∗i Γi,jvj =
∑
i,j
v∗i 〈ψ |O†iOj|ψ〉vj
= 〈ψ |V †V |ψ〉 = |V |ψ〉|2 ≥ 0,
and thus Γ  0. Moreover it is easy to see that the elements of the matrix Γ
satisfy the following linear constraints
(2.25)
Γi,j = Γk,l ⇐ O†iOj = O†kOl,
O†iOj = O⇒ Γi,j = 0.
Further in this work we are interested in optimizing the values of expressions
which are linear functions of the elements of Γ. The discussion in sec. 1.2.1.2
allows us to consider only the real part of the matrix Γ for such kind of
problems. Thus further in this work all SDP problems are in real variables.
With the above formulation, the conditions of the definition 2.2 also have
to be imposed as additional linear constraints. There exists a method which
allows to assure that the distributions will be no-signaling. This is done by
taking into account only the reduced outcome sets. Then, for example, in
the binary case we consider only sequences with operators E0x and F
0
y (since
the outcomes “1” can be recovered with E1x = I − E0x and F 1y = I − F 0y ). In
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consequence the Γ matrix contains only probabilities PA(0|x), PB(0|y) and
P (0, 0|x, y) stated explicitly (see Eq. (2.21)). We use the normalization and
no-signaling of probabilities to get
(2.26)
PA(1|x) = 1− PA(0|x),
PB(1|y) = 1− PB(0|y),
P (1, 0|x, y) = PB(0|y)− P (0, 0|x, y),
P (0, 1|x, y) = PA(0|x)− P (0, 0|x, y),
P (1, 1|x, y) = 1− P (0, 0|x, y)− P (0, 1|x, y)− P (1, 0|x, y).
This gives the reduced Γ, which we further refer to simply as Γ.
From this, we have some relaxation of the conditions on the probability
distribution P(A,B|X, Y ) which are quantum. Instead of assuming that the
state |ψ〉 and the proper measurement operators exist, we check if it is pos-
sible to construct an PSD matrix Γ which satisfies conditions (2.25) together
with no-signaling constraints. It is easy to see that the family of matrices
satisfying conditions in (2.25) is convex.
To sum up, we consider sequences of operators S of a certain length with
a ∈ A˜, b ∈ B˜, x ∈ X and y ∈ Y . We use them to define a set of PSD
matrices with constraints (2.25). We relate certain entries of these matrices
with probabilities, either directly or using (2.26). The optimization task linear
in entries of matrices from this set is an SDP optimization problem.
We note that the problem of checking whether given probability distribu-
tion is quantum can be modeled as an SDP feasibility problem with relevant
entries of matrices determined by a given distribution.
With the NPA method it is possible to construct a hierarchy of relaxations
by taking different choices of the set of sequences S. One defines a set Sk as
a set of all sequences of operators {Eax, Eby} on length at most k. We have
that S1+AB = S1 ∪ {EaxEby}, where S1+AB is defined in (2.22).
Note that the relaxations allow for a wider class of joint probability dis-
tributions than the quantum mechanics. The sets allowed by Sk are denoted
by Qk. The larger set S we choose, the more restrictive is the relaxation.
In [151] it was shown, that the hierarchy of such relaxations converges to
quantum mechanics in a sense stated in (2.27).
Hierarchy of level Q2 means that the set S consists of all sequences of
measurement operators of length 2, whereas in level Q1+AB, S is a set of all
sequences of length 1 and sequences with one operator of Alice and one of
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Bob. Obviously Q2 is defined by a longer S, than Q1+AB. To sum up we have
(2.27)
S1 ⊂ S2 · · · ⊂ S∞,
Q1 ⊃ Q2 · · · ⊃ Q,
Q =
∞⋂
k=1
Qk.
The last equality, i.e. convergence to the quantum set, is proven in [151] and
is crucial for this work. The sizes of sets Sk, and thus the sizes of Γ matrices,
grow exponentially as
O
(
(|A| · |X|+ |B| · |Y |)k) .
In practice one rarely uses sets beyond Q2, and Q1+AB is sufficient for most
purposes.
We mention that in the first level of the hierarchy, Q1, the probabilities
occurring in Γ can possibly be negative. For this reason for this hierarchy
level one has to add the constraint of non-negativity of probabilities explic-
itly as linear constraints. The hierarchy Q1+AB, and the subsequent levels
does satisfy the no-signaling principle in a natural way, without additional
constraints.
Further in this work we refer to the k-th NPA hierarchy with settings A
and B, and outcomes X and Y , for Alice and Bob respectively, as
Qk(A,B|X, Y ).
Because the settings and outcomes can be numbered, we will usually refer
only to the sizes of the relevant sets, and write Qk(|A|, |B|||X|, |Y |). The Γ
matrix is sometimes called a certificate, since it gives a clue that the related
joint probability distribution, (2.21), possibly is quantum.
We also note that the hierarchy can be in a natural way defined for sce-
narios involving more than two parties [149].
An example of an SDP matrix defining an NPA problem is given in ap-
pendix A. This kind of matrices is discussed in more details in sec. 6.2.1.
2.3.0.1. The Almost quantum set. The above relaxations are very efficient.
The work [149] considers the possibility that correlations which are observed
in the physical world are in fact described not by quantum mechanics, but
by hypothetical theory which allows the set Q1+AB. We will say a few words
on this problem.
The problem of deriving the laws of physics out of some simple postulates
is not new. The special relativity theory is build on postulates that the laws
of physics are invariant in all inertial systems, and that the speed of light in
a vacuum is the same for all observers.
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There were many efforts to find relevant postulates for quantum theory
[172, 32, 119, 153, 69]. It reveals that the set Q1+AB satisfies all of them.
Only the relation between this set and the postulate of Information Causality
[169] is currently unknown. For these reasons this set is called an Almost
Quantum set of probability distributions. For most of practical application
this set is close enough to the quantum set. The situations in which higher
levels of the NPA hierarchy are needed are rare.
2.3.1. Primal and dual formulations and the complexity of the Γ
matrix. As we mentioned in sec. 1.2.1, an SDP problem can be stated either
in a primal or in a dual form. We will now discuss the issue of formulation
of the SDP problems involving the Γ matrix.
The problem we wish to consider is the following: optimize some linear
expression F (Γ) under linear constraints of the form Gi(Γ) ≥ gi and Hj(Γ) =
hj, with Γ satisfying also linear constraints stated in (2.25).
We start with a primal formulation, which is suggested in the original
NPA paper [151]. In this case Γ = X is the primal variable, and constraints
Hj(Γ) = hj with the defining constraint from (2.25) are expressed with the
linear constraint matrices {Ai}mi=1. Each equality constraint from (2.25) is
imposed by one matrix Ai. The constraints Gi(Γ) ≥ gi are easily stated in
the mixed form (see sec. 1.2.2), or by adding additional diagonal terms in an
SDP matrix (the latter method is more expensive). The problem with primal
formulation is that the number of linear constraints, m, is large, see tab. 2.3
for the example of the scenario with two parties, with two settings and two
outcomes.
In the dual formulation we identify all entries of the Γ matrix which are
constrained to be equal with one of the values in the dual variable y. Recall
that ΓI,I = 1, and this value is put into the C matrix. Similarly, like in
the primal formulation, the constraints Gi(Γ) ≥ gi are expressed either as
diagonal terms or in the mixed form. The constraints Hj(Γ) = hj can be
imposed in two ways. One way is to use the dependencies stated by them
to reduce the number of degree of freedom of the dual variable y. The other
way is to replace each constraint by two inequalities,
Hj(Γ) ≥ hj,
Hj(Γ) ≤ hj.
Although the latter method slightly increases the difficulty of the problem,
it allows to employ the method of sec. 6.2.4 to improve the performance of a
solver.
The sizes of problems (without constraints Gi and Hj) are determined by
the size of the Γ, n, and the number of the linear constraint matrices {Ai}mi=1,
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m. Tab. 2.3 shows examples of sizes of problems in the scenario involving two
parties, each with two settings and two outcomes in both primal and dual
formulations. It is easy to see that the dual formulation seems to be more
suitable. Further in this work we state the problems in the dual form.
Table 2.3. Sizes of SDP problems occurring in different hi-
erarchy levels of the NPA method for CHSH problem, i.e. for
the quantum scenario involving two parties, each with two set-
tings and two outcomes on their measurement devices. The
column n refers to the size of the Γ matrix, and thus the size
of SDP variables. Columns m-primal and m-dual contain the
number of linear constraint matrices, {Ai} (cf. (1.6) and (1.8))
in primal and dual formulation of problem constrained with
conditions from (2.25). The average density is given by m-dual
n2
,
and express the sparsity of the linear constraint matrices in the
dual formulation.
hierarchy level n m-dual average density (dual) m-primal
Q2 13 31 0.183 137
Q3 25 61 0.098 563
Q4 41 101 0.060 1579
Q5 61 151 0.041 3569
Q6 85 211 0.029 7013
Q7 113 281 0.022 12487
Q8 145 361 0.017 20663
Q9 181 451 0.014 32309
Q10 221 551 0.011 48289
Q11 265 661 0.009 69563
Q12 313 781 0.008 97187
Q13 365 911 0.007 132313
Q14 421 1051 0.006 176189
Q15 481 1201 0.005 230159
2.3.2. Example of Navascues-Pironio-Ac´ın problem. We will now
give a simple example of the method. We consider a scenario Q1(2, 2|2, 2).
This is a case with two parties, each having two setting, X = Y = {1, 2}, and
obtaining two outcomes, A = B = {0, 1}. We consider the reduced outcomes
set, which in this case is {E01 , E02 , F 01 , F 02 }. The sequence of operators of length
at most 1 is
S1 = {I, E01 , E02 , F 01 , F 02 } ≡ {O1, O2, O3, O4, O5}.
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This five sequences will label the rows and columns of the certificate, and
thus this leads to a 5× 5 hermitian PSD matrix:
Γ(complex) ≡

1 χ1 χ2 χ4 χ7
χ∗1 χ1 χ3 χ5 χ8
χ∗2 χ
∗
3 χ2 χ6 χ9
χ∗4 χ
∗
5 χ
∗
6 χ4 χ10
χ∗7 χ
∗
8 χ
∗
9 χ
∗
10 χ7.

This comes directly from the definition (2.23). For example, we have for some
state |ψ〉 and operators {E01 , E02 , F 01 , F 02 }:
Γ
(complex)
1,2 = 〈ψ |O†1O2|ψ〉 = 〈ψ |E01 |ψ〉 ≡ χ1
= 〈ψ |E01E01 |ψ〉 = Γ(complex)2,2 = Γ(complex)2,1 = χ∗1.
Thus χ1 is a real number. We can repeat this reasoning for other χi, apart
from χ3 and χ10
5, which are thus complex numbers. On the other hand, as
explained above, we take as the certificate the real part of this matrix. Thus
Γ will be a 5× 5 real matrix:
Γ ≡

1 y1 y2 y4 y7
y1 y1 y3 y5 y8
y2 y3 y2 y6 y9
y4 y5 y6 y4 y10
y7 y8 y9 y10 y7
  0,
yi ∈ R. It is easy to see that this matrix satisfies conditions (2.25). In the
dual formulation of SDP this matrix can be parametrized in the following
way:
C −
∑
i
yiAi =
1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
− y1

0 −1 0 0 0
−1 −1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
 · · · − y10

0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 −1
0 0 0 −1 0
  0.
If we use the notation from (1.10), then the matrices Ai are columns of a
matrix A given in appendix A.
5This is because χ3 ≡ 〈ψ |E01E02 |ψ〉 in general is not equal to 〈ψ |E02E01 |ψ〉, and simi-
larly for χ10.
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We have
PA(0|0) = ΓI,E00 = y1,
PA(0|1) = ΓI,E01 = y2,
PB(0|0) = ΓI,F 00 = y4,
PB(0|1) = ΓI,F 01 = y7,
P (0, 0|0, 0) = ΓE00 ,F 00 = y5,
P (0, 0|1, 0) = ΓE01 ,F 00 = y6,
P (0, 0|0, 1) = ΓE00 ,F 01 = y8,
P (0, 0|1, 1) = ΓE01 ,F 01 = y9.
Only these probabilities occur directly in the Γ, because we have used the re-
duced outcome set. We can recover the remaining probabilities using formulas
from (2.26).
Note that ΓE00 ,E01 = y3 and ΓF 00 ,F 01 = y10 are not probabilities. They refer
to 〈ψ |E00E01 |ψ〉 and 〈ψ |F 00F 01 |ψ〉, which have no physical meaning, because
Alice and Bob perform their measurements only once.
Let us denote by MF [P(A,B|X,Y )] a matrix which under Frobenius prod-
uct operation with Γ gives the value of a linear function of probabilities,
F [P(A,B|X, Y )]. For example with F [P(A,B|X, Y )] = PB(0|1)−P (0, 0|1, 0)
we construct
MPB(0|1)−P (0,0|1,0) ≡

0 0 0 0 1
2
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 −1
2
0
0 0 −1
2
0 0
1
2
0 0 0 0
 .
Then we have
Tr
(
ΓMPB(0|1)−P (0,0|1,0)
)
= y7 − y6 = PB(0|1)− P (0, 0|1, 0).
We use matrices MF [P(A,B|X,Y )] in primal formulation of NPA. For dual for-
mulation we define vF [P(A,B|X,Y )] with
vi ≡ Tr
(
AiMF [P(A,B|X,Y )]
)
.
To formulate maximization of the expression F [P(A,B|X, Y )] as primal SDP
we use C = −MF [P(A,B|X,Y )] and explicitly state constraints (2.25) with Ai
matrices and vector b. In dual formulation we use b = vF [P(A,B|X,Y )] as the
target. Usually we will not use canonical forms of SDP in this work, but
formulate problems in the most intuitive way.
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2.3.3. Maximization of Bell operators. In this section we give two
examples of SDP problems using NPA method. We will use these optimization
problems further in chapter 6 as performance testing cases for different SDP
solvers. This examples will also explain the notation we use further in this
work.
The first example is the CHSH maximization in Almost Quantum level:
maximize Tr (ΓMCHSH)
subject to Γ ∈ Q1+AB(2, 2|2, 2)(2.28)
where
MCHSH ≡MC(1,1) +MC(1,2) +MC(2,1) −MC(2,2).
This problem gives the exact value, 2
√
2, up to numerical precision. This
illustrates how the NPA method can be used to calculate an approximation
of the Tsirelson bound.
The second example is the I3322 maximization in the same level of the
hierarchy formulated as SDP in the following way, cf. Eq. (2.12):
maximize Tr (ΓMI3322)
subject to Γ ∈ Q1+AB(2, 2|3, 3)(2.29)
where
MI3322 ≡MPA(1|1) − 2MPB(1|1) −MPB(1|2) +MP (1,1|1,1) +MP (1,1|1,2)
+MP (1,1|1,3) +MP (1,1|2,1) +MP (1,1|2,2) −MP (1,1|2,3)
+MP (1,1|3,1) −MP (1,1|3,2).
2.4. Dimension witnesses
In this section we give a brief overview of topics related to the so-called
dimension witnesses [116, 37, 74, 168, 53].
Dimension witnesses are defined in a scenario with two parties, Alice
and Bob. Let X¯ and Y¯ be sets labeling the settings of Alice and Bob, and
let B¯ be a set of the outcomes that Bob can obtain. Both parties get some
random inputs, x ∈ X¯ and y ∈ Y¯ , for some sets X¯ and Y¯ . Afterward Alice
sends a message to Bob depending on her input. The message can either be a
classical message (a number) or a quantum state of some dimension d. In the
latter case, Bob after receiving the quantum state of dimension d performs
some measurement on it and obtains a result b ∈ B¯. In the former (classical)
case Bob calculates his result using some (possibly random) function of the
message and his input, y. The message is then one digit, {0, . . . , d−1}, which
can be modeled as sending a state φ ∈ {| 0〉, . . . , | d− 1〉}.
These considerations lead to some conditional probability distribution
P(B¯|X¯, Y¯ ) in a prepare-and-measure scheme (P-M), depicted in Fig. 2.3.
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We formalize the conditions for this distribution in the following definition 2.4.
Roughly speaking, a probability distribution in P-M is realized by a setup in
which Alice prepares and sends states from a Hilbert space H of dimension d
to Bob who, after receiving, performs on them some operations leading him
to his outcome. We assume that there is no entanglement between Alice and
Bob.
Figure 2.3. Prepare-and-measure scenario.
Definition 2.4. Let B¯, X¯, and Y¯ be sets, and H be a Hilbert space of a
finite dimension d.
A probability distribution in P-M scheme is a conditional probability dis-
tribution Pd(B¯|X¯, Y¯ ) such that for b ∈ B¯, x ∈ X¯ and y ∈ Y¯ we have
P (b|x, y) = Tr (ρxM by) ,
where {ρx}x∈X¯ is a set of density matrices on the space H, and {M by}b∈B¯ are
POVMs on this space for all y ∈ Y¯ .
We say that Pd is realized by sets {ρx}x∈X¯ and
{{M by}b∈B¯}y∈Y¯ , and
denote it
Pd
[{ρx}x∈X¯ , {{M by}b∈B¯}y∈Y¯ ] .
If B¯ = {0, 1}, then Pd(B¯|X¯, Y¯ ) is called a binary probability distribution.
Then B¯ can be omitted, Pd(X¯, Y¯ ).
The set of all P-M probability distributions for given d, B¯, X¯ and Y¯ is
denoted by Pd(B¯|X¯, Y¯ ).
The set of all P-M probability distributions for given B¯, X¯ and Y¯ , but
without restriction on the dimension is denoted by P(B¯|X¯, Y¯ ), viz.
P(B¯|X¯, Y¯ ) =
∞⋃
d=2
Pd(B¯|X¯, Y¯ ).
We denote by P(P )(X¯, Y¯ ) the subset of binary probability distribution with
{M by}y∈Y¯ being projective measurements with restrictions that d = 2 and
∀b∈{0,1}∀y∈Y¯ TrM by = 1,
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meaning that for any y ∈ Y¯ both M0y and M1y project on different subspace of
dimension 1.
Let us note that we have
(2.30) Pd(B¯|X¯, Y¯ ) ⊆ Pd+1(B¯|X¯, Y¯ ),
since increasing the dimension of communicated state we can send at most
the same amount of data. The key property of dimension witnesses is that
they allow to distinguish the dimensions for which inclusion in (2.30) is strict.
Using the definition of probability distributions in P-M scheme, we may
introduce a notion of dimension witnesses which is analogous to the concept
of Bell operators.
Definition 2.5. Let B¯, X¯, and Y¯ be sets, P(B¯|X¯, Y¯ ) ∈ P(B¯|X¯, Y¯ ),
βb,x,y ∈ R for all b ∈ B¯, x ∈ X¯ and y ∈ Y¯ , and CW ∈ R. A dimension
witness W is a linear function of conditional probability distributions, i.e. it
has the following form:
(2.31)
W (B¯, X¯, Y¯ , {βb,x,y}, CW )[P(B¯|X¯, Y¯ )] ≡
∑
b∈B¯
∑
x∈X¯
∑
y∈Y¯
βb,x,yP (b|x, y) + CW .
If B¯ = {0, 1}, then the dimension witness is called binary.
If ∀b∈B¯∀y∈Y¯
∑
x∈X¯ βb,x,y = 0, then the dimension witness is called zero-
summing.
From the above definition it follows that dimension witnesses are linear
functionals on P(B¯|X¯, Y¯ ).
A dimension witness states a maximal value of a certain linear combina-
tion of these probabilities that is possible to be obtained with a given dimen-
sion of the state space. Since, in contrary to the case of Bell inequalities,
the limits possible to be reached with given dimensions of the communicated
system in classical and quantum cases interlace, there is no direct analogy of
the Bell inequality. Instead the limits allowed for each particular case of the
dimension of the communicated system are considered. Thus the dimension
witnesses can be used to lower bound the size of communication needed to
reproduce some probability distribution P(B¯|X¯, Y¯ ) [74, 168, 37].
CHAPTER 3
Device-independent and semi-device-independent
protocols
Nowadays information has become one of the most important resources,
which is illustrated by an enormous success of computer science and infor-
mation technology. These disciplines deal in particular with the information
processing. Another important investigated issue is the reliability of the in-
formation. The purpose of this chapter is to discuss how this problem is
addressed by QI.
In 1998 at FOCS Mayers and Yao [134] proposed a new approach to at-
taining a credibility of information. This approach, called device-independent
(DI), allows to gain a trust to a device in the case in which we do not trust
the vendor of our devices, and even do not know how the device is con-
structed. No matter how unbelievable this claim sounds, it reveals that in
some cases one may draw conclusions only from the observed results which
the device returns, or in other words, by performing some self-testing instead
of investigating the internal working of the device.
It may sound a little paradoxical that we can gain some certainty about a
device without the knowledge of its construction, especially if the device has
been constructed by our enemy wanting to mislead us. One thing we can be
certain about is the fact that the device is governed by the laws of physics,
so its working is limited by what is allowed by quantum mechanics. Without
looking inside the device we also may easily state that it comprises of several
separate parts. DI approach shows that these two facts may in many cases
be enough to make sure that the untrusted device works as expected. As we
will describe in sec. 3.1, one of the ways to perform self-tests on a certain
class of devices is to conduct a Bell experiment.
Still, Bell experiments are very difficult to perform, since they require a
high degree of precision and extremely high efficiency of the detectors used.
For this reason a slightly different approach has been introduced [168], which
assumes some knowledge about the device. Since we have to know something
about the construction of the device, this approach is called semi-device-
independent [117, 217] (SDI). It offers a good compromise between security
and experimental feasibility.
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In SDI we usually work in the prepare-and-measure scheme, see sec. 2.4.
In this framework dimension witnesses, instead of Bell inequalities, are used.
We still do not make any assumption of the internal working of the devices,
but we assume that the communication between parties is bounded to the
extent known to us and that there is no entanglement between parts of the
device. This approach is much more convenient in practical realization.
Both for prepare-and-measure protocols in SDI, and for correlation pro-
tocols in DI, we would like to define a value that measures how reliable its
particular realization is. As this value we take the expectation value of the
relevant dimension witness or Bell operator, respectively, attained in the rel-
evant protocol. This value is called a security parameter. It is possible to
use more than one security parameter. In general a security parameter does
not have to be the expectation value of a dimension witness or Bell operator,
but any linear function of probabilities occurring in a given setup.
Below we discuss some particular applications of DI and SDI. Readers not
interested in details of the methods used in DI may skip sec. 3.1.3 which gives
an overview of the topic of the randomness extraction. Similarly, sec. 3.4, in
which we briefly discuss the issue of estimation of parameters in experiments,
may be skipped. The only aim of that section is to illustrate how the values of
expressions like the values of Bell operators are estimated in the experiment.
Readers should remember from these sections that the protocols described
further in chapter 4 are indeed possible to conduct, and the randomness they
generate can be quantified and used for generic purposes.
We note that the NPA method has become a basic tool for investigation
of DI scenarios [170, 141]. In our works [114, 140] we developed a method
to apply the NPA for SDI scenario. Other methods for optimization in SDI
are [148, 152].
3.1. Randomness expansion
Random number generation is an important issue in computer science.
The applications of random numbers are ubiquitous. They occur in such
topics as authentication [38], cryptography, gambling and system modeling.
Nonetheless, most of the random number generators (RNGs) are based on
a purely algebraical manipulation on the initial seed. Since the series of num-
bers produced by such generators are created in a deterministic manner, these
RNGs are called pseudo-random number generators (PRNGs). However, it is
very difficult to develop a reliable pseudo-random number generation method.
On the other hand, in many cases safe RNG method is crucial for the security
of computer systems. A prominent example of systems whose security was
undermined by PRNG is the Secure Socket Layer encryption protocol in early
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versions of Netscape web browser which used a seed of a small entropy (the
time of a day, the process and the parent process ids) [82]. In 2008 it was
discovered that the results of PRNG of Debian’s OpenSSL package are easy
to predict [221]. The vulnerability of the PRNG of Windows 2000 operating
system has been investigated in [57].
Although there exist tests [181] which allow checking whether a given
sequence of numbers is reliable, or determine whether it conforms to a par-
ticular probability distribution, we can never be sure its security without the
knowledge of how the sequence was generated. These tests can never give
a guarantee that the numbers were indeed trustworthy, that is they cannot
be predicted by an adversary. If we know the pseudo-random generating
algorithm and the initial seed (or some long enough sequence of generated
numbers), then we can predict every sequence of number that will ever be
obtained by PRNG. All classical PRNGs have this significant [142] drawback.
There also exist RNGs based on some chaotic classical physical processes
such as electric or atmospheric noise or on estimating the entropy of hardware
interrupts (for example in /dev/random RNG on Linux systems), but they
either need a third party supplier (the former case), or are not able to attain
a satisfactory rate (the latter cases).
On the contrary, one of the most striking properties of quantum mechanics
is that it is intrinsically random. The randomness is present in the deepest
level of quantum physics, and is unavoidable. We know that some processes
are intrinsically random, if only the no-signaling principle is valid, which as
we have said is one of the most fundamental assumptions of modern physics
(see sec 2.1.1).
In this situation it is natural to try to use properties of quantum mechanics
in order to generate entirely random sequences of numbers. There were efforts
to make use of such quantum processes like nuclear decay (e.g. HotBits [222]),
or photons hitting a semi-transparent mirror (for example, id Quantique’s
RNGs [223]).
However, when using one of the commercially available quantum random
number generators (QRNGs), we still have to trust the vendor of the device.
This assumption is crucial for QRNGs which produce randomness, e.g. by
performing measurements in Hadamard basis with states from computational
basis. Such a device works only if it indeed implements the declared states
and measurements. Unfortunately, in cryptographic context one does not
always trust his devices.
Suppose there is an honest constructor who wants to produce and sell
QRNGs. His problem is the lack of trust among his potential customers. Since
he does not want to cheat his clients, he can make the design of his device
open. But still some parties may distrust that the device is constructed in the
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declared manner. This way the idea of the quantum randomness certification
emerged [170]. As mentioned briefly in the introduction to this chapter if we
want to be sure that a device does really produce random numbers, we can
perform a self-test with a Bell experiment.
One of the achievements of DI which is recently developing rapidly is
the usage of the violation of certain Bell inequalities as a certificate1 of
randomness for series of numbers from QRNGs constructed in a suitable way
[45, 170, 46, 114]. In [45, 170] as a certificate of randomness the violation
of the CHSH Bell inequality [43] was used, while in [46] the GHZ correlations
were used instead. In our work [141] we have investigated a few other ways
to certify the randomness within the DI scheme, see chapter 4.
The QRNGs which need some initial randomness for the purpose of cer-
tification2 are called randomness expanders. This is the case in all discussed
protocols.
We would like to emphasize that the certification with Bell experiments
works independently of the internal construction of the device used. If the
value obtained in the experiment attains a certain threshold, we are sure that
the generated results are indeed random, even if the device has been prepared
by our foe. A lower bound on the amount of the obtained secure randomness
can then be quantified by means of min-entropy using, e.g. the methods
discussed in this work.
We refer to the total value of min-entropy generated by a working ran-
domness expansion protocol as amount of randomness .
As already mentioned, SDI approach is more feasible in realization than
DI. It reveals that this scheme also allows an efficient randomness certification
[116]. For this reason in our papers [114, 140] we have investigated the
relation between random number expansion protocols based on correlations
occurring in the Bell scenario, and on protocols relying on the prepare-and-
measure scheme. Further in sec. 4.3, we discuss this relation and the issue of
SDI certification in more details.
A typical scheme of a DI randomness certification protocol is the following.
One chooses an expression, which can be a Bell operator or set of operators,
which will be used to certify the amount of randomness generated in the
protocol, and a pair of settings, x0 and y0, used to produce randomness. A
protocol runs in a series of iterations and involves typically two parties, Alice
1We note that certificate is a homonym, used both as a term for the existence of a
relevant Γ matrix in NPA method, and for a warranty of reliability in context of DI and
SDI. The meaning is clear from the context.
2If the QRNG is certified to be reliable, one does not need any randomness to generate
subsequent numbers. On the other hand, in sec. 3.4 we describe methods which interweave
the process of certification and generation.
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and Bob, who share a series of entangled states, one per iteration. In a sin-
gle iteration they randomly choose their measurement settings using private
trusted RNG3. After the measurements they reveal their measurement set-
tings and outcomes to perform estimation of the value(s) of operator(s) used
as certificates, using for example a method described in sec. 3.4.1. This value
(values) is used to quantify the amount of certified randomness contained in
the pairs of outcomes of Alice and Bob generated in iterations with settings
x0 and y0.
An SDI randomness certification protocol works in a similar way. This
time the parties do not share entangled states, but instead in each iteration
Alice prepares a quantum state depending on her setting and sends it to Bob.
Random numbers are obtained from the outcomes of Bob for the selected
settings x0 and y0. One uses dimension witnesses for certification instead of
Bell operators.
Before we move to the discussion of other applications of DI, we develop
some issues related to DI analysis of two types of probability distributions.
3.1.1. Joint probability distributions. Let us take two sets, X and
Y , which label the measurement settings of Alice and Bob in DI scheme, and
two sets, A and B, which label their respective outcomes.
In sec. 1.5 we defined the min-entropy of a probability distribution. We
will now use this notion in order to quantify the randomness contained in
joint probability distributions. The global randomness is the one which is
contained in the pair of outcomes of Alice and Bob. For the joint probability
distribution P(A,B|X, Y ) the global min-entropy given x ∈ X and y ∈ Y is
− log2
(
max
a∈A,b∈B
P (a, b|x, y)
)
.
We refer to the randomness of an outcome of a single party as a local ran-
domness.
Throughout this work we use min-entropy as a measure of the efficiency
of the protocols, see sec. 1.5.
For given A, B, X, Y , x0 ∈ X, y0 ∈ Y , a Bell inequality I and s ∈ R we
define as the probability of guessing outcomes the following terms:
Pguess(P(A,B|X, Y ), x0, y0) ≡ max
a∈A,b∈B
P (a, b|x0, y0)
3As mentioned previously, the protocols are randomness expanders, since they re-
quire some initial randomness. One may decide to perform certification first using PRNG,
and then always to choose x0 and y0. Otherwise one interweaves the certification with
the proper randomness generation. Because in a vast majority of the iterations the set-
tings x0 and y0 are chosen, the initial randomness is significantly less that the generated
randomness.
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This is motivated by intuition that if one tries to guess the outcomes, he will
guess the most probable, cf. above discussion of min-entropy. Thus we have
the following expression of min-entropy of outcomes (see sec. 1.5):
H∞(P(A,B|X, Y ), x0, y0) ≡ − log2 (Pguess(P(A,B|X, Y ), x0, y0))
We define the certified randomness with the value s of a Bell operator I
by
(3.1)
Hcert∞ (I, x0, y0, s) ≡
min
P(A,B|X,Y )∈Q
H∞(P(A,B|X, Y ), x0, y0),
subject to I[P(A,B|X, Y )] ≥ s.
Hcert∞ (B, x0, y0, s) is called the min-entropy certified by the value s of B. Note
that DI independent problem defined above in (3.1) can be relaxed to an NPA
problem if we replace Q with Qn(A,B|X, Y ) for some hierarchy level n, e.g.
Q.
3.1.2. Prepare-and-measure probability distributions. As we men-
tioned above, if we can bound the dimension of the communicated system, we
may use the prepare and measure scheme and certify the randomness [116].
For given B¯, X¯, Y¯ , x0 ∈ X¯, y0 ∈ Y¯ , a dimension witness W (see sec. 2.4),
s ∈ R and d ≥ 2 as the probability of guessing we define the following term:
(3.2) Pguess(Pd(B¯|X¯, Y¯ ), x0, y0) ≡ max
b∈B¯
P (b|x0, y0),
with min-entropy given by
H∞(Pd(B¯|X¯, Y¯ ), x0, y0) ≡ − log2
(
Pguess(Pd(B¯|X¯, Y¯ ), x0, y0)
)
.
In analogy to (3.1), we define
(3.3)
P certguess(W,x0, y0, s, d) ≡ max
Pd(B¯|X¯,Y¯ )∈Pd(B¯|X¯,Y¯ )
max
b∈B¯
P (b|x0, y0),
subject to W [Pd(B¯|X¯, Y¯ )] ≥ s,
and
Hcert∞ (W,x0, y0, s, d) ≡ − log2
(
P certguess(W,x0, y0, s, d)
)
for the case when randomness is certified with a dimension witness with com-
munication limited by d (see the definition 2.4), which is the min-entropy
certified by the value s of W (for the dimension d).
We also introduce the particular case of certified randomness, viz.
(3.4)
P cert(P )guess (W,x0, y0, s) ≡
max
P2(B¯|X¯,Y¯ )∈P(P )(X¯,Y¯ )
max
b∈B¯
P (b|x0, y0).
subject to W [P2(B¯|X¯, Y¯ )] ≥ s,
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where P(P )(X¯, Y¯ ) is defined in definition 2.4. Note that in (3.3) and (3.4)
maximum is taken at two stages: we consider that probability distribution for
which the most probable result has the highest probability among all other
probability distributions.
The meaning of the above equations is as follows. (3.2) expresses the prob-
ability that the eavesdropper correctly guesses a single outcome generated on
the side of Bob. As usually, the strategy used by the eavesdropper is to guess
the most probable result for a given distribution of outcomes Pd(B¯|X¯, Y¯ ).
(3.3)) refers to the maximal guessing with all possible probability distribu-
tions of outcomes being in accordance with the observed security parameter.
(3.4) gives this probability with a further restriction to the case with the
dimension two and projective measurements.
3.1.3. Randomness extractors. Having some string of characters from
the source with a given min-entropy per character it is possible to extract its
randomness, that is to create a shorter string with a higher min-entropy per
character [209, 55, 208]. Now we will give a short overview of the random-
ness extraction. This section is not necessary to understand the remaining
part of this work, and can be omitted by uninterested readers.
The task of randomness extraction is the following [55, 171]. One has
the access to a source of uniformly random bits which is considered to be
expensive, and thus one would like to reduce its usage. This source produces
a seed S of length d, S ∈ {0, 1}d. One also has the access to a source of
random bits which are not uniform, but one knows the min-entropy of the
source. This source produces a string R of bits of length n, R ∈ {0, 1}n, of
min-entropy H∞(R) ≥ k. Both sources are assumed to be independent. One
is interested in obtaining a sequence Ext(R, S) ∈ {0, 1}m of m bits which are
in some sense close to be uniformly random. We say that a function
Ext : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d → {0, 1}m
is a (m, k, δ) extractor with uniform seed if under the above assumptions we
have
1
2
∑
rm∈{0,1}m
∣∣P [Ext(R, S) = rm]− 2−m∣∣ ≤ δ,
where term 2−m comes from uniform probability distributions.
It is important to ask, how long the seed should be so that a (m, k, δ)-
strong extractor exists. One may show [55] that for any k ∈ [0, n] and δ > 0
there exists such an extractor with m = k − 4 log 1
δ
− O(1) which requires a
seed of length d = O
(
log2
(
n
δ
)
log(m)
)
.
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In short, it is possible to obtain a probability distribution close to the
uniform distribution on m bits with a source of min-entropy close to m and
a seed of length depending logarithmically on m.
3.2. Randomness amplification
As mentioned in chapter 2, the application of the laws of quantum me-
chanics allows to perform tasks impossible in classical information theory,
like secure cryptography, or randomness certification. Recently, another area
where QI theory makes new things possible has emerged. It is the amplifica-
tion of weak randomness [47].
Let us consider a source generating a sequence of bits,
s = (s0, s1, · · · , sN−1).
This source is described by a constant . The bits from the sequence may be
correlated with each other, and also with some variable e, with a constraint
saying that these correlations are limited by the following condition
(3.5) ∀i 1
2
−  ≤ P (si = 0|s0, . . . , si−1, e) ≤ 1
2
+ .
The source of randomness described by this constraint is usually referred to
as a Santha-Vazirani source (SV).
If the constraints in (3.5) hold, we say that the sequence s, or the gen-
erating source, is -free. The parameter  gives a bound on the bias of the
generated bits from the perfect uniformly distributed i.i.d. sequence, and for
this reason is called the bias of the source. Obviously  = 0 corresponds to
the case where the output of the source is perfectly random. On the other
hand, if  = 1
2
, then the sequence can be even deterministic. We assume that
the variable e is known by a treacherous party, but it is unknown to us.
The task of randomness amplification is to use some post-processing
of the generated sequence s to obtain another, possibly shorter, sequence y
which is ′-free with ′ < . The question of the possibility of randomness
amplification using classical (i.e. not quantum) algorithms has been answered
negatively in a famous paper by Santha and Vazirani, presented at FOCS
in 1984 [186]. They have shown that for any deterministic function f :
{0, 1}N → {0, 1} there exists an -free SV such that the bias of f(s) is at
least .
Colbeck and Renner in their groundbreaking paper [47] proved that, con-
trary to classical amplification, the procedure of amplification is possible in
the quantum case. Their idea is based on performing a Bell experiment and
applying a hashing function to the measurement outcomes. However, the
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protocol that they presented works only if the source of randomness is -free
with  less than about 0.086.
It is important to distinguish the task of amplification and the task of
randomness expansion discussed in the previous section. The randomness
expanders generate sequences of random bits, for which the average min-
entropy is known, but do not guarantee anything about a particular bit. In
randomness amplification we are interested in generating a bit with bias less
than the initial one.
The randomness amplification not only has practical applications, but it
also sheds light on fundamental issues of quantum mechanics. One is that if
there exist only slightly random processes in the Universe, then also processes
with arbitrary high randomness do [75]. So far the possibility of randomness
amplification has been demonstrated only under very restrictive conditions,
nonetheless it is a very active area of research [47, 75, 175, 29, 50, 87, 26].
In [139] we have introduced the first randomness amplification protocol
which allows amplification of arbitrary weak randomness and is possible to be
realized in practice. We do so by presenting an amplification protocol which
is based on the Mermin game (see sec. 2.2.8). It works for any  < 1
2
and can
tolerate a finite amount of noise and experimental imperfections. We describe
this amplification protocol in sec. 4.4.
3.3. Cryptography
The basic task of cryptography is to establish a mean of a secret commu-
nication between distant parties. This problem is at least as old as humanity.
Cryptography uses methods involving some data manipulation i.e. encoding.
In contrast to, e.g., dispatching a guarded convoy with just an envelope con-
taining a letter, this way of contact keeps the message even if it is known to
an eavesdropper.
One of the most famous and important historical cryptographic protocols
is the Caesar cipher, an example of a substitution cipher in which letters of
the alphabet in the message are rearranged. It is easy to break this kind of
ciphers.
Let us note that the Caesar cipher employs a cryptographic key which
determines the method of rearranging the alphabet. The cipher requires
both parties to know the key used to encode and decode the message. The
cryptography which requires both parties to know the same key is called
symmetric. In modern cryptography one of the basic requirements for a
protocol is the Kerckhoffs’s principle stated in 1883 saying that the protocol
should be secure even if its algorithm is publicly known, or, as formulated by
Shannon [192] in 1949, the enemy knows the system. Thus the more difficult
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to guess the key is, the more secure the message is, but we assume that the
eavesdropper knows our protocol.
The asymmetric, or public key, cryptography distinguishes the key used
to encode the message, and the key which has to be used to decode it. In this
kind of encoding one of the parties makes his public key available to everyone.
A party who wants to send the message uses a relevant algorithm to encode it
and sends it to the owner of the key. The owner then uses his private key to
decode the message. The security of this form of cryptography is based on the
difficulty of certain mathematical tasks like computing the discrete logarithm,
or integer factorization. Still, at least in principle, it is possible to break this
kind of ciphers. For this reason a notion of information-theoretic security
has been introduced. This refers to such cryptographic protocols which are
secure against an eavesdropper with unbounded computational power [192].
In this work we are interested in methods of establishing a key used for
symmetric cryptography. The considered scenarios involve two parties con-
sidered as honest, Alice and Bob, who want to communicate with each other,
and an eavesdropper, called Eve, who wants to learn the content of their
messages. Alice and Bob agree on the protocol they want to use, and the
protocol is known to Eve. Their task is to establish an information-theoretic
secure key.
We always assume that the data which have not been published anywhere
are secure. In particular the eavesdropper does not have the direct access to
the generated key either on Alice’s, or on Bob’s side, since in this case the
cryptography is pointless.
3.3.1. Quantum cryptography. Quantum key distribution (QKD) is
a significant achievement in the field of cryptography. Its techniques allow
Alice and Bob to meet the task of establishing an information-theoretic secure
key using a quantum device, public communication, and secure private RNG.
We refer readers interested in the history of QKD to the work of Brassard
[31].
The first quantum cryptographic protocol is BB84, announced in 1984
by Charles Bennett and Gilles Brassard in the groundbreaking paper [19].
The protocol is the following. Alice uses her private secure RNG to generate
two N -bit strings, x, b ∈ {0, 1}N . Then she sends a sequence of N quantum
states. The state sent in i-th iteration depends on the i-th bits of these
strings, xi and bi. Bob uses his private secure RNG to generate an N -bit
string y ∈ {0, 1}N . He receives the series of the quantum states, and performs
measurements depending on his bits, yi for i-th iteration. The prepared states
and measurements are chosen in such a way that the conditional probability
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distribution P(b|x, y) is given by4
P (bi|xi, xi) = 1, P (¬bi|xi, xi) = 0,
P (bi|xi,¬xi) = P (¬bi|xi,¬xi) = 1
2
.
This means that in iterations in which xi = yi are the same, Bob recovers the
full information on bi, and if xi 6= yi, then he gets no information. After his
measurements Bob announces his string y, and Alice announces her string x
over a public channel. Parties compare their strings, and create the key using
these bits in b for which xi = yi. Thus both parties share the same string of
length on average N
2
. One may see that a potential man-in-the-middle attack
would be to intercept some of the states, perform some measurement on it,
and send another state to Bob instead of the previous one. It can be shown
that such kind of eavesdropping can always be detected statistically by Alice
and Bob.
Another important QKD protocol was proposed by a Polish physicist
Ekert in 1991 [61]. In this protocol parties share a maximally entangled
state of two qubits and each of them performs a measurement in one of three
basis selected in a way which allows them both to establish a shared key,
and calculate a security parameter to detect potential eavesdropping. This
protocol is similar to DI protocols in that it employs the security parameter to
prove confidence. Nonetheless, we stress that this is not a DI protocol, since it
assumes the implementation of the shared quantum state and measurements,
thus requires a trusted device.
3.3.2. Device-independent quantum key distribution. The task of
secure cryptography is particularly exposed to the threat of an untrusted
vendor. For this reason it is natural to use the DI approach for further
improvements of reliability of the cryptographic protocol. As mentioned in
the introduction to this chapter, with DI approach to the analysis of quantum
protocols, it is possible to cope with the situation when the vendor of the
cryptographic device is not trusted. This lack of credit concerns the source of
particles, the communication channel, and their measuring apparatuses etc.
We usually assume that the source of randomness needed by a QKD protocol
is trusted. We discuss this issue in sec. 4.1.6.
Some examples of early partially-DI QKD protocols are considered in
[16, 2, 190], but these were vulnerable to some particular types of attacks
4To be more precise the states are the following. If xi = 0 then Alice sends a qubit
from the computational basis, | bi〉. If xi = 1 then she sends a qubit from the Hadamard
basis, |+〉 for bi = 0, and | −〉 for bi = 1. Bob measures in the basis depending on his input
yi: in the computational basis for yi = 0 and in the Hadamard basis for yi = 1.
54 Device-independent protocols
and needed additional assumptions. In 2007, Ac´ın et al. [1], introduced the
first device independent QKD protocol secure against the so-called collective
attacks. Another important step in the development of DI-QKD protocols was
the work by Masanes et al. [132]. In that paper they provided a more general
security scheme based on causally independent measurement processes.
Common properties of DI-QKD protocols include:
(1) A protocol runs series of iterations.
(2) The parties share some entangled state (unknown to the parties).
(3) The parties possess private secure RNG, which generate private se-
quences of numbers.
(4) The random numbers are used to select measurement settings for
each of the iterations.
(5) After a series of iterations parties publish some of their data and use
them to estimate one or more security parameters.
(6) The unrevealed data are used by each of the parties to calculate a
raw key.
(7) The parties perform the key reconciliation, which requires them
to publish some parts of their raw keys to obtain a shared value of
the key.
Most of DI-QKD protocols assume that their private RNGs in p. 3 generate
unbiased random numbers. The protocols usually use only a single security
parameter in p. 4. The data published in p. 5 are usually the measurement
settings, and the raw key is simply some selected subset of outcomes of the
parties. In sec. 4.1 we describe a protocol which differs in these points.
As mentioned, a protocol works in iterations. The key rate refers to
the average number of secure shared bits obtained in a single iteration of a
protocol.
A method for estimation of security parameters in p. 4 is given in sec. 3.4.2.
The key reconciliation [33] in p. 7 is a standard procedure, which allows
to obtain exactly the same strings of bits for all parties, even if they start
with slightly different strings. The amount of communication depends on the
conditional min-entropies between the initial strings.
3.3.2.1. Masanes-Pironio-Ac´ın protocol. We will briefly discuss the quan-
tum key distribution protocol given by Masanes, Pironio and Ac´ın (MPA)
[132]. This protocol assumes that the state of the cryptographic device does
not depend on the previous iterations (i.e. the device does not use any inter-
nal memory). The parties can use any Bell operator to certify the key rate.
The paper [132] in particular considers the following Bell scenario.
Let N ∈ {2, 3}. The parties obtain binary outcomes of measurements,
thus A = B = {0, 1}. The set of settings for Alice is X = {0, . . . , N −1}, and
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for Bob Y = {−1, 0, . . . , N − 1}. Let δ(y) be equal to 1 when y = −1, and 0
otherwise. The Bell operator used to certify the security of the protocol is∑
a∈A,b∈B
N−1∑
x=0
x∑
y=x−1
(−1)a+b+δ(y)P (a, b|x, y).
For N = 2 the above expression contains a CHSH operator. The authors of
[132] show that when the Bell operator attains its maximal quantum value,
then
PA(0|N − 1) = PA(1|N − 1) = 1
2
.
They also calculate the min-entropy H∞(N − 1, s) of the outcomes of Alice
when the setting x is N − 1 as a function of the security parameter s.
For majority of iterations Alice fixes her setting to N − 1, and Bob to
N . The protocol also assumes that the conditional entropy of the setting of
Bob given the setting of Alice for this pair of settings is low, 0 ≤ H(b|a,N −
1, N) 1.
After performing all measurements, both parties publish their measure-
ment settings. They use these iterations in which Alice has chosen the setting
N − 1 and Bob N to create their raw keys. Afterward they perform the rec-
onciliation, requiring them to publish at average H(b|a,N − 1, N) bits per
bit of the raw key. Thus the key rate of the protocol when the value of the
security parameter is s, is given by the expression
(3.6) P (x = N − 1, y = N) · (H∞(N − 1, s)−H(b|a,N − 1, N)) .
3.4. Experimental estimation of parameters
We will now briefly discuss the problem of experimental estimation of
physical parameters. This issue goes beyond the main topic of this work, and
we will only sketch it. This section is not necessary to understand the rest of
this work.
The protocols considered in this work in chapter 4, secs 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4,
have in common several properties important from the point of view of ex-
perimental estimation. All these protocols need to estimate the average value
of at least one expression (e.g. Bell operators or dimension witnesses), and
involve more than one party. On the other hand, the task of these protocols,
i.e. the generation of randomness, allows the parties to communicate with
each other, which is not the case in QKD protocols, like the one described in
sec. 4.1.
QKD protocols, including the protocol from sec. 4.1, usually involve (at
least) two parties which can communicate only via a public channel, and thus
the messages they exchange cannot be considered as unknown to a potential
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eavesdropper, in particular if their private data are used to generate a secret
key. On the other hand, the parties have to estimate some parameters con-
cerning both of them, and thus requires them to send some of their internal
data to the other party. The parties want to have a strong confidence in their
estimation and to publish not more information than it is necessary.
As we will see, this requires us to employ a different method for each of
these two tasks.
Currently there are two popular methods of estimation of parameters:
the first is using martingales5 and the second uses symmetric variables. The
former is suitable for the task randomness generation, whereas the latter
should be used for QKD.
In the analysis of QKD protocols we restrict here our considerations to
protocols secure against eavesdroppers without memory. This assumption
means in particular that the state of the device does not depend on the
iteration. This assumption is standard, see [132] for a discussion. The issue
of attaining the security against a general eavesdropper remained unsolved
for many years, and has been recently addressed by Arnon-Friedman, Renner
and Vidick in [9]6.
3.4.1. Estimation with martingales and Azuma theorem. The
method of estimation involving martingales was introduced to the field of
quantum information science in 2001 by Richard D. Gill [78]. Further it
was employed in a seminal paper by Pironio et al. [170] in the context of
randomness certification.
We discuss here the estimation of the average value of a single Bell op-
erator. This is easily applied to the case with dimension witnesses or to the
case with more expressions to estimate.
Recall (2.8) with a general form of a Bell expression (we omit CI , since
one does not need to estimate a known constant value):
I =
∑
a∈A
∑
b∈B
∑
x∈X
∑
y∈Y
αa,b,x,yP (a, b|x, y).
In each iteration i = 1, . . . , N the behavior of the box is described by some
probability distribution Pi(A,B|X, Y ). Since this probability is determined
by the internal working of the device, which is unknown to us, we do not know
this distribution. Because in each iteration this distribution may be different,
we even cannot estimate this distribution by repeating the experiment many
5Martingales are stochastic processes with the property that the conditional expec-
tation of any of their future values is equal to their current value. They formalize the
intuition of a gain in a fair gambling game.
6The security against an eavesdropper with memory has been previously proved for
several protocols, e.g. in [15, 215], and in our work [174] for the case without noise.
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times. Nonetheless, the device has some behavior, and one can think of the
value of the Bell operator in i-th round. Let us denote it by Ii.
In the considered scenario we run a sequence of N measurements on a
quantum box. We are interested in estimating the average value of the Bell
operator, I¯, i.e.
I¯ ≡ 1
N
N∑
i=1
Ii.
In i-th iteration of the setting for Alice is xi, and the setting for Bob is
yi.
Let χi(a, b|x, y) be an indicator, i.e. a binary function equal 1 if in i-
th iteration of the performed experiment the settings are x and y, and the
outcomes are a and b for Alice and Bob, and equal to 0 otherwise. Let us
define a random variable:
(3.7) Iˆi =
∑
a∈A
∑
b∈B
∑
x∈X
∑
y∈Y
αa,b,x,y
χi(a, b|x, y)
P (x, y)
,
where P(X, Y ) is the distribution of settings. Then
Iˆ ≡ 1
N
N∑
i=1
Iˆi
is an estimator of I¯.
Using the Azuma-Hoeffding inequality [13, 94] one may show [170, 63]
that for  > 0, pmin ≡ minx∈X,y∈Y P (x, y), αmax ≡ max(αa,b,x,y), and Imax
being the Tsirelson bound of the Bell operator, we have
P (I¯ ≤ Iˆ − ) ≤ exp
− 2N
2
(
αmax
pmin
+ Imax
)
 .
This means that the probability that the estimator I¯ differs significantly from
the actual value Iˆ decreases exponentially with the number of runs.
In [63, 171] it was shown how the above estimation can be applied in the
context of randomness certification. In the original paper [170] the author
used this method improperly.
Let xi and yi denote the settings used by Alice and Bob in the i-th iteration
of the experiment, and Nx,y the number of iterations in which the pair of
settings x and y occurred. We have
∑
x,yNx,y = N .
In [63] the authors divide the interval [Imin, Imax], where Imin is the mini-
mal quantum value of the Bell operator, into m disjoint parts,
{Ωl = [Jl, Jl+1)}i=1,...,m,
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and define the so-called “good” even G. We will not describe their method
in details and just state that they prove the following theorem:
Theorem 3.1. For any , δ > 0 there exists a “good” even G with proba-
bility
P [G] ≥ 1−m · 2−δN − 3 · 2−cpmin2·N
such that if G occurs, and Iˆ ∈ Ωl, then
N∑
i=1
H∞(Pi(A,B|X, Y ), xi, yi) ≥
(∑
x,y
Nx,y ·Hcert∞ (I, x, y, Jl−1)
)
− δN − 1.
The intuitive sense of this theorem is that in a long series of iterations
of the randomness generating device the probability that the generated min-
entropy is on average less than expected decreases exponentially with the
number of iterations.
Further in this work, in sec. 4.2, we calculate Hcert∞ (I, x, y, s) for a par-
ticular choice of x = x0 and y = y0 and s ∈ [Imin, Imax]. From the above
theorem it follows that we may use a distribution of settings P(X, Y ) which
prefers this particular pair of settings with probability arbitrarily close to 1,
and certify with probability of failure decreasing exponentially with N that
the device produced at least
N ·
(
P (x0, y0) ·Hcert∞ (I, x0, y0, Iˆ − )− δ
)
− 1
bits of randomness in the sequence of outcomes (ai, bi)i from iterations with
settings xi = x0 and yi = y0.
3.4.2. Symmetric probability distributions and the task of esti-
mation. In the scenario considered in the previous section, the parties could
reveal all their results to each other. In the case of estimation in QKD, they
do not have such a possibility, because of the lack of a secure private channel
(since the aim of QKD is to establish such a channel). Thus, the parties want
to publish only some subset of their data in order to estimate their security
parameters. In [133] the following method which can be used in this scenario
was introduced.
Let V ⊂ R be a finite alphabet, and V = (V1, · · · , VN) be a random
variable with values in VN , and probability distribution PV. We say that V
is symmetrically distributed if for any permutation
pi : {1, · · · , N} → {1, · · · , N}
we have
PV(v1, . . . , vN) = PV(vpi(1), · · · , vpi(N)).
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Let us denote
v+ ≡ max{|v| ∈ V}.
In [133], in lemma 5, the following property of symmetric random vari-
ables is stated:
Lemma 3.2. Let V = (V1, · · · , VN) be a symmetrically distributed random
variable, let N1, N2 be positive integers satisfying N1 +N2 = N , and Vest be a
random variable defined as
(3.8) Vest ≡ 1
N2
N∑
i=N1+1
Vi.
Then the probability that∑
v1∈V
...
vN∈V
PV(v1, . . . , vN) · (v1 · v2 · · · · · vN1) ≥
(
Vest +N
− 1
4
2
)N1
is not greater than
2(N + 1)|V|−1 exp
(
−
√
N2
4v2+
)
.
This lemma gives the following method of estimation which is possible to
be used in QKD.
We are interested in estimating the number of the generated bits of the
secure key in a QKD scenario, i.e. the min-entropy or, equivalently, the
guessing probability of a sequence obtained in given QKD protocol.
Let s1, · · · , sK be a set of security parameters7. We assume that we know
a convex function Pguess(s1, · · · , sK) giving an upper bound on the average
guessing probability of a single digit (bit or, in general, dit) of a key.
Lemma 3.2 gives a method to estimate the average guessing probability
of a digit in a long key. We start with expressing Pguess as a function of
probabilities occurring in the problem, P. Since Pguess is convex, it is possible
to construct a function P˜guess linear in P, which upper bounds Pguess.
For a given iteration i we may express an estimator of the value of P˜guess,
Pˆguess,i, in a similar way as we did for a Bell operator in (3.7). In order to
calculate the average value of P˜guess over long series of iterations, we have to
make their distribution symmetric.
As previously mentioned, we restrict to the case where the device does not
have memory. This means in particular that the values of Pˆguess,i for different i
are independent, still not necessarily equal. Using initial private randomness,
7Recall that security parameters are all linear functions of probabilities occurring in
the problem.
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one of the honest parties involved in the QKD, say Alice, after the series
of all measurements, may choose a random permutation pi : {1, . . . , N} →
{1, . . . , N}, and announce it. Let us define
Vi ≡ Pˆguess,pi(i),
i.e. V = (V1, · · · , VN) permute the estimators of iterations. It is now straight-
forward to use lemma 3.2 to have a method of estimation of the value of P˜guess,
and thus get an upper bound on the probability that one can guess the value
of a bit of the key, Pguess. This simply requires parties to publish the settings
and measurements in N2 iterations to calculate the value of (3.8).
This method has been used in QKD protocols, e.g. in [132], and in our
work [174].
CHAPTER 4
Quantum protocols
This chapter covers the main topic of this work, namely the presentation
of our results obtained using SDP in the analysis of quantum protocols. In
each section we describe some results of our previous works [114, 139, 141,
174, 140]. All the figures in this chapter are taken from these works. The
organization of this chapter is as follows.
The results of [174] are contained in sec. 4.1, where we provide an analysis
of a DI-QKD protocol belonging to a family we introduced. The protocol has
several novel features distinguishing it from the QKD protocols discussed in
sec. 3.3.
The main advantage of the protocol is the smaller vulnerability to im-
perfect RNGs used for generation of the settings. This way we show that
using our method it is possible to construct a QKD protocol which retains
its security even if the source of randomness used by communicating parties
is strongly biased.
We analyze the robustness of the protocol using SDP. We also introduce
post-processing methods. The post-processing has a paradoxical property
that rejecting a random part of the private data can increase the key rate of
the protocol.
The paper [141] concerning DI randomness expansion is discussed in
sec. 4.2. We use the methods of SDP to calculate the min-entropy certified
by a number of DI-QRNG protocols.
The issue of analysis of SDI protocols [114, 140] is divided in two sections.
In sec. 4.3.2.2 we discuss some properties of dimension witnesses, and then
use these properties in sec. 4.3 to develop a method to solve SDI problems
relaxations with the NPA.
In sec. 4.4 we refer our result of [139] that amplification of arbitrarily
weak randomness is possible using quantum resources. We present a protocol
that uses the Mermin game for randomness amplification, and calculate its
parameters. We derive the necessary bounds on the violation of the inequality
as a function of the initial randomness quality.
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4.1. Quantum key distribution using Hardy’s paradox
In this section we generalize the results of [132] stating that a condition
imposed on a single Bell operator may certify the randomness of the out-
comes. We consider the case when instead of a Bell operator, the Hardy’s
paradox is used, and the key is formed from the measurement settings with
the outcomes made public. The last property is shared with the non-DI
prepare-and-measure protocol SARG04 [188]. These properties distinguish
our proposal from other QKD protocols which use a single Bell operator,
publish their settings, and use outcomes to generate the key.
The proposed protocol has an important advantage over other solutions.
The other QKD protocols, in which the key is obtained from the outcomes, are
known [27, 96] to posses a drawback that even small imperfectness in private
RNGs significantly decreases the key rate. In contrast, we demonstrate that
they are not so dangerous for our protocol. More precisely, we take a standard
DI-QKD described in sec. 3.3.2.1, which uses CHSH, and show that it fails if
the bias of RNGs is greater than 0.1. On the other hand, our protocol allows
positive key rates far beyond this point.
We use SDP in order to evaluate the key rate of the discussed protocol.
Before we start the discussion of the protocol, we have to state the Hardy’s
paradox.
4.1.1. The Hardy’s paradox and the Hardy’s state. The Hardy’s
paradox is another phenomenon which is not possible in the set of classical
probabilities, L, but is allowed in the quantum set, Q. The paradox has been
introduced in 1992 by Lucien Hardy [88].
Let us consider a physical system consisting of two subsystems shared
between two distant parties, Alice and Bob. Each of the parties have access
to one of the subsystems. Both of them can choose one of two binary mea-
surement settings, and get binary outcomes. The Hardy’s paradox introduces
the following set of conditions on the probability distribution P(A,B|X, Y )
(in this case A = B = X = Y = {0, 1}):
(4.1)
P (0, 0|0, 0) = q > 0,
P (0, 0|1, 0) = 0,
P (0, 0|0, 1) = 0,
P (1, 1|1, 1) = 0,
where
q ≡ 5
√
5− 11
2
.
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One may show [98, 99, 174, 173] that the state and measurement which
realize a quantum probability distribution which satisfies conditions (4.1)
must be a unique, up to a local unitary, pure two-qubit entangled state.
4.1.2. The idea of the protocol. We consider a scenario in which two
distant parties, Alice and Bob, want to generate a secure key. They are
allowed to use public classical communication.
We discuss the case when private sources of randomness are biased in
sec. 4.1.6. For the rest of this section we assume the randomness to be
unbiased. We consider two distributions: uniform and the one described
in the section 4.1.4.2, further referred to as nonuniform. Note that one of
the benefits of using nonuniform distribution is the fact that it requires less
randomness (in terms of min-entropy).
The QKD protocol proceeds in the following way.
We assume that both parties share parts of a sequence of entangled states.
Each part of an entangled pair is called a subsystem. The pairs can be
obtained from an untrusted device. The protocol runs in an iterative way.
One entangled pair is needed for each iteration.
In a single iteration i, Alice and Bob choose randomly their settings,
xi ∈ {0, 1} and yi ∈ {0, 1} with their private sources of randomness. Then
they put these settings into untrusted measurement devices and get results
ai and bi. Both parties keep their settings xi and yi private, and publish their
outcomes, ai and bi.
We briefly mention that in order to certify the key rate the parties have
to reveal some subset of their settings. These are needed to estimate the
values of probabilities occurring in the statement of the Hardy’s paradox. In
this section we explicitly state which part of the joint probability concerns
settings, and which outcomes, e.g. we write P (a = 0, b = 0|x = 1, y = 0)
instead of P (0, 0|1, 0). With this notation the Hardy’s conditions are defined
in the following way by, cf. Eq. (4.1):
P (a = 0, b = 0|x = 0, y = 0) = q,
P (a = 0, b = 0|x = 1, y = 0) = 0,
P (a = 0, b = 0|x = 0, y = 1) = 0,
P (a = 1, b = 1|x = 1, y = 1) = 0.
The idea of the protocol emerges from Hardy’s conditions in the following
way. The second and third conditions state that if both Alice and Bob get
outcomes 0, then their settings have to be the same, or, in other words,
P (x 6= y|a = b = 0) = 0. The first condition states that the probability
of getting both outcomes 0 is positive. From the fourth condition it fol-
lows that the device cannot be described by a local probability distribution;
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otherwise a malevolent constructor would be able to predict the behavior of
the device. The probability of guessing of the settings when both outcomes
were 0 depends on the ratio between P (a = 0, b = 0|x = 0, y = 0) and
P (a = 0, b = 0|x = 1, y = 1). The analysis of this ratio is the main topic of
this section, since it is directly related to the key rate of the protocol.
In order to generate the key, Alice and Bob select those iterations for
which ai = bi = 0. From the definition of the Hardy’s paradox, (4.1), it is
easy to see that in the noiseless case they have xi = yi, and thus may generate
the key simply by taking their local settings, which are secret and equal for
both parties.
Below we use SDP to analyze the noisy case, in which the probabilities
only approximate the one of the noiseless case. In this noisy case the key
reconciliation has to be performed. This requires parties to reveal some values
of their secret bits.
The quantum probability distribution satisfying the condition of the noise-
less Hardy case, (4.1), is unique. In this case we have
(4.2)
0 < P (a = 0, b = 0|x = 0, y = 0) = 5
√
5− 11
2
< P (a = 0, b = 0|x = 1, y = 1) =
√
5− 2.
In the noisy case instead of the ideal Hardy’s probabilities we take
(4.3)
P (a = 0, b = 0|x = 0, y = 0) = h1,
P (a = 0, b = 0|x = 1, y = 0) = h2,
P (a = 0, b = 0|x = 0, y = 1) = h3,
P (a = 1, b = 1|x = 1, y = 1) = h4.
Further in this work we will calculate the guessing probability of a key for a
grid of values hi. This will allow us to approximate a function
Pguess[P(2, 2|2, 2)]
giving an upper bound on the probability of guessing a single bit of the key
by an eavesdropper. In sec. 3.4.2 it has been discussed how such a function
is used in an experimental estimation of the security of a protocol.
Below, for the analysis of the noisy case, we decided to use the model of
white noise. In particular we are interested in a projection of that grid along
the line hi defined by
(4.4)
h1 = p · q + 1− p
4
,
h2 = h3 = h4 =
1− p
4
,
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since these are the probabilities observed in the case with white noise.
4.1.3. Analysis of the protocol. In order to analyze the protocol we
have to introduce some basic notions. We start with a definition of distribu-
tion of settings. Then we move to the discussion of the guessing probability
of a setting which differs significantly from the guessing probability of an
outcome. We finish with a description of the method allowing to express the
guessing probability of a setting as the NPA problem.
4.1.3.1. Distribution of settings. We say that the distribution of settings
is fair, or unbiased, if all settings are i.i.d. with a probability distribution
defined by
(4.5)
Punbiased(X, Y ) = (P (0, 0) = pA · pB, P (0, 1) = pA · (1− pB),
P (1, 0) = (1− pA) · pB, P (1, 1) = (1− pA) · (1− pB)).
In the analysis of the Hardy’s protocol the following two distributions are
of particular interest. The first probability distribution is defined by
pA = pB =
1
2
.
Further, in sec. 4.1.4.2, we consider a nonuniform probability distribution
defined by
pA = pB =
1
2
(
√
5− 1).
4.1.3.2. The guessing probability of a setting. We will now consider con-
ditional probabilities of Alice’s settings x when we know that both Alice and
Bob got the outcome 0, namely P (x|a = 0, b = 0). These probabilities may
be expressed in terms of P(A,B|X, Y ) with the use of Bayes rule, as
(4.6) P (x = 0|a = 0, b = 0) = σ
σ + ν
and
(4.7) P (x = 1|a = 0, b = 0) = ν
σ + ν
.
Here σ and ν are defined as
(4.8)
σ ≡P (a = 0, b = 0|x = 0, y = 0)P (x = 0, y = 0)+
P (a = 0, b = 0|x = 0, y = 1)P (x = 0, y = 1)
(4.9)
ν ≡P (a = 0, b = 0|x = 1, y = 0)P (x = 1, y = 0)+
P (a = 0, b = 0|x = 1, y = 1)P (x = 1, y = 1).
Let us consider a vector h expressing the assumption of the probabilities
occurring in the Hardy’s paradox, see (4.3). We introduce two concave func-
tions, Γ0(h) and Γ1(h), that give upper bounds for values of P (x = 0|a =
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0, b = 0) and P (x = 1|a = 0, b = 0), respectively, allowed by quantum me-
chanics or one of its NPA relaxations. Note, that these functions do not make
any assumptions about the shared state and the measurements of Alice and
Bob, so they give DI bounds. Examples of these functions for h given by (4.4)
are shown in fig. 4.1.
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Figure 4.1. Functions Γ0(h) and Γ1(h) for uniform and
nonuniform (see sec. 4.1.4.2) distribution of settings. These
functions give upper bounds for values of P (x = 0|a = 0, b = 0)
and P (x = 1|a = 0, b = 0) for h given by (4.4) with η = 1− p.
4.1.3.3. Semi-definite programming relaxation of the guessing probability.
This section describes how to use SDP in order to evaluate upper bounding
functions Γ0(h) and Γ1(h).
To use the NPA method, we introduce functions Γ˜0(h), and Γ˜1(h), which
give the relevant upper bounds on probability P (x|a = 0, b = 0) assuming
that the state under consideration is pure. Then it is easy to see that the
functions Γ0(h) and Γ1(h) are concave hulls of Γ˜0(h) and Γ˜1(h), respectively.
Let us consider a particular entangled pair used in i-th iteration of the
protocol. Without loss of generality, using no signaling principle, we may
assume that an eavesdropper performs his measurement with result e before
Alice and Bob start the protocol. What is more, in order to consider probabil-
ity distributions allowed for a particular subsystem l, we may ignore (“trace
out”) other subsystems and perform optimization over bipartite states.
In [132] the authors have been able to use the NPA in a straightforward
way in order to find the upper bounds for the case they considered. It was pos-
sible because they were interested in the probability of guessing the outcome
if the setting is known, PA(a|x), which appears directly in NPA problems as
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a variable. In our case there is no variable corresponding to P (x|a, b), and
thus we cannot use the NPA directly. To be more precise, the expressions
in (4.6) and (4.7) are not linear in variables occurring in the NPA, and thus
they cannot be used either as a target, or as a constraint.
In order to overcome this difficulty let us note that for given h using (4.3)
we get
(4.10) σ = h1 · P (x = 0, y = 0) + h3 · P (x = 0, y = 1),
which is a constant, and
(4.11)
ν = h2 · P (x = 1, y = 0) + P (a = 0, b = 0|x = 1, y = 1) · P (x = 1, y = 1).
Note that the probabilities P (x, y) depend on the random number generator,
and not on the internal construction of the device, and we assume that they
are under control of Alice and Bob. Thus the only variable occurring in the
problem is the probability P (a = 0, b = 0|x = 1, y = 1).
It is easy to see that the expressions (4.6) and (4.7) achieve their maximal
values as functions of (4.10) and (4.11), if ν gets its minimal or maximal
value, respectively. Thus we only need to use SDP optimization to establish
the range of possible values of ν for a given h. This can be done using the
NPA directly.
Obviously, calculating the function for all possible values of continuous
parameters h is impossible. Instead we calculate it only for some values.
Now, if we represent the function with set of vectors, each containing the
coordinates of a single point together with the value of the function, then the
problem of linearly constrained optimization over this function can be solved
with linear programming. Examples of such problems are problems stated
in (4.15) and (4.16) further in this section.
4.1.4. Post-processing strategies. We will now discuss methods of
post-processing strategies which can be applied in order to improve the key
rate obtained with the described protocol.
The analysis of the case without noise helps to understand the reason why
the use of the dropping strategy can increase the key rate. It also explains
the role of nonuniform distribution of settings.
4.1.4.1. A dropping strategy. As already mentioned, in the noiseless case
with uniform distribution of settings we have
P (a = 0, b = 0|x = 0, y = 0) = 5
√
5− 11
2
≈ 0.090167,
and
P (a = 0, b = 0|x = 1, y = 1) =
√
5− 2 ≈ 0.236068,
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so that
P (a = 0, b = 0|x = 0, y = 0) < P (a = 0, b = 0|x = 1, y = 1).
From this we get that the guessing probability for an eavesdropper is higher
than 1
2
, since the probability that the settings (used in key generation) are
equal to 1 is greater that the probability that they are equal to 0. Below we
give a strategy which allows to get the guessing probability equal to 1
2
.
With the dropping strategy, after performing her measurements, Alice
randomly selects only the following fraction of iterations with ai = bi = 0 and
xi = 1 (in the perfect case we then have also that yi = 1):
P (a = 0, b = 0|x = 0, y = 0)
P (a = 0, b = 0|x = 1, y = 1) .
Afterward Alice sends the list of selected iterations to Bob via an authenti-
cated public channel.
In this reduced list of iterations Alice has an approximately equal number
of settings 0 and 1. (Obviously in the noiseless case they correspond to
the same values on the side of Bob.) Thus the guessing probability for an
eavesdropper is now exactly equal to 1
2
.
Now, we have
Pnot dropped(a = 0, b = 0|x = 0, y = 0)
+ Pnot dropped(a = 0, b = 0|x = 1, y = 1) = 5
√
5− 11 ≈ 0.180334.
To get the actual ratio of the total outcomes that are contained in the key,
this should be multiplied by
P (x = y = 0) = P (x = y = 1) =
1
4
.
Thus the key rate is equal to 5
√
5−11
4
≈ 0.04508.
4.1.4.2. Nonuniform distribution of settings. Instead of choosing measure-
ment settings with equal probabilities, both Alice and Bob may choose the
measurement settings x = 0 (resp. y = 0) and x = 1 (resp. y = 1) with a
ratio r : 1− r, for some r = pA = pB, where the joint probability distribution
P(X, Y ) is given by (4.5).
In order to obtain the guessing probability equal to 1
2
, meaning that
P (a = 0, b = 0, x = 0, y = 0) = P (a = 0, b = 0, x = 1, y = 1),
the condition for r reads
(4.12) P (a = 0, b = 0|x = 0, y = 0)r2 = P (a = 0, b = 0|x = 1, y = 1)(1−r)2,
4.1 Quantum key distribution using Hardy’s paradox 69
or, equivalently
r =
√
P (a = 0, b = 0|x = 1, y = 1)√
P (a = 0, b = 0|x = 0, y = 0) +√P (a = 0, b = 0|x = 1, y = 1) .
Thus we have
(4.13) pA = pB = r =
1
2
(√
5− 1
)
≈ 0.61803.
The key rate in the noiseless case, where there is no need for reconciliation,
is thus
(4.14)
P (a = 0, b = 0|x = 0, y = 0) · P (x = 0, y = 0)+
P (a = 0, b = 0|x = 1, y = 1) · P (x = 1, y = 1)
= 2P (a = 0, b = 0|x = 0, y = 0)r2.
This stems from the fact that each event P (a = 0, b = 0, x = 0, y = 0) and
P (a = 0, b = 0, x = 1, y = 1) generates 1 bit of a key. The equality is a
consequence of (4.12).
Using (4.13) and (4.14) we calculate that the key rate for the noiseless
case is given by
2P (a = 0, b = 0|x = 0, y = 0)r2 ≈ 0.06888.
4.1.5. Calculation of the key rates. We will now describe a method of
calculating the key rate achieved by protocols based on the Hardy’s paradoxes
when we allow a noise to occur.
Let us denote by n the number of iterations with both outcomes equal to
0, after total number of N iterations. This is on average given by
n ≈ P (a = 0, b = 0) ·N.
The malevolent constructor of the device, Eve, proceeds as follows. The
iterations can be divided into two groups. For iterations within the first
group, Eve makes a guess that the key value is 0, and for iterations from the
second group, she guesses the key value is 1. We consider the case in which
the average values of the Hardy’s probabilities, (4.3), are given by a vector h.
Let us denote the probability that a subsystem belongs to the first group
by p0, and let the average values of the Hardy’s probabilities from this group
be given by h0. This allows guessing 0 by Eve with the probability upper
bounded by P0 ≡ Γ0(h0) ≥ 12 (P0 ≥ 12 , since otherwise it would be profitable
to guess bit 1 instead of 0).
The remaining part of subsystems, which occurs with probability p1 =
1 − p0, has the Hardy’s probabilities given by h1, and Eve guesses correctly
the key value is 1 with probability not exceeding P1 ≡ Γ1(h1) ≥ 12 .
70 Quantum protocols
4.1.5.1. Basic case. In the simplest case described in sec. 4.1.2, in which
no dropping strategy is used, the best thing Eve may do is to maximize her
guessing probability, P
(1)
guess(h). The relevant upper bound for the average
guessing probability is given by the solution of the following problem in vari-
ables p0, p1,h0,h1:
maximize p0Γ0(h0) + p1Γ1(h1)
subject to p0h0 + p1h1 = h,
p0 + p1 = 1,
p0, p1 ≥ 0.
(4.15)
Surprisingly approximation of this problem may be obtained using LP, see
sec. 4.1.7.2. Solutions of this problem for h given by (4.4) are shown in
Fig. 4.2.
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Figure 4.2. Average guessing probability of a key when
no dropping strategy is used. This is given by solutions
of the problem (4.15). Cases with uniform and nonuniform
distribution of settings are shown.
In this case the key rate is given by the following formula, cf. (3.6):
K1 = P (a = 0, b = 0)
(− log2(P (1)guess(h))−H(x|y)) .
The term P (a = 0, b = 0) stems from the fact that the only round for which
a = b = 0 generates the key. The expression − log2(P (1)guess(h)) is the average
min-entropy of a bit of key, and H(x|y) is the conditional entropy, which
determines the amount of communication needed of reconciliation of the key,
as shown in [33]. The communicated messages in reconciliation reveal some
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part of the key to an eavesdropper. Reconciliation is needed when the noise
occurs, since then we do not have P (x 6= y|a = b = 0) = 0.
Both expressions, P (a = 0, b = 0) and the conditional entropy H(x|y)
can be calculated from the experimental setup1, and reflect the amount of
communication needed for the key reconciliation. Examples of conditional
entropies for different post-processing strategies and distributions of settings
are shown in fig. 4.3.
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Figure 4.3. Values of conditional entropies of the set-
ting of Alice given the setting of Bob, H(x|y), if out-
comes on both sides are 0. The cases with uniform and
nonuniform distribution of settings, and with and without drop-
ping strategy, are considered. In the case of the nonuniform
distribution of settings, the line referring to use of a dropping
strategy is slightly above the one without any dropping. Note
that the fact that H(x|y) depends on noise is a result of a differ-
ent dependence of probabilities P (x, y|a = b = 0) on the noise
for different x and y.
4.1.5.2. The dropping strategy. Let us now consider those iterations in
which both published outcomes are 0. Among them the number of iterations
with the setting of Alice equal to 0 is
(p0P0 + p1(1− P1))n ≡ pA0 · n,
1A brief explanation may be necessary at this point. Even though we are working in
DI scheme, we can expect the device to generate a probability distribution obtained with
a reasonable setup. Thus a probable probability distribution is given by the one obtained
with a noised Hardy’s state with proper measurements, which determines the value of
P (a = 0, b = 0) and H(x|y).
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and equal to 1 is
(p0(1− P0) + p1P1)n ≡ pA1 · n.
In these equations we assume that the device is prepared by an eavesdropper
in the way which maximizes his guessing probability. Thus we assume that
in those iterations in which he tries to guess the key value to be equal to
0, the device generates this value with maximal probability, P0; similarly for
those iterations in which the eavesdropper guesses the key value 1, the device
generates it with probability P1.
If pA0 < p
A
1 , then Alice discards
(
pA1 − pA0
) ·n part of the iterations having
the value 1. After this she has equal number of iterations with each of the
values, namely pA0 · n.
For this scenario Eve will on average guess correctly p0P0n iterations with
the value 0, and
pA0
pA1
p1P1n iterations with the value 1. Thus we get that her
guessing probability among those iterations that are not discarded is given
by
P (2)guess ≡
1
2pA0 n
(
p0P0n+
pA0
pA1
p1P1n
)
=
1
2
(
p0P0
pA0
+
p1P1
pA1
)
.
The case with pA0 > p
A
1 gives exactly the same formula.
In order to calculate the bound on the guessing probability P
(2)
guess(h) we
use the following problem in variables p0, p1,h0,h1:
maximize
1
2
(
1
pA0
p0Γ0(h0) +
1
pA1
p1Γ1(h1)
)
subject to p0h0 + p1h1 = h,
p0 + p1 = 1,
p0, p1 ≥ 0.
(4.16)
As in the previous case, the values
pA0 = P (x = 0|a = 0, b = 0), and
pA1 = P (x = 1|a = 0, b = 0)
are calculated from the setup.
The key rate is now given by the following formula:
K2 =P (a = 0, b = 0) ·
(
2 min
(
pA0 , p
A
1
)) ·
· (− log2 (P (2)guess(h))−H(x|y, dropping)) .
Both P (a = 0, b = 0) and the conditional entropy H(x|y, dropping) can be
calculated directly from the setup, i.e. the state and measurements expected
to be used (see the footnote in sec. 4.1.5.1).
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4.1.6. Biased sources of randomness. Let us assume that the average
probability distribution of the source of randomness is given by (4.5). Still,
in each iteration, the probability distribution is biased in a way known to an
eavesdropper. For the sake of simplicity we consider only biases obtained by
changing the parameters pA and pB to pA ±  and pB ± , respectively, for
given . This is justified by Proposition 1 of [87]. This gives four possible
biased distributions of settings, denoted (Pbiased,i(x, y))i=1,2,3,4. The average
distribution in (4.5) can be obtained only if the proportions of all biased
distributions are equal.
If we know only the average distribution given by (4.5), then for iterations
with a particular biased distribution Pbiased,i(x, y), the observed conditional
probabilities are under- or overestimated, viz.
(4.17) Pobserved(a, b|x, y) = P (a, b|x, y) Pbiased,i(x, y)
Punbiased(x, y)
,
cf. Eq. (3.7).
Let us consider the noiseless case with nonuniform distribution of settings,
given by (4.1) with
P (a = 0, b = 0|x = 0, y = 0) = q = 5
√
5− 11
2
,
and thus with
(4.18) P (a = 0, b = 0|x = 1, y = 1) = q˜ =
√
5− 2.
For a given biased distribution Pbiased,i(x, y), the probability that the gener-
ated bit of the key in a particular iteration is 0, denoted by Pi,key=0, is given
by the formula
Pi,key=0 ≡ qPbiased,i(0, 0)
qPbiased,i(0, 0) + q˜Pbiased,i(1, 1)
,
cf. Eq. (4.6).
Since the eavesdropper tries to guess the more probable key value, the
guessing probability is given by the formula
Pguess,i = max(Pi,key=0, 1− Pi,key=0).
In order to obtain the average guessing probability, this expression has to be
averaged over all four possible biased probability distributions, viz.∑
i=1,2,3,4
1
4
Pguess,i.
Using this we can get that for  ≈ 1
10
the Hardy protocol is still able to
work. Thus the proposed protocol is able to work even in cases when the
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only available source of randomness is biased. Up to our knowledge this is
the first known protocol able to work with such a high bias [87].
4.1.7. Explanation of the problems in the protocol. Here we give
more details regarding the optimization problems we were using in this section
for the analysis of the Hardy’s protocol.
4.1.7.1. NPA problem for Hardy’s paradox. Now, we will give an example
of a problem occurring in the analysis of the protocol from this section. As
a particular case let us take the following SDP problem for maximization of
the value of ν:
maximize Tr (ΓMν)
subject to Γ ∈ Q1+AB(2, 2|2, 2)
Tr
(
ΓMP (0,0|0,0)
) ≥ h1,
Tr
(
ΓMP (0,0|1,0)
) ≤ h2,
Tr
(
ΓMP (0,0|0,1)
) ≤ h3,
Tr
(
ΓMP (1,1|1,1)
) ≤ h4,
(4.19)
where
Mν = (1− pA)
(
pBMP (0,0|1,0) + (1− pB)MP (0,0|1,1)
)
refers to the probability that both results are 0 and Alice’s setting is 1
(cf. Eq. (4.9)).
We note that this problem relaxes the equality conditions of (4.3) to
inequalities. These are simple for an SDP solver to handle, since equalities
are introduced as pairs of opposite inequalities. This SDP problem has been
used as one of the performance tests in chapter 6 with
h1 = q − , h2 = h3 = h4 = ,
where  ≡ 10−8, and pA and pB are given in (4.13).
4.1.7.2. Guessing probability as a linear problem. Let us consider the prob-
lem (4.15). We will show a method to approximate it with a linear problem.
Recall from sec. 4.1.3.3 that Γ0(h) and Γ1(h) are concave hulls of functions
Γ˜0(h) and Γ˜1(h). The latter pair of functions is calculated for given h with
a problem similar to the problem (4.19). The value of Γi(h) for given h is
calculated as a maximum over all convex combinations of Γ˜i(·) calculated for
all possible points.
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For obvious reasons, we can calculate Γ˜i(·) only for a finite set of κ points,
{h(k)i }k, as stated2 in sec. 4.1.3.3, and thus get only an approximation of Γi(h).
Taking this into account we formulate an approximation of the problem (4.15)
in variable x ∈ R2κ as a primal LP, (1.7) with
AT =

· · · (h(k)0 )1 · · · (h(k)1 )1 · · ·
· · · (h(k)0 )2 · · · (h(k)1 )2 · · ·
· · · (h(k)0 )3 · · · (h(k)1 )3 · · ·
· · · (h(k)0 )4 · · · (h(k)1 )4 · · ·
· · · 1 · · · 1 · · ·
 ,
with b = [h1, h2, h3, h4, 1]
T , and
c = −[· · · Γ˜0(h(k)0 ) · · · Γ˜1(h(k)1 ) · · · ].
The value of xk for k ∈ {1, . . . , κ} determines the share of a point with the
value h
(k)
0 (see (4.3)) and the eavesdropper guessing 0. The value of xk for
k ∈ {κ + 1, . . . , 2κ} determines the share of a point with the value h(k−κ)1
(see (4.3)) and the eavesdropper guessing 1. First four constraints mean that
the average observed value in (4.3) are given by h1, h2, h3 and h4. The last
row of A and b is the normalization of convex coefficients constraint. This
normalization includes the constraint p0 + p1 = 1. The average guessing
2We have chosen an irregular set with more points near the values of particular impor-
tance, i.e. 0 and q = 5
√
5−11
2 . More precisely we have chosen
h1 ∈ {0.0000001, 0.000001, 0.0000025, 0.000005, 0.00001, 0.000025, 0.00005,
0.0001, 0.00025, 0.0005, 0.001, 0.003, 0.007, q − 0.0000001,
q − 0.000001, q − 0.00001, q, q + 0.00001, q + 0.000001, q + 0.0000001},
h2 ∈ {0.0000001, 0.000001, 0.0000025, 0.000005, 0.00001, 0.000051, 0.00011, 0.00051,
0.0011, 0.0031, 0.0071, q − 0.0000001, q − 0.00001, q, q + 0.00001,
q + 0.0000001, 0.15, 0.2, 0.25, 0.3},
h3 ∈ {0.0000001, 0.000001, 0.0000025, 0.000005, 0.00001, 0.000052, 0.00012, 0.00052,
0.0012, 0.005, q − 0.0000001, q − 0.00001, q, q + 0.00001, q + 0.0000001,
0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8, 1},
and
h4 ∈ {0.0000001, 0.000001, 0.00001, 0.00013, 0.0013, 0.0033, 0.0073, q − 0.00001,
q, q + 0.00001, 0.15, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9, 1}.
Each set has 20 elements. Thus the calculation of the grid requires the calculation of
160000 point being solutions of SDP problems. As shown in chapter 6, the calculation of
the grid with SDPT3 solver takes about 35h, with SeDuMi solver about 17h, and about
4h with PMSdp.
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probability is obtained by averaging the guessing probability over all h
(k)
i=0,1
and guesses 0 and 1.
4.2. Randomness expansion with two devices
In this section we will describe properties of several protocols for DI-
QRNG introduced by us in [141]. Each of the protocols is able to certify two
bits of randomness in each iteration in the noiseless case. Their efficiency is
investigated in the presence of white noise with the NPA method.
One of our results is that for a different level of noise different protocols
generate most randomness. For this reason the vendor of DI-QRNG should
use different protocols depending on the amount of noise he expects to occur.
Another of our results is that some of the protocols can be improved with
additional observation of some CHSH expression.
As presented in chapter 3, the laws of quantum mechanics give to an hon-
est vendor a way to convince his potential customers that his device generates
reliable randomness. With the help of some protocol, e.g. based on Bell op-
erators, he can allow them to check with some statistical tests that the device
indeed produces certain amount of randomness, regardless of the way it has
been constructed. However, he still needs to decide which protocol to use.
We consider the scenario with a device consisting of three parts, viz. a source
of entangled states and two measurement apparatuses.
We note that all protocols are possible to be physically realized with
devices obeying the laws of quantum physics. A prominent example of ex-
periments involving similar protocols was conducted by Pironio et al. [170].
4.2.1. Randomness certification protocols. In all the protocols de-
scribed below we assume that Alice’s and Bob’s devices are separated during
the measurements. This holds, e.g. if they are distant to each other. If we
want the randomness not only to be fair, which is the case for example in
gambling and system modeling purposes, but also to be confidential, e.g. for
cryptography or authentication, we also have to assume that the untrusted
device does not communicate with the world outside. Without this assump-
tion even a fair RNG may send the results to the adversary.
The general scheme is as follows. We consider a Bell operator, resp. a
set of operators. Next we choose a pair of settings, x0 for Alice and y0 for
Bob which will be used to generate random numbers. We perform a series
of iterations. In majority of the iterations we use settings x0 and y0, but
for a randomly chosen iterations we use any other random settings instead.
These iterations are used to estimate the values of operators used to certify
the randomness.
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As mentioned in chapter 3, since for this purpose some initial randomness
is needed, protocols described below are randomness expanders3.
To analyze the protocol we plot the min-entropy given some values of the
operators. The plots are obtained using the NPA.
4.2.2. Investigated protocols. Below we present several different ran-
domness certification protocols. Recall that η = 1− p is the noise parameter.
First, we consider protocols based on a violation of a single Bell inequality.
For this purpose we use inequalities from the Braunstein-Caves family, CHSH,
modified CHSH, I1 and I2 (see secs 2.2.3, 2.2.1 and 2.2.7 in chapter 2).
Afterward we consider two more complicated protocols. First of them
is based on a decomposition of CHSH operator into two parts, each having
independent constraints. Second of them is T3C operator (see sec. 2.2.5) with
two additional CHSH constraints.
Finally, in sec. 4.2.2.4 we show that imposing an additional CHSH condi-
tion in general gives a way to improve a protocol.
For the sake of simplicity of the analysis, we assume in these protocols
which are composed of more than one operator that in each iteration all
of the operators are affected by Eve to the same extent. In general one
should consider the case when in some iterations one of the operators has a
higher value than the average, whereas another one has a lower value than
the average. We gave an example of such analysis previously in sec. 4.1.
4.2.2.1. Bell inequalities as protocols. As first Bell operators we consider
BC3, BC5 and BC7 from Braunstein-Caves family. As a pair of settings used
for randomness generation with BCn operator we use x0 = 1 and y0 =
3
2
+ n
2
.
The certified min-entropy is calculated as logarithm of the solution of the
following problem:
maximize max
a,b∈{1,··· ,n}
{
Tr
(
ΓMP(a,b|1, 32+n2 )
)}
subject to Γ ∈ Q1+AB(2, 2|3, 3)
Tr (ΓMBCn) ≥ cn
(4.20)
where MBCn is the matrix constructed for the BCn operator, and
cn = 2p · n · cos
( pi
2 · n
)
.
3Note that in the case when we are interested not only in generating strings of that
with some randomness, but also in extracting shorter random strings of a randomness of
a better quality, then we need even more initial randomness for a randomness extraction,
see sec. 3.1.3.
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Note that this is not an SDP formulation. In order to solve this problem
we have to use n2 different SDPs, one for each possible pair of a and b, and
afterward take the maximum of these results.
For our numerical tests in chapter 6 we take n = 3, a = b = 1, and
p = 0.99.
The results for protocols using Braunstein-Caves operators, as a function
of noise, are shown in fig. 4.4. For all levels of noise the simplest operator,
BC3 (see Eq. 2.13) gives the highest min-entropy.
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Figure 4.4. Lower bounds on min-entropy for protocols using
Braunstein-Caves operator.
As the next Bell operator we use modified CHSH (see sec. 2.2.4). We
examine the min-entropy with the pair of settings x0 = y0 = 1.
In the last example of protocols we take Bell operators defined above as
I1 and I2, see sec. 2.2.7. The pair of measurement settings for which the
min-entropy is calculated are x0 = y0 = 1 for both protocols.
The results for protocols using modified CHSH, I1 and I2 are shown in
fig. 4.5.
4.2.2.2. E0 and E1. In this case instead of taking only a single operator
corresponding to some Bell inequality, we use more than one for randomness
certification.
Let us consider the following decomposition of a single CHSH operator
into two operators:
(4.21)
E0 = C(1, 1) + C(1, 2),
E1 = C(2, 1)− C(2, 2).
Let us note that this certificate requires both Alice’s and Bob’s parts of
the device to have only 2 possible measurement settings. It is the smallest
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Figure 4.5. Lower bounds on min-entropies for randomness
certification protocols using modified CHSH, I1 and I2, as a
function of noise.
requirement among all presented protocols. In this work we refer to this
protocol as E0E1.
Using the Uffink’s inequality [211] we obtain that the maximal values of
pairs of operators from (4.21) lie on a circle of radius 2. Taking into account
symmetries of these operators, their maximal values obtainable in quantum
mechanics may be parametrized in the following way:
(4.22)
E0,max(φ) = 2 cos(φ)
E1,max(φ) = 2 sin(φ)
where φ ∈ [0, pi
2
]
. A device is tuned by the constructor to produce probabili-
ties leading to a particular value of φ. Since we are dealing with a correlation
form of operators if the noise η occurs then the limiting values in (4.22) have
to be multiplied by 1− η = p.
Below we use the NPA to determine the min-entropy for measurement
settings x0 = 2 and y0 = 1 as a function of φ for maximal values of the
operators given in (4.21) for different values of noise. Afterward we find the
optimal angle φ as a function of noise. To certify the randomness we assume
that simultaneously E0 ≥ 2 · p · cos(φ) and E1 ≥ 2 · p · sin(φ). This way we
have a family of protocols parametrized by a continuous variable φ.
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The optimization problem is formulated as
maximize max
a,b∈{1,2}
{
Tr
(
ΓMP (a,b|2,1)
)}
subject to Γ ∈ Q1+AB(2, 2|2, 2)
Tr (ΓME0) ≥ e0,
Tr (ΓME1) ≥ e1
(4.23)
where
ME0 ≡4
(
MP (1,1|1,1) +MP (1,1|1,2) −MPA(1|1)
)
+
+ 2
(−MPB(1|1) −MPB(1|2) +M1) ,
and
ME1 ≡ 4
(
MP (1,1|2,1) −MP (1,1|2,2)
)
+ 2
(
MPB(1|2) −MPB(1|1)
)
,
and
e0 ≡ 2p cosφ,
e1 ≡ 2p sinφ.
In fig. 4.6 the results for this protocol are shown for different noises. As one
may expect, for parameter φ equal 0 and pi
2
the min-entropy is 0, since in this
case the possible values of the operators from (4.21) in quantum and classical
cases are the same. Thus the behavior of the device can be implemented
locally and gives no warranty of the randomness. Another result is that the
optimal angle between average values of operators from (4.21) depends on
the noise parameter p. This dependence is shown in tab. 4.1.
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Figure 4.6. Lower bound on min-entropy for E0E1 pro-
tocol as a function of φ (see Eq. 4.22) for different values of
noise.
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p φ
0.9999999 0.0252
0.999999 0.0452
0.99999 0.0811
0.9999 0.1460
0.999 0.2638
0.99 0.4562
0.95 0.6179
0.9 0.6948
0.85 0.7357
0.8 0.7617
Table 4.1. Optimal value of φ depending on noise.
In our performance tests we use a = b = 1, φ = pi
4
and p = 1. Note that
this is on the boundary of the set Q. For this reason this problem is expected
to possibly cause problems with feasibility.
4.2.2.3. T3 with an additional condition. Let us consider a scenario in
which Alice has 4 possible measurement settings and Bob has 3, each having
2 possible outcomes. In [114] the T3 operator was used. Now let us take two
additional Bell operators, which are identical to CHSH with certain choices
of settings, viz.:
CHSH1 = C(0, 1) + C(2, 1) + C(0, 2)− C(2, 2)(4.24a)
CHSH2 = C(1, 1) + C(3, 1) + C(1, 2)− C(3, 2)(4.24b)
The Tsirelson bound of the operator T3 is 4
√
3 ≈ 6.928, and for operators
from (4.24) is 2 · √2 ≈ 2.82, the same as for the standard CHSH.
If we impose on the device a condition that both operators from (4.24)
achieve the value of at least 0 ≤ C ≤ 2√2, then the maximal value of T3
is a function of C, T3max = T3max(C). We require the device to obtain this
maximal value. In the case when we cope with noise or imperfections of the
device, where 0 < p < 1, then we have to multiply values of T3 and CHSH
by p. We call this protocol T3C.
Assuming these conditions we determine the lower bound on the min-
entropy as a function of C with maximal possible value of T3 for Alice’s
setting x0 = 1 and Bob’s y0 = 3.
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The min-entropy is evaluated with the following problem
maximize max
a,b∈{1,2}
{
Tr
(
ΓMP (a,b|1,3)
)}
subject to Γ ∈ Q1+AB(2, 2|4, 3)
Tr (ΓMT3C) ≥ c0,
Tr (ΓMCHSH1) ≥ c1,
Tr (ΓMCHSH2) ≥ c2,
(4.25)
where
MCHSH1 ≡ 4
(
MP (1,1|1,1) +MP (1,1|3,1) +MP (1,1|1,2) +MP (1,1|3,2)
)
and MT3C and MCHSH2 are defined in an analogous way as in previous prob-
lems.
For the numerical tests in chapter 6 we take a = b = 1, and
c0 ≡ 4p
√
3,
c1 ≡ 2.3p,
c2 ≡ 2.3p,
p = 0.99.
Nonetheless, the values possible to obtain for c1 and c2 are a little bit higher
that 2.3. We have chosen this value so that the results are easier to reproduce.
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Figure 4.7. Lower bound on min-entropy for protocol
T3C as a function of C for different values of noise.
Fig. 4.7 shows the results for this protocol. It is worth noticing that in
the case without noise as parameter C approaches its maximal value 2
√
2,
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then the min-entropy tends to 2. The min-entropy strongly depends on C.
This dependence is shown in the tab. 4.2.
p 0.999999 0.99999 0.9999 0.999
C
p
2.826 2.82 2.8 2.75
p 0.99 0.95 0.9 0.8
C
p
2.6 2.55 2.828 2.828
Table 4.2. Optimal value of parameter C for protocol T3C
depending on noise.
Considering the bound on the value of the operator T3, it is maximal for
C ≈ 2.3094116. For high noises (p < 0.95) min-entropy has a local minimum
near this point.
Tab. 4.3 compares the amount of certified randomness by T3C and by T3
without additional CHSH conditions.
p T3 T3C
0.99999 1.3294 1.7871
0.999 1.2171 1.4101
0.95 0.55873 0.5931
0.9 0.19515 0.3072
0.8 0 0.1136
Table 4.3. Comparison of min-entropies certified by T3 alone
and with two additional CHSH conditions.
4.2.2.4. Improving the modified CHSH protocol with a CHSH constraint.
Let us note that even though CHSH inequality is not able to certify two bits
of randomness per iteration even in the noiseless case [170], it is quite efficient
for p ≤ 0.9, see tab. 4.4, being able to certify more randomness than most of
the protocols presented above. Thus if we impose an additional condition for
the CHSH operator we may hope to improve some of the above protocols.
Let us consider the modified CHSH protocol augmented with the “pure”
CHSH. Combining modCHSH with a condition
C(1, 2) + C(1, 3) + C(2, 2)− C(2, 3) ≥ p · 2 ·
√
2
gives the results shown in tab. 4.5. This result shows that for low noises the
improved modified CHSH protocol is almost as efficient as the most efficient
single-operator protocol described above. One should note that the former
requires fewer measurement settings. What is more, for high degrees of noises
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p global local
0.99999 1.21757 0.99090
0.999 1.12231 0.91155
0.95 0.58411 0.47234
0.9 0.37757 0.30718
0.8 0.13510 0.11362
Table 4.4. Randomness certified by CHSH inequality
for different noises. The global randomness is the random-
ness, that is contained in a pair of bits, where one is the outcome
of Alice, and the other is the outcome of Bob. The local ran-
domness is the one of one bit of outcome for one of the parties.
These data are the same for any possible pair of settings x0 and
y0 used for generation. Randomness is given in terms of min-
entropy
p modified CHSH Improved modified CHSH
0.99999 1.9764 1.9764
0.999 1.7751 1.7751
0.95 0.7775 0.78024
0.9 0.4365 0.45443
0.8 0.0468 0.1342
Table 4.5. Comparison of modified CHSH protocols with and
without the additional CHSH constraint in terms of certified
global min-entropy.
this protocol is very close to the efficiency of the protocol E0E1. Finally, for
intermediate amounts of noise it is the best one.
We refer interested readers to our paper [141] for more technical details.
4.2.3. Numerical results with semi-definite problems. The first
interesting fact is that among the protocols under investigation there is no
single optimal protocol.
What is even more remarkable is that the three best ones fall into three
distinct categories. One of these protocols uses a single Bell operator BC3,
another one is a combination of two Bell operators, modified CHSH and
CHSH, whereas E0E1protocol is not even composed of Bell operators4. This
proves that there is more than one place to look for optimal protocols.
4Neither E0 nor E1 is a Bell operator, since the maximal value of each of them treated
separately is the same in the classical and quantum case.
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For p > 0.9 the protocol based on BC3 operator certifies the largest
amount of randomness. On the other hand, for high noises (p ≈ 0.8) the
largest min-entropy is obtained using the protocol E0E1. The main dis-
advantage of this protocol is the necessity to chose the angle φ parameter
individually for each level of noise.
The protocol T3C has the same drawback as E0E1, namely it requires the
constructor to choose its parameter, C, depending on the noise. Similarly it
gives good results for high noises, p ≈ 0.8, but not as good as E0E1. It
requires also more measurement settings.
The amount of achieved randomness for small noises, i.e. p ≥ 0.9, by pro-
tocols using modified CHSH, I1 and I2, is slightly smaller that the randomness
from the protocol BC3. On the other hand, the protocol based on modified
CHSH operator requires less measurement settings than BC3. In the case
of intermediate noise, 0.85 ≤ p ≤ 0.92, this protocol with additional CHSH
condition certifies most randomness. It requires 2 binary measurements for
Alice and 3 for Bob.
Protocols with more complicated Bell operators, I1 and I2, slightly differ
depending on the amount of noise. For p ≥ 0.999 the protocol I1 gives more
randomness than I2 (2.20), while for p ≤ 0.999 I2 gives more randomness
than I1.
All the above protocols are compared for selected values of p in tables 4.6
and 4.7. A comparison of the three protocols which are in our opinion the
most interesting is shown in fig. 4.8. We conclude that the vendor of QRNGs
should choose one of these three protocols, depending on the amount of noise
he is expecting the device to have to cope with.
p BC3 BC5 BC7 E0E1 T3C
0.99999 1.9769 1.9656 1.9537 1.7854 1.7871
0.999 1.7792 1.6841 1.5917 1.4013 1.4101
0.95 0.7885 0.5534 0.4258 0.6484 0.5931
0.9 0.4474 0.2342 0.1064 0.4163 0.3072
0.8 0.0709 0.0000 0.0000 0.1461 0.1136
Table 4.6. Comparison of protocols from Braunstein-Caves
family, E0E1, and T3C for different values of noise in terms of
certified global min-entropy. In case of E0E1 protocol we take
values for optimal angle parameter.
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p modified CHSH I1 I2
0.99999 1.9764 1.9753 1.9742
0.999 1.7751 1.7649 1.7558
0.95 0.78024 0.7219 0.7262
0.9 0.45443 0.3625 0.3959
0.8 0.1342 0.0000 0.0398
Table 4.7. Comparison in terms of certified global min-
entropy of protocols with improved modified CHSH, I1 and I2
for different noises.
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Figure 4.8. Comparison of three most efficient of investigated
protocols for 0.84 ≤ p ≤ 0.94.
4.3. Semi-device-independent scenario in NPA
As mentioned previously, in this section we describe our method which we
introduced and developed in papers [114, 140], and which allows to analyze
SDI scenarios with the methods of SDP, via a reduction to an DI problem
modeled in the NPA. We use this method to establish the robustness of a
few SDI-QRNGs. With this method it is possible to impose an arbitrary
restriction on the dimension of the communicated quantum system.
We also introduce the procedure of reduction of a dimension witness.
Using this it is possible to obtain a new dimension witness. We show that
such a reduced witness is able to certify in SDI at least as much randomness
as the initial one.
We note that a physical implementation of a protocol obtained with the
proposed method has been realized by Ahrens et al. [3].
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Recently two other methods which allow to perform a similar task of
formulation SDP relaxations of SDI problems have been introduced in [148]
and [152]. The drawback of the former is that the size of the SDP problems
is growing exponentially with the communicated dimension. In the latter
method this is not observed. Both methods are closely related to the NPA
method.
As mentioned above, a common method for the certification of QRNGs is
to perform a Bell experiment as self-testing. This requires the device to be
based on measurements on entangled states. On the other hand, the creation
of an entangled system is relatively more difficult than the preparation of
a simple quantum state. For this reason it is preferred to use prepare and
measure protocols. On the other hand, the topic of Bell inequalities is by far
better developed in the literature than the topic of dimension witnesses [116,
74, 168, 37]. Thus, it is useful to have a method which allows to develop
devices of the first kind with the help of the well established knowledge about
the devices of the second type.
One of the topics of this section are relations between Bell inequalities
and dimension witnesses. One of such relations deals with converting a DI
protocol to SDI, and vice versa in such a way, that the second protocol inherits
some properties of the first one.
4.3.1. Properties of probability distributions. Let us give the fol-
lowing lemma stating some properties of joint probability distributions which
we will use further in this work.
Lemma 4.1. For a, b ∈ {0, 1} (binary outcomes) and arbitrary x, y, let us
assume the no-signaling principle (see the definition 2.2). Then we have the
following implications:
(1) If P (a, b|x, y) = P (¬a,¬b|x, y) holds, then we have P (a|x) = 1
2
and
P (b|a, x, y) + P (b|¬a, x, y) = 1.
(2) If P (b|a, x, y) + P (b|¬a, x, y) = 1 holds, then we have
P (b|a, x, y) = P (¬b|¬a, x, y).
(3) If P (a|x) = 1
2
and P (b|a, x, y) = P (¬b|¬a, x, y) hold, then we have
P (a, b|x, y) = P (¬a,¬b|x, y).
We have proved this lemma in [140].
4.3.2. Analysis of dimension witnesses. We start the discussion of
SDI in the NPA with the statement of some properties of dimension witnesses
which we introduced in [140].
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4.3.2.1. Zero-summing dimension witnesses. In our paper [140] we have
introduced the following definition of a particular form of dimension witnesses.
Definition 4.2. A dimension witness W of the form of (2.31) with the
set of Alice’s settings X¯ of even size, B¯ = {0, 1} and CW = 0, is symmetric,
if there exists a bijection φ : X¯ → X¯ with
∀xφ(x) 6= x,
and
βb,x,y = −βb,φ(x),y = −β¬b,x,y.
For a set χ¯ ⊂ X¯ we define
Wχ¯ ≡
∑
b∈{0,1}
∑
x∈χ¯
∑
y∈Y¯
βb,x,yP (b|x, y).
A set χ¯ ⊂ X¯ satisfying χ¯ ∩ φ(χ¯) = ∅, and χ¯ ∪ φ(χ¯) = X¯ is called a half
of X¯.
If a set χ¯ is a half, then Wχ¯ is called a dimension witness reduced with
respect to χ¯. φ and χ¯ may be omitted if it is obvious which automorphism or
set is considered.
Note that it follows that every symmetric dimension witness is also a
binary zero-summing dimension witness. What is more, symmetric dimension
witnesses are linear combinations of expressions of the form
(4.26) ω(x, y) ≡ 1
2
(D(x, y)−D(φ(x), y)) ,
where
(4.27) D(x, y) ≡ P (0|x, y)− P (1|x, y).
In sec. 4.3.4.3, we investigate the properties of symmetric dimension wit-
nesses in more details.
4.3.2.2. Properties of dimension witnesses. Further we will use the fol-
lowing theorem [140]:
Theorem 4.3. Let H be a Hilbert space of a dimension 2.
Let X¯, Y¯ , {βb,x,y}b∈{0,1},x∈X¯,y∈Y¯ be sets, and CW > 0. Let W be a binary
dimension witness defined by these sets.
Let {ρx}x∈X¯ ≡ S be a set of states on H.
Let
{{M0y ,M1y }}y∈Y ≡M be a set of binary POVM on H.
For these sets of states and POVMs let us define
s ≡ W [P2(S,M)].
The following implications hold:
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(1) If ∀y∈Y¯
∑
x β0,x,y =
∑
x β1,x,y, then there exists a set of binary POVM
on H, M˜ ≡
{
{M˜0y , M˜1y }
}
y∈Y¯
, such that
∀y,b Tr M˜ by = 1,
and
W [P2(S,M˜)] = s.
(2) If
∑
b,x,y βb,x,y = 0, and ∀y,b TrM by = 1, then for
S˜ ≡ {I− ρx}x∈X¯ ,
which is a set of states on H, we have
W [P2(S˜,M)] = −s.
(3) If ∀y,b TrM by = 1, then there exists a set of projective measurements,
M˜ ≡ {{Π0y,Π1y}}y∈Y¯ with ∀b∈B¯,y∈Y¯ Tr (Πby) = 1, such that
W [P2(S,M˜)] ≥ s.
The first statement in this theorem states that in the dimension 2 the
condition that all measurement operators have trace 1 is not restrictive with
regard to the set of values possible to attain.
The second statement gives sufficient conditions under which an operation
of negation of all states gives the same value of a dimension witness but with
opposite sign.
The third statement, which may be used to complement the first, says
that under certain conditions it is not restrictive to use only projective mea-
surements in case when the values possible to be attained are considered.
Here we will prove only the first of these implications. Interested readers
are referred to our paper [140] for a complete proof of other statements.
Proof. Let us take y ∈ Y¯ . Let
cy =
1
2
(
1− Tr(M0y )
)
,
M˜0y = M
0
y + cyI,
M˜1y = M
1
y − cyI.
We will prove that
∀y,bM˜ by  0.
Obviously we have from the completeness of measurements
M˜0y + M˜
1
y = M
0
y +M
1
y = I.
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There exists an orthonormal basis {| 0y〉, | 1y〉} in which
M0y = v0| 0y〉〈0y |+ v1| 1y〉〈1y |,
and
M1y = (1− v0)| 0y〉〈0y |+ (1− v1)| 1y〉〈1y |,
where v0, v1 ∈ [0, 1].
We have cy =
1
2
(1− v0 − v1), and I = | 0y〉〈0y |+ | 1y〉〈1y |. Thus
M˜0y =
1
2
(1 + v0 − v1)| 0〉〈0 |+ 1
2
(1− v0 + v1)| 1〉〈1 |.
Since 1 + v0 − v1 ≥ 0 and 1− v0 + v1 ≥ 0, we have M˜0y  0, and Tr M˜0y = 1.
Similarly, we check that M˜1y  0 and Tr M˜1y = 1.
Repeating this construction for all y ∈ Y¯ , we obtain a set of POVM,
M˜ ≡
{
{M˜0y , M˜1y }
}
y∈Y¯
.
We have
Tr(ρxM˜
b
y) = P (b|x, y) + (−1)b · cy,
and from this it follows that
W [Pd(S,M˜)] =
∑
b,x,y
βb,x,y Tr(ρxM˜
b
y) =
s+
∑
y
cy
(∑
x
β0,x,y −
∑
x
β1,x,y
)
= s.
This finishes the proof of the first implication. 
4.3.3. Relation between Bell operators and dimension witnesses.
If we start with a DI-QRNG protocol based on some Bell operator, and
construct out of it a prepare and measure SDI protocol, we hope it to certify a
reasonable amount of min-entropy which is somehow related to the efficiency
of the DI protocol. This is a useful case, as there exist many randomness
expansion protocols based on Bell operators [170, 46, 139]. We have given
a few examples of such protocols in sec. 4.2.
Another situation occurs when we have some SDI-QRNG protocol and
want to employ the well developed SDP methods to analyze it. Here we
present a way to obtain a new Bell operator with the property that the DI
protocol using it certifies at most as much randomness as the SDI protocol.
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4.3.3.1. Conversion from a dimension witness to a Bell operator. Let us
consider a device D0 obtained from an untrusted vendor. The device consists
of two parts, which we consider as black boxes, one used by Alice, and the
other used by Bob. The only parameter of the device which we are able
to verify is the dimension of the message send from one part of it to the
other one. We make also a standard assumption that the device cannot
communicate with the world outside the laboratory.
Similarly as in a DI case, let X¯ be the set of settings among which Alice
can choose. But in contrast to our previous cases, now these settings do not
relate to any measurement producing an outcome to Alice. Instead, the box
is supposed to produce and emit one of the quantum states of the dimension
d. Let us denote the prepared states by {ρx}x∈X¯ . The states are unknown to
us.
Bob is also given a part of the device with settings labeled as Y¯ . Now these
are the measurements settings performing one of the measurements given by
POVMs from the following set
{{M by}b∈B¯}y∈Y¯ . We do not know anything
about those measurements apart from the fact that they are performed on
the state emitted by the part of the device belonging to Alice.
Since we know the dimension of the communicated states, this is obviously
an SDI scenario. Let us denote the conditional probability of obtaining the
outcome b ∈ B¯ when the chosen settings are x ∈ X¯ and y ∈ Y¯ , by PD0(b|x, y).
Now, suppose that we are given a dimension witness W of the form given
in (2.31) above. Let us assume that this dimension witness achieves in the
experiments on the device D0 on average the value W0.
Although the device D0 is not trusted, we may still think about another
device, denoted here by D1.
The device D1 also consists of two parts, with buttons labeled by the same
sets X¯ and Y¯ on the side of Alice and Bob respectively. In this device we
assume that both parts share a singlet state of the dimension d (see sec. 2.1.1).
The part on the side of Alice performs some projective measurement with
outcome 0 (if the projection succeeds) or 1 (otherwise), depending on the
chosen input x ∈ X¯. We also assume that the measurement projects Alice’s
part of the singlet on the state ρx that is the same as the relevant state from
the device D0.
If the projection has succeeded, which happens with the probability 1
d
,
then the device returns a = 0 and changes the state on the Alice’s side into
the state ρx, otherwise it returns a = 1. Since the shared state is a singlet,
this measurement prepares the same d-dimensional state on the side of Bob.
Afterward he performs the same POVM {M by}b∈B¯ as the device D0 would
perform, and finally he returns the outcome b ∈ B¯. We do not have to
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analyze the case in which a = 1, since probabilities PD1(1, b|x, y) are not
used in our relaxation.
Let us denote the probability that Alice gets the outcome a with the
setting x, and simultaneously Bob gets the outcome b with the setting y by
PD1(a, b|x, y). It is easy to see, that
PD0(b|x, y) = d · PD1(0, b|x, y).
Let us consider a third device, D2, with the same interface as D1. Now
the conditions on the internal working are relaxed, namely we do not assume
anything about the performed measurements. Now the parts of Alice and
Bob are allowed to an arbitrary state ρ of any dimension. For this device we
give an additional constraint
∀x∈XPD2(0|x) = 1
d
,
where PD2(a|x) is the probability of getting the outcome a by Alice with the
setting x with the device D2. We note that the description of this device is
DI. Thus we may employ SDP with the NPA method to model its behavior,
i.e. the probability distributions of the device D2.
For the third device let us denote the probability of getting the outcomes
a and b with a given pair of settings x and y for Alice and Bob, respectively,
as PD2(a, b|x, y).
It is easy to see that all the conditional probability distributions which
are possible to be obtained by the device D1, and equivalently by the device
D0, are also possible to be obtained with the device D2. What is more, since
the device D2 is a relaxed version of the initial device D0, if both of them
have the same value of the relevant security parameters, then the certified
amount of min-entropy generated by the device D2 gives a lower bound of
the min-entropy certified to be generated by the device D0.
This way we have proved the following theorem.
Theorem 4.4. Let A = {0, 1}, B = B¯, X = X¯ and Y = Y¯ be sets. Let
us take s ∈ R, d ≥ 2, a Bell operator B of the form given by (2.8), and a
dimension witness W of the form given by (2.31).
Let us assume that in the definition of W we have
βb,x,y = d · α0,b,x,y,
α1,b,x,y = 0,
CI = CW .
Let Pd,SDI(s) be a subset of Pd(B¯|X¯, Y¯ ) with d ≥ 2 satisfying the condition
that
∀P(B¯|X¯,Y¯ )∈Pd(B¯|X¯,Y¯ )W [P(B¯|X¯, Y¯ )] = s,
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cf. the definition 2.4.
Let us define
PDI(s) ≡{PSDI(B|X, Y ) : ∃PDI({0, 1}, B|X, Y ) such that
∀xPA,DI(0|x) = 1
d
,B[PDI({0, 1}, B|X, Y )] = s,
PSDI(b|x, y) = d · PDI(0, b|x, y)} .
Then Pd,SDI(s) ⊆ PDI(s).
The theorem states that if a Bell operator and a dimension witness are
related in the way given above, then we can use the set of probabilities allowed
with the former in DI as a relaxation of the set of probabilities allowed with
the latter in SDI. Fig. 4.9 shows an example of application of the theorem
4.4.
We have thus developed a relation between Bell operators and dimension
witnesses stating that the amount of randomness certified by a Bell operator
lower-bounds the amount of randomness certified by the relevant dimension
witness.
Recall that one of key features of the set of DI joint probability distribu-
tions is that it can be efficiently approximated using the NPA hierarchy. A
useful property of the method is that we obtain a bound for any dimension
of the communicated system changing only a value of the linear bound.
We conclude that using
P (b|x, y) = d · P (0, b|x, y),
we get that the certified min-entropy of SDI protocol is lower-bounded by the
one of the DI protocol minus log2 d.
4.3.3.2. Conversion from a Bell operator to a dimension witness. In [114]
we have proposed a heuristic method for obtaining a dimension witness from
a Bell operator. Here we only briefly sketch the idea. We rewrite DI joint
probabilities as
(4.28) P (a, b|x, y) = P (b|a, x, y) · P (a|x).
If we now define x¯ ≡ (a, x), and βb,x¯,y ≡ βb,(a,x),y ≡ αa,b,x,y · P (a|x), then we
can take B¯ = B, X¯ = A × X, and Y¯ = Y , and create a new dimension
witness.
We stress that this method is heuristic. We do not state any general
relation between the min-entropy which is possible to be certified with an
SDI protocol obtained this way, and with the initial DI protocol. We refer
interested readers to [114] and [140] for more details. Examples of such
protocols, using witnesses T2, T3, BC3 and modified CHSH, are described
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below in the section 4.3.6. Starting with a Bell operator of the form
(4.29)
∑
x,y
α˙x,y
(
1
2p0,x
(P (0, 0|x, y)− P (0, 1|x, y))
+
1
2p1,x
(P (1, 1|x, y)− P (1, 0|x, y))
)
,
where p0,x+p1,x = 1, we get a symmetric dimension witness of the form given
in (2.31), where
β0,x,y = α˙x,y,
β1,x,y = −α˙x,y.
To obtain a new SDI protocol, we first assume that a is an initial DI scenario
chosen randomly by Alice, with the distribution defined by P (a|x) ≡ pa,x.
Then we rewrite the probabilities in a form in Eq. 4.28. Finally, to move from
probabilities P(A,B|X, Y ) to P(B|X, Y ), we replace P (a|x) with constant
values, and obtain an operator of a form of a dimension witness.
4.3.4. Binary zero-summing dimension witnesses in dimension
two. Now, we will show that for the class of binary zero-summing dimen-
sion witnesses (see the definition 2.5 in chapter 2) it is possible to obtain a
tighter SDP relaxations with the NPA, if the scenario with a Hilbert space
of dimension 2 is considered. We will now restrict our considerations to this
case.
We show that for binary zero-summing dimension witnesses in dimension
two it is possible to obtain tighter bounds in comparison with the one obtained
using theorem 4.4. Moreover, we show that with a symmetric dimension
witness we can perform an operation of reduction which reduces the number of
settings used by Alice by half, and thus simplify the scenario, while retaining
the ability in certification of randomness.
For the purpose of this considerations we define a negation of two dimen-
sional state as ¬ρ ≡ I− ρ.
4.3.4.1. Determinisic and projective strategies. We start with a binary
zero-summing dimension witness
W = W ({0, 1}, X¯, Y¯ , {βb,x,y}, CW ).
The witness is used to certify the randomness generated when Alice uses her
preparation setting x0 ∈ X¯, and Bob uses the measurement setting y0 ∈ Y¯ .
Let {ρx}x∈X¯ be the set of states, and
{{M0y ,M1y }}y∈Y¯ be the measure-
ments maximizing the guessing probability of the generated bits.
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Let us note that the value of binary zero-summing dimension witness does
not change if for arbitrary y ∈ Y¯ , the measurement is changed to
{M0y + cI,M1y − cI},
where c is such that the spectrum of the operators remains in the range [0, 1].
From the fact that the potential adversary wants to make the probability
of one of the outcomes of the measurement y0 as large as it is possible, we
conclude that the form of the measurements which maximizes his guessing
probability is
(4.30)
[
1 0
0 1− δ
]
,
[
0 0
0 δ
]
.
Let us note that by the theorem 4.3.1 and 4.3.3 it is not restrictive for the
vendor to use only projectors of trace 1 for the measurements different than
y0.
The strategy of using a measurement of the form of (4.30) for the setting
y0, and projectors of trace 1 for all remaining measurements, is equivalent to
using the mixture of the following two strategies:
• P - a pure strategy: a projective measurement of trace 1 is used as
the measurement selected by the setting y0.
• D - a deterministic strategy: measurement y0 returns always the
same value 0 or 1.
For the setting y0 in fraction δ of the cases, the strategy P is used, and in the
remaining cases the strategy D. For the remaining measurements the same
projective measurements of trace 1 are used in both cases.
The guessing probability for the strategy D is 1, and for the strategy P it
is Pguess. This way we get that the average guessing probability is
(4.31) (1− δ) + δ · Pguess.
In the case of a zero-summing dimension witness with the deterministic
strategy, measurements with the setting y0 give no contribution to the value
of the witness. Thus the certification of the randomness with the dimension
witness
W = W ({0, 1}, X¯, Y¯ , {βb,x,y}, CW )
when the vendor of the device uses the mixed strategy is, after applying
certain affine transformation, (4.31), equivalent to the certification with a
dimension witness
W(δ,y0)({0, 1}, X¯, Y¯ , {β˜b,x,y}, CW )
with β˜b,x,y defined in (4.32) below, and the strategy P, where the guessing
probability of Eve is given by (4.31).
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Since the vendor may choose any δ ∈ [0, 1] which allows to observe the
required value of the dimension witness W , when calculating lower-bound
on the certified min-entropy, the worst case should be considered for each
situation.
This way, we have proved the following
Lemma 4.5. Let W = W ({0, 1}, X¯, Y¯ , {βb,x,y}, CW ) be a binary zero-
summing dimension witness, x0 ∈ X¯, and y0 ∈ Y¯ . Let
W(δ,y0) = W(δ,y0)({0, 1}, X¯, Y¯ , {β˜b,x,y}, CW )
be a dimension witness, where
(4.32) β˜b,x,y =
{
βb,x,y if y 6= y0
δ · βb,x,y if y = y0 .
Then
P certguess(W,x0, y0, s, 2) = max
δ∈[0,1]
(
(1− δ) + δ · P cert(P )guess (W(δ,y0), x0, y0, s)
)
where
P certguess(W,x0, y0, s, 2),
and
P cert(P )guess (W,x0, y0, s)
are defined in (3.3) and (3.4).
4.3.4.2. Tighter bounds from the NPA. The consequence of restricting the
vendor to the dimension 2 and measurements of trace 1 is that the following
holds for all x ∈ X¯ and y ∈ Y¯ , and for any b ∈ {0, 1}:
(4.33)
Tr(¬ρxM¬by ) = Tr((I− ρx)(I−M by)) =
1− Tr(M by) + Tr(ρxM by) = Tr(ρxM by) = P (b|x, y).
This relation allows to refine the relaxation given in the section 4.3.3.1.
Now we consider a device D1′ that models the strategy P by sharing the
singlet state of dimension 2, projecting on pure states {ρx}x∈X¯ on the side
of Alice, and measuring on the side of Bob with projective measurements of
trace 1,
{{M0y ,M1y }}y∈Y¯ . In contrast to the device D1 if the projection on
a state ρx for any x ∈ X¯ fails, then the prepared state is ¬ρx. It is easy to
see that, by (4.33), for all a, b ∈ {0, 1}, x ∈ X, and y ∈ Y the probabilities
obtained in this device are constrained by the relation
(4.34) P (a, b|x, y) = P (¬a,¬b|x, y).
A further relaxation, analogous to the one leading from the device D1 to the
device D2, allows to obtain a device D2′ satisfying the relation (4.34) which
can be modeled by SDP.
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Thus we have shown that for the case when the communicated state has
dimension 2 and B¯ = {0, 1} we have a relaxation given by the device D2′
satisfying (4.34). In this case we have the following relation
P (b|x, y) is relaxed by−→ PD2′(0, b|x, y) + PD2′(1,¬b|x, y)
from the construction of the device D2′. From this it follows that (4.27),
D(x, y) = P (0|x, y)− P (1|x, y), is relaxed by
PD2′(0, 0|x, y) + PD2′(1, 1|x, y)− PD2′(0, 1|x, y)− PD2′(1, 0|x, y)
= CD2′(x, y).
We can write it symbolically
(4.35) D(x, y)
is relaxed by−→ CD2′(x, y).
Thus we finally obtain
(4.36) ω(x, y)
is relaxed by−→ 1
2
(CD2′(x, y)− CD2′(φ(x), y)) ,
where we have ω(x, y) = 1
2
(D(x, y)−D(φ(x), y)), as defined in (4.26).
We summarize these considerations in the following
Theorem 4.6. Let X = X¯ and Y = Y¯ be sets.
Let us take s ∈ R, a Bell operator B of the form given in (2.8), and
a binary zero-summing dimension witness W of the form given in (2.31),
satisfying
βb,x,y = α0,b,x,y = α1,¬b,x,y.
Let P(P )SDI(s) be a subset of P(P )(X¯, Y¯ ) containing those probabilities
P2({0, 1}|X¯, Y¯ )
which satisfies W [P2] = s.
Let us define
PDI,cond(s) ≡{PSDI(B|X, Y ) : ∃PDI({0, 1}, {0, 1}|X, Y ) such that
∀a,b,x,yPDI(a, b|x, y) = PDI(¬a,¬b|x, y),
B[PDI({0, 1}, {0, 1}|X, Y )] = s,
PSDI(b|x, y) = PDI(0, b|x, y) + PDI(1,¬b|x, y)} .
Then P(P )SDI(s) ⊆ PDI,cond(s).
Similarly to the theorem 4.4, this theorem shows how to use the set of
probabilities allowed in DI as a relaxation of the relevant set in SDI, this time
for a more restricted case.
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From the lemma 4.1 we get that the condition
P (a, b|x, y) = P (¬a,¬b|x, y)
is more restrictive than P (a|x) = 1
2
. In consequence
∀sP(P )SDI(s) ⊆ PDI,cond(s) ⊆ PDI(s),
where the sets are defined in theorems 4.4 and 4.6. Thus the theorem 4.6
refines the results of the theorem 4.4 for the case of binary zero-summing
dimension witnesses.
Secs 4.3.7.2 and 4.3.7.1 show examples of lower and upper bounds for min-
entropy certified when the untrusted vendor uses the strategy P. In secs 4.3.7.3
and 4.3.7.4 lower bounds for the certified min-entropy in case when the un-
trusted vendor uses the mixed strategy are presented. All lower bounds are
calculated using the NPA.
The upper-bounds are obtained by finding explicit representations of states
and measurements with fminunc subroutine in OCTAVE. This optimization
has been carried over pure states and projective measurements and, in con-
trast to SDP, is not guaranteed to reach global minimum.
Interestingly, in all protocols considered in sec. 4.3.7.4, it is optimal for
the adversary to use δ = 1, meaning that using the mixed strategy gives no
gain in comparison with the strategy P.
4.3.4.3. Symmetric dimension witnesses. If a dimension witness is sym-
metric, then there is a way to reduce the size of the set of settings of Alice, X¯,
whilst the obtained dimension witness can certify at least the same amount
of randomness as the initial one. Recall that symmetric dimension witnesses
are special cases of binary zero-summing dimension witnesses.
The following theorem is an immediate result of the theorem 4.6 and the
theorem 4.3, p.2:
Theorem 4.7. Let Π be an SDI protocol with quantum communication
limited to dimension 2 with a symmetric dimension witness W satisfying
• the value of the security parameter is equal to s,
• the protocol certifies the randomness r, and
• a pure strategy P is used.
Then the same value of the security parameter s is still possible to be attained
and certifies at least the same randomness r, if we impose an additional con-
dition
ρx = I− ρφ(x) = ¬ρφ(x),
implying
(4.37) P (b|x, y) = P (¬b|φ(x), y).
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Roughly speaking, the theorem 4.7 states that symmetric dimension wit-
nesses have some degree of freedom that does not increase the range of values
possible to be attained, but allows adversary to “distribute” the average value
of the witness among the states to mislead about the reliability of the device.
The method proposed shows a way to remove this freedom.
Let us define φ((a, x)) ≡ (¬a, x) and a set
χ ≡ {(0, x) : x ∈ X} ⊆ {0, 1} ×X.
We will now employ the heuristic method of conversion from Bell operators
to dimension witnesses, sec. 4.3.3.2, for the case of correlation form of Bell
operators. These operators can be expressed as in (4.29) with pa,x =
1
2
and
α˙x,y = αx,y. Then C(x, y) turns into
1
2
(P (0|(0, x), y) + P (1|(1, x), y)− P (1|(0, x), y)− P (0|(1, x), y)) =
1
2
(D((0, x), y)−D((1, x), y)) = ω(x, y)
= P (0|(0, x), y)− P (0|(1, x), y),
and thus X¯ = {0, 1} × X. We know that a dimension witness which is a
linear combination of expressions ω(x, y) is symmetric. This means that it is
always possible to obtain a symmetric dimension witness from a correlation
Bell operator via:
(4.38) C(x, y)
using heuristic conversion−→ ω(x, y).
In order to apply theorem 4.7 we first assume (4.37), i.e. that
P (b|(a, x), y) = P (¬b|(¬a, x), y),
and that W is a symmetric DW with
X¯ = {0, 1} × χ¯
for some set χ¯. The former assumption is justified below, but first we state
its consequence. From the assumptions it follows that
(4.39)
∀x∈χ¯,y∈Y¯ ω(x, y) = P (0|(0, x), y)− P (0|(1, x), y)
= P (0|(0, x), y)− P (1|(0, x), y) = D((0, x), y).
Let us now consider once again the P-M device D0 and assume that the
set of settings of Alice is X¯ = {0, 1} × χ¯, and W is used for certification.
Let φ((a, x)) = (¬a, x) for (a, x) ∈ X¯. We now introduce a device D1′′
which prepares the same states as D0 for settings in {0} × χ¯, and states
ρ(1,x) = ¬ρ(0,x) for settings in {1} × χ¯. By theorem 4.7 this device can attain
the same value s of W as the device D0 (this is obtained when states and
measurements were chosen properly, which is always possible), and certifies at
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least the same amount of randomness. But from (4.39) it follows that with the
dimension witness Wχ¯ (see definition 4.2) the device D1
′′ will certify exactly
the same amount of randomness as with W . On the other hand, since for
Alice preparations for settings from {1} × χ¯ does not influence the value of
Wχ¯, we can consider another, reduced, device, D2
′′, which has only half of the
settings compared to devices D0 and D1′′, and using the dimension witness
Wχ¯ certifies at least as much randomness as the initial device D0 with W .
If we identify the settings (0, x) ∈ {0} × χ¯ in the initial device, with
settings x ∈ χ¯ of the reduced device we get
(4.40) ∀x∈χ¯ω(x, y) reduction−→ D(x, y).
instead of ω(x, y) from (4.38). This is an example of the reduction. We note
that using this method the number of states used by Alice is halved.
4.3.5. Summary of relations between Bell operators and dimen-
sion witnesses. To summarize, we have the following conversion:
• arbitrary DW → BI, (2.8), by theorem 4.4
• binary zero-summing DW → BI, (2.8), tighter min-entropy bound,
by theorem 4.6
• correlation BI with A = {0, 1} → symmetric DW with X¯ = {0, 1}×
X using C(x, y)→ ω(x, y) by (4.38)
• symmetric DW with X¯ = {0, 1} × X → reduced DW with X¯ = X
using ω(x, y)→ D(x, y) by (4.40)
• symmetric DW → correlation BI with X = X¯ by (4.36)
This gives us two chains of transformations.
The first is given by (4.35), (4.38), and (4.36):
D(x, y)
is relaxed by−→ C(x, y) using heuristic conversion−→
ω(x, y)
is relaxed by−→ 1
2
(C(x, y)− C(φ(x), y)) .
The second one, (4.38), (4.40), and (4.35), gives the following one-to-one
relation between correlation Bell operators, symmetric dimension witnesses
and reduced dimension witnesses
C(x, y)
using heuristic conversion−→ ω(x, y) reduction−→
D(x, y)
is relaxed by−→ C(x, y).
4.3.6. Examples of conversion between DI and SDI protocols. In
this section we give several examples of applications of the methods presented
above. All figures are plotted with respect to the noise parameter p. On the
plots − denotes the logical negation of a bit.
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4.3.6.1. Tn as dimension witnesses. In [115] a family of dimension wit-
nesses based on quantum random access codes (QRAC s) was introduced. In
(n to 1)-QRAC Alice encodes n bits by sending one of the 2n states to Bob
who tries to guess one of the bits performing one of n measurements. These
dimension witnesses are symmetric.
The symmetric dimension witness of the (2 to 1)-QRAC can be written
in the form
(4.41) ω(1, 1) + ω(1, 2) + ω(2, 1)− ω(2, 2).
The reduced form of this dimension witness is thus
(4.42) D(1, 1) +D(1, 2) +D(2, 1)−D(2, 2).
The randomness certified by these two dimension witnesses is lower-bounded
by the values obtained with two Bell operators stated in (4.43a) and (4.43b),
respectively:
(4.43a)
1
2
(C(1, 1) + C(1, 2) + C(2, 1)− C(2, 2)
+C(3, 1) + C(3, 2) + C(4, 1)− C(4, 2)) ,
and for the dimension witness from the equation (4.42),
(4.43b) T2 ≡ C(1, 1) + C(1, 2) + C(2, 1)− C(2, 2).
The operator defined in (4.43b) is exactly the CHSH Bell operator. Lower
bounds for this case are shown in sec. 4.3.7 in figs 4.10, 4.14, 4.18 and 4.22.
Let us now consider the next QRAC, i.e. the (3 to 1)-QRAC. This is
given by the equation
(4.44)
∑
x∈X¯,y∈Y¯
(−1)xyP (0|x, y),
with X¯ = {000, . . . , 111} and Y¯ = {0, 1, 2}.
Taking φ(x) = ¬x, where negation is bit-wise, X¯ ≡ {000, 001, 010, 011}
and Y¯ ≡ Y¯ , the following reduced dimension witness is obtained
(4.45)
P (0|000, 0) + P (0|001, 0) + P (0|010, 0) + P (0|011, 0)
+ P (0|000, 1) + P (0|000, 2) + P (0|001, 1)− P (0|001, 2)
− P (0|010, 1) + P (0|010, 2)− P (0|011, 1)− P (0|011, 2).
Now, we can use this reduced dimension witness and employ the above
method, (4.35), to get the Bell operator T3 described above in sec. 2.2.5,
in (2.17). On the other hand, if we use the dimension witness without reduc-
tion, namely in a form defined in (4.44), we obtain a larger Bell operator on
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P({0, 1}, {0, 1}|{1, . . . , 8}, {1, 2, 3}) with similar properties
(4.46)
T3′ ≡ 1
2
(C(1, 1)− C(5, 1) + C(2, 1)− C(6, 1) + C(3, 1)− C(7, 1)
+ C(4, 1)− C(8, 1) + C(1, 2)− C(5, 2) + C(1, 3)− C(5, 3)
+ C(2, 2)− C(6, 2)− C(2, 3) + C(6, 3)− C(3, 2) + C(7, 2)
+C(3, 3)− C(7, 3)− C(4, 2) + C(8, 2)− C(4, 3) + C(8, 3)) .
We may calculate a lower-bound on Hcert∞ (T3, x0, y0, s, 2), the certified min-
entropy, with x0 = 1, y0 = 1 using the theorem 4.6 and executing a series
of SDP problems for a grid of values of δ ∈ [0, 1]. Fig. 4.15 shows the min-
entropies certified with the Bell inequality T3 for different additional condi-
tions. NPA lower-bounds on the certified min-entropy obtained by theorem
4.4 with additional condition P (a, b|x, y) = P (¬a,¬b|x, y) assuming that the
strategy P is used are shown in fig. 4.11, and in figs 4.19 and 4.23 for the
mixed strategy.
4.3.6.2. BC3 as a dimension witness. We will now consider a dimen-
sion witness constructed with the above method out of the BC3 Bell oper-
ator. First, we construct a symmetric dimension witness with six settings
on the side of Alice given by the following operator on P({0, 1}|{0, 1} ×
{1, 2, 3}, {1, 2, 3}):
(4.47)
P (0|(0, 1), 1)− P (0|(1, 1), 1) + P (0|(0, 1), 2)− P (0|(1, 1), 2)
+ P (0|(0, 2), 2)− P (0|(1, 2), 2) + P (0|(0, 2), 3)− P (0|(1, 2), 3)
+ P (0|(0, 3), 3)− P (0|(1, 3), 3)− P (0|(0, 3), 1) + P (0|(1, 3), 1).
Using the method of reduction, we may transform this symmetric dimension
witness with six preparation states to a reduced one with only three states.
Let us take
φ((a, x)) ≡ (¬a, x),
χ ≡ {(0, x) : x ∈ {1, 2, 3}} ⊆ {0, 1} × {1, 2, 3}.
Then we obtain the following dimension witness:
2(P (0|(0, 1), 1) + P (0|(0, 1), 2) + P (0|(0, 2), 2)+
+ P (0|(0, 2), 3) + P (0|(0, 3), 3)− P (0|(0, 3), 1))− 4.
If we identify settings (0, x) with x, we get the reduced dimension witness
given
(4.48)
2(P (0|1, 1) + P (0|1, 2) + P (0|2, 2)+
+ P (0|2, 3) + P (0|3, 3)− P (0|3, 1))− 4.
We now do the opposite way, and starting with the dimension witness
given by (4.47) we use the theorem 4.6 to get the following Bell operator on
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P({0, 1}, {0, 1}|{1, . . . , 6}, {1, 2, 3}) for the calculation of the lower bound on
min-entropy generated by the protocol using the witness:
(4.49)
1
2
(C(1, 1) + C(1, 2) + C(2, 2) + C(2, 3) + C(3, 3)− C(3, 1)
+C(4, 1) + C(4, 2) + C(5, 2) + C(5, 3) + C(6, 3)− C(6, 1)) ,
where we have changed the labels of the settings of Alice in the following way:
(0, 1) ≡ 1, (0, 2) ≡ 2, (0, 3) ≡ 3, (1, 1) ≡ 4, (1, 2) ≡ 5, and (1, 3) ≡ 6.
If we start with the reduced dimension witness from (4.47) and assume
P (a, b|x, y) = P (¬a,¬b|x, y), we get that the lower-bounding Bell operator is
exactly the initial BC3.
The min-entropies certified with BC3 for different additional conditions
are plotted in fig. 4.16, cf. fig. 4.4 in sec. 4.2. Lower-bounds on the min-
entropy certified in the SDI protocol, calculated using the NPA and the the-
orem 4.4 with additional condition P (a, b|x, y) = P (¬a,¬b|x, y) are plotted
for strategy P in fig. 4.12 and for mixed strategy in figs 4.20 and 4.24.
4.3.6.3. Modified CHSH as a dimension witness. Taking into account that
the DI-QRNG protocol with modified CHSH, Eq.(2.15), is very robust in cer-
tifying the randomness (see sec. 4.2.2.1), the dimension witness with random-
ness lower-bounded by it may also be expected to be robust. Lower-bounds
for the discussed DI and SDI protocols are plotted in figs 4.13, 4.17, 4.21, and
4.25 in sec. 4.3.7.
Choosing P (a|x) = 1
2
and applying the heuristic method from sec. 4.3.3.2
to the modified CHSH operator, we get the following symmetric dimension
witness
(4.50) ω(1, 2) + ω(1, 3) + ω(2, 1) + ω(2, 2)− ω(2, 3).
The reduced dimension witness created with this operator is
(4.51) D(1, 2) +D(1, 3) +D(2, 1) +D(2, 2)−D(2, 3),
and acts on P({0, 1}|{1, 2}, {1, 2, 3}).
The min-entropy of the protocol using the dimension witness defined
in (4.50) is lower-bounded by the following Bell operator
(4.52)
1
2
(C(1, 2) + C(1, 3) + C(2, 1) + C(2, 2)− C(2, 3)
+C(3, 2) + C(3, 3) + C(4, 1) + C(4, 2)− C(4, 3))
defined on probability distributions
P({0, 1}, {0, 1}|{1, 2, 3, 4}, {1, 2, 3}).
104 Quantum protocols
4.3.6.4. CGLMP dimension witness. We will now use the heuristic method
mentioned above in order to convert the CGLMP Bell operator defined in (2.18)
in order to obtain the following CGLMP dimension witness:
(4.53)
P (0|1, 1)− P (2|1, 1) + P (0|1, 2)− P (2|1, 2)− P (0|2, 1) + P (1|2, 1)
− P (0|2, 2) + P (1|2, 2)− P (1|3, 1) + P (2|3, 1)− P (1|3, 2) + P (2|3, 2)
− P (0|4, 1) + P (1|4, 1) + P (0|4, 2)− P (2|4, 2)− P (1|5, 1) + P (2|5, 1)
− P (0|5, 2) + P (1|5, 2) + P (0|6, 1)− P (2|6, 1)− P (1|6, 2) + P (2|6, 2).
on
P({0, 1, 2}|{1, . . . , 6}, {1, 2}).
Applying the method from sec. 4.3.3.1, we get the following Bell operator
P (0, 0|1, 1)− P (0, 2|1, 1) + P (0, 0|1, 2)− P (0, 2|1, 2)− P (0, 0|2, 1)
+ P (0, 1|2, 1)− P (0, 0|2, 2) + P (0, 1|2, 2)− P (0, 1|3, 1) + P (0, 2|3, 1)
− P (0, 1|3, 2) + P (0, 2|3, 2)− P (0, 0|4, 1) + P (0, 1|4, 1) + P (0, 0|4, 2)
− P (0, 2|4, 2)− P (0, 1|5, 1) + P (0, 2|5, 1)− P (0, 0|5, 2) + P (0, 1|5, 2)
+ P (0, 0|6, 1)− P (0, 2|6, 1)− P (0, 1|6, 2) + P (0, 2|6, 2)
on P({0, 1}, {0, 1, 2}|{1, . . . , 6}, {1, 2}). This expression can be analyzed with
the NPA. The certified randomness for CGLMP and different values of d are
shown in fig. 4.9.
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Figure 4.9. Lower-bounds on the certified randomness
for the CGLMP protocol, namely using the dimension wit-
ness defined in (4.53) for different values of the dimension d as
a function of noise parameter p.
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4.3.7. Investigation of semi-device-independent protocols. Now
we will use the method of SDP in order to investigate the properties of the
SDI-QRNG protocols considered above.
4.3.7.1. Tightness of bounds. We start with the illustration of how the
lower bounds are close to the actual values.
Figs 4.10, 4.11, 4.12, and 4.13 show numerical lower bounds and upper
bounds on the randomness certified for the strategy P. The lower bounds are
obtained with SDP in Almost Quantum level, and the upper bound by find-
ing an explicit pure quantum states and rank-1 measurements parametrized
by (2.3) and optimized with fminunc subroutine in OCTAVE. We observe
an advantage for the reduced versions.
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Figure 4.10. Numerical lower-bounds via SDP and upper-
bounds on the randomness certified for the strategy P with the
reduced and full dimension witness T2, see (4.41) and (4.42).
4.3.7.2. Relation between families of conditions. Now, we will consider
lower bounds from the NPA method on min-entropy certified by different
Bell operators for different levels of noise. The situation differs from the
standard quantum randomness expansion considered in sec. 4.2 in that we
take into account additional constraints of the probability distributions, not
only the value of a certain Bell operator. These considerations illustrate the
relations summarized in lemma 4.1.
In figs 4.14, 4.15, 4.16, and 4.17, the reduced Bell operators give lower
bounds on the relevant reduced symmetric dimension witnesses for the strat-
egy P. We observe that using reduced dimension witnesses provides an ad-
vantage in the terms of certifiable randomness. The reduced Bell operators
are given by (4.43b), (2.17), (2.13), and (2.15), while Bell operators that may
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Figure 4.11. Numerical lower-bounds via SDP and upper-
bounds on the randomness certified for the strategy P with the
reduced and full dimension witness T3, see (4.44) and (4.45).
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Figure 4.12. Numerical lower-bounds via SDP and upper-
bounds on the randomness certified for the strategy P with the
reduced and full dimension witness BC3.
be used for lower bounding the randomness of full symmetric dimension wit-
nesses are given by (4.43a), (4.46), (4.49), and (4.52). These refers to T2,
Fig. 4.14, T3, Fig. 4.15, BC3, Fig. 4.16, and modified CHSH, Fig. 4.17, cases
respectively.
4.3.7.3. Mixed P and D strategy. Here we show lower bounds obtained
using the NPA on the certified randomness in SDI-QRNG with reduced di-
mension witnesses when the malevolent constructor of the device uses the
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Figure 4.13. Numerical lower-bounds via SDP and upper-
bounds on the randomness certified for the strategy P with the
reduced and full dimension witness obtained from the modified
CHSH Bell operator, see (4.50) and (4.51).
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Figure 4.14. Lower bounds via SDP on min-entropy certi-
fied by T2 DI-QRNG protocol for different levels of noise and
different additional constraints. The full Bell operator is given
by (4.43a), and the reduced Bell operator is given in (4.43b).
mixed strategy with different values of the parameter δ, see sec. 4.3.4. If a
certain value of a dimension witness is impossible to be achieved with a given
δ, then, since the eavesdropper cannot mislead us this way, the value 1 is put
on the figures. The cases of T2, Fig. 4.18, T3, Fig. 4.19, BC3, Fig. 4.20, and
modified modCHSH, Fig. 4.21, are shown on these plots.
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Figure 4.15. Lower bounds via SDP on min-entropy certi-
fied by T3 DI-QRNG protocol for different levels of noise and
different additional constraints. The full Bell operator is given
by (4.46), and the reduced Bell operator is given in (2.17).
 0
 0.5
 1
 1.5
 2
 0.7  0.8  0.9  1
mi
n-e
ntr
op
y [
bit
s]
no conditions, reduced
P(a|x)=0.5, reduced
P(a,b|x,y)=P(-a,-b|x,y), reduced
no conditions
P(a|x)=0.5
P(a,b|x,y)=P(-a,-b|x,y)
Figure 4.16. Lower bounds via SDP on min-entropy certified
by BC3 DI-QRNG protocol for different levels of noise and
different additional constraints. The full Bell operator is given
by (4.49), and the reduced Bell operator is given in (2.13).
4.3.7.4. The robustness of semi-device-independent protocols. Now we will
give the lower bounds obtained using the NPA on the certified randomness
for both reduced and symmetric dimension witnesses in the case when the
malevolent vendor uses the mixed strategy with the optimal (from his point
of view) value of the parameter δ. This occurs to be 1 in all cases, which
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Figure 4.17. Lower bounds via SDP on min-entropy certi-
fied by modified CHSH DI-QRNG protocol for different levels
of noise and different additional constraints. The full Bell op-
erator is given by (4.52), and the reduced Bell operator is given
in (2.15).
Figure 4.18. The efficiency of mixed strategies P and D for
different values of δ in (4.31) for reduced T2 SDI-QRNG pro-
tocol.
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Figure 4.19. The efficiency of mixed strategies P and D for
different values of δ in (4.31) for reduced T3 SDI-QRNG pro-
tocol.
supports a conjecture that there is no gain when a mixed strategy is used.
The plots show the cases referring to T2, Fig. 4.22, T3, Fig. 4.23, BC3,
Fig. 4.24), and modified CHSH, Fig. 4.25.
4.4. Amplification of arbitrarily weak Santha-Vazirani source with
three devices
This section deals with the quantum answer to the question about the
possibility of amplification of arbitrary free randomness stated in sec. 3.2.
We show that this task is possible if we are using quantum resources.
Our amplification protocol involves a Bell experiment with the Mermin
game, see sec. 2.2.8. We introduced this protocol in the paper [139]. We refer
interested readers to our paper for a detailed analysis of physical aspects of
the protocol.
We show that the Mermin game has a very important property that for
any quality of the SV source of randomness the violation required to amplify
it is possible to be observed using quantum resources. Thus, our protocol,
in opposition to the protocol proposed by Gallego et al. in [75], can find
practical application, since the latter needs a maximal noiseless violation.
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Figure 4.20. The efficiency of mixed strategies P and D for
different values of δ in (4.31) for reduced BC3 SDI-QRNG pro-
tocol.
The majority of papers on the randomness amplification [47, 75, 175,
29, 50, 87] assume only the no-signaling principle. Since our task here is not
to study the foundations of the quantum theory, but to provide a protocol
which can be used in practice, we assume the laws of quantum mechanics.
We note that the amplification task differs from cryptographic scenario in the
point that, after the amplification process, the generated bits do not have to
be kept secret. In this case we are interested only in their indeterminacy, not
privacy.
4.4.1. Description of the scenario. In opposition to the DI-QRNGs
and SDI-QRNGs considered above, if we are to use -free string of bits as
a source of settings, we cannot assume that the distribution of inputs is
unbiased. We discussed this issue in sec. 4.1.6 in the analysis of DI-QKD
using the Hardy’s paradox. We assume that the value of  is known.
The proposed protocol of amplification of weak randomness considers two
types of devices, namely the -free Santha-Vazirani source of randomness,
and quantum boxes shared among three honest parties. Since we are working
in a DI scheme, we do not assume anything about internal construction of
quantum boxes.
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Figure 4.21. The efficiency of mixed strategies P and D for
different values of δ in (4.31) for reduced modified CHSH SDI-
QRNG protocol.
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Figure 4.22. The robustness of the reduced T2 SDI-QRNG
protocol with the worst case value of δ in (4.31).
The task of randomness amplification is performed in competition with
a malevolent vendor of those devices, Eve. She is able to produce a random
variable e which is to some extent correlated with those devices. We refer to
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Figure 4.23. The robustness of the reduced T3 SDI-QRNG
protocol with the worst case value of δ in (4.31).
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Figure 4.24. The robustness of the reduced BC3 SDI-QRNG
protocol with the worst case value of δ in (4.31).
e as the knowledge of Eve. The task of amplification is now to generate a
final bit y that is ′-free with respect to Eve, or precisely
1
2
− ′ ≤ P (y|e) ≤ 1
2
+ ′.
The procedure runs in a sequence of iterations. With the SV source of
randomness the parties are able to produce an arbitrary large sequence of bits,
s. Each party gets one bit as their input, and produces one bit of output.
For iteration i we denote by xi, yi and zi the settings of each party, and by
114 Quantum protocols
 0
 0.2
 0.4
 0.6
 0.8
 1
 0.9  0.925  0.95  0.975  1
mi
n-e
ntr
op
y [
bit
s]
reduced symmetric
Figure 4.25. The robustness of the reduced modified CHSH
SDI-QRNG protocol with the worst case value of δ in (4.31).
ai, bi and ci their outcomes. Since in Mermin game, see sec. 2.2.8, we have
xi ⊕ yi ⊕ zi = 1, we assume that only xi and yi are randomized, and zi is
calculated as xi ⊕ yi ⊕ 1.
Without going into details, the crucial part is the calculation of random-
ness of local outputs of any of the three involved parties, say Alice. Below
we show that this randomness is good enough to allow, after post-processing,
the amplification of the initial randomness.
4.4.2. Calculation of the randomness with semi-definite program-
ming. We will use SDP relaxation given by the NPA method. This time the
scenario is more complicated, since it involves not two, but three parties. As
mentioned before, the NPA can be extended to such a case. Nonetheless,
finding lower bounds on the quality of randomness generated by playing a
biased non-local game is non-trivial.
For any given distribution p(x, y|e) the NPA can be used to efficiently find
a lower bound on this randomness. The problem with our case is that this
probability distribution is not only unknown to us, but it can also be different
in each iteration. The only thing that we know about p(x, y|e) is that both
bits x and y come from an -free source (with known ).
Let us write the success probability of the biased Mermin game in the
following form
(4.54)
∑
x,y
p(x, y|e)P (a⊕ b⊕ c = xy|x, y, x⊕ y ⊕ 1, e).
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The term P (a ⊕ b ⊕ c = xy|x, y, x ⊕ y ⊕ 1, e) is defined directly by the
description of the quantum box used in the protocol, where P (a, b, c|x, y, z, e)
is the probability of outcomes a, b and c when the settings are x, y and z,
and e is the knowledge of Eve. We define
PA(a|x, y, z, e) ≡
∑
b,c
P (a, b, c|x, y, z, e)
as the marginal probability of Alice.
Let us consider the following set of constraints on the probabilities for
some  ∈ [0, 1
2
) and Ps ∈ [0, 1]:
(4.55)
∑
x,y
p(x, y|e)P (a⊕ b⊕ c = xy|x, y, x⊕ y ⊕ 1, e) ≥ Ps,
1
2
−  ≤ p(x|e) ≤ 1
2
+ ,
1
2
−  ≤ p(y|x, e) ≤ 1
2
+ ,
P({0, 1}, {0, 1}, {0, 1}|{0, 1}, {0, 1}, {0, 1}, {e}) is quantum for all e.
Ps may be understood as a lower bound on the success probability of the
biased Mermin game, (4.54), known (e.g. from an experiment) to the user of
the device. We want to find a function Pmax(, Ps) being the solution of the
following optimization problem in variables P (a, b, c|x, y, z, e):
maximize max
x,y,i,∈{0,1},e
PA(i|x, y, x⊕ y ⊕ 1, e)
subject to the conditions from (4.55) are fulfilled.
(4.56)
This problem cannot be formulated as an SDP problem using the NPA, since
the conditions from (4.55) are not linear in the variables. In order to overcome
this difficulty let us consider what the success probability of the unbiased
game, (i.e. with  = 0) would be if the same states and measurements are
used in it.
Let us denote the quantum probability distribution which solves the prob-
lem (4.56) as
Popt({0, 1}, {0, 1}, {0, 1}|{0, 1}, {0, 1}, {0, 1}, {e}).
The success probability, P ubs , of the unbiased game with quantum box defined
by the distribution Popt is given by the following expression
P ubs ≡
1
4
∑
x,y
Popt(a⊕ b⊕ c = xy|x, y, x⊕ y ⊕ 1, e).
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Let us define
Pm ≡ min
x,y
Popt(a⊕ b⊕ c = xy|x, y, x⊕ y ⊕ 1, e).
Obviously we have
P ubs ≥ Pm.
The success probability, Psuccess, of the biased Mermin game, (4.54), for a
given value of Pm is as large as possible when the probability p(x, y|e) in
front of Pm is as small as possible. Since we know that this probability is
generated by -free Santha-Vazirani source, the smallest probability of a pair
of outcomes is
(
1
2
− )2. Moreover, Popt(a⊕ b⊕ c = xy|x, y, x⊕ y ⊕ 1, e) ≤ 1
for all x and y. Recall that Ps is a lower bound on Psuccess. From these
considerations we obtain
Ps ≤Psuccess ≤ (1
2
+ )2 + 2(
1
2
+ )(
1
2
− ) + (1
2
− )2Pm =
1−
(
1
2
− 
)2
+
(
1
2
− 
)2
Pm ≤ 1−
(
1
2
− 
)2 (
1− P ubs
)
and, in consequence,
(4.57) P ubs ≥ 1−
1− Ps(
1
2
− )2 .
We will now find a way to relax the problem (4.56) to a form possible to
be stated as an NPA problem. This will allow us to calculate an upper bound
on Pmax(, Ps). The above considerations show that from (4.55) it follows
that there exists a probability distribution
P({0, 1}, {0, 1}, {0, 1}|{0, 1}, {0, 1}, {0, 1}, {e})
satisfying conditions:
(4.58)
1
4
∑
x,y
P (a⊕ b⊕ c = xy|x, y, x⊕ y ⊕ 1, e) ≥ 1− 1− Ps(
1
2
− )2 ,
P({0, 1}, {0, 1}, {0, 1}|{0, 1}, {0, 1}, {0, 1}, {e}) is quantum for all e.
Thus the conditions from (4.55) imply (4.58), and thus the value of the so-
lution on the following maximization problem in variables P (a, b, c|x, y, z, e)
gives an upper bound on the value of the solution of the problem (4.56):
maximize max
x,y,i,∈{0,1},e
maxPA(i|x, y, x⊕ y ⊕ 1, e)
subject to the conditions from (4.58) are fulfilled.
It is crucial for practical implementations that the value of Ps can be experi-
mentally estimated.
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We calculated the upper bounds on Pmax(, Ps) with the NPA with the
hierarchy level
Q1+AB+AC+BC(2, 2, 2|2, 2, 2).
From an upper bound on Pmax(, Ps) it is straightforward to calculate an
upper bound on the bias of the output of Alice, ′ = Pmax(, Ps)− 12 . Let us
denote this upper bound on the bias by g(, Ps). This function is shown in
fig. 4.26.
Our main result is that for any 0 < , η < 1
2
there exists Ps < 1 such that
g(, Ps) ≤ η. To be more precise, we have numerically checked only  ≤ 0.499,
and conjecture this is true for all  < 1
2
. The critical value of Pcrit() such
that for all Ps > Pcrit() we have g(, Ps) <  is plotted in fig. 4.27.
Figure 4.26. Maximal bias of the measurement out-
come as a function g(, Ps) of the weakness of randomness and
success probability of winning in the Mermin game. This gives
the critical values of the success probabilities required to take
inputs from -free source and get outcomes with bias less than
′.
4.4.3. The randomness amplification protocol. If the success prob-
ability was the same for each iteration, this would complete the task, since
it would be enough to perform an experiment with an average success prob-
ability lower than  and take the outcomes of one of the parties as our final
sequence. Then ′ = g(, Ps). Yet, we cannot assume this, since the success
probability may differ between iterations. For this reason we have to perform
some post-processing of the outcomes.
This result is somehow technical, and not directly connected to the topic of
this work, i.e. SDP in the analysis of quantum protocols. We refer interested
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Figure 4.27. Winning probabilities in the Mermin
game sufficient for randomness amplification as a func-
tion Pcrit() of the bias of the source of randomness. If Ps is
above the plot it means that the bias of the final bit y is lower
than that of the source. Note that higher values of Ps are re-
quired for extremal initial ’s. This is because if  is large the
initial quantity of randomness is bad which makes the amplifi-
cation difficult. On the other hand, if  is already low then to
amplify it we need to obtain an even more random bit which is
again difficult.
readers to our paper [139] for a complete proof that the presented protocol
is working properly. We mention that the crucial part of the proof uses the
following lemma by Chor and Goldreich [39]:
Lemma 4.8. Let us define an (N, b)-source which produces N bits
s1, . . . , sN
such that P (s1, . . . , sN |k) ≤ 2−b. Consider two independent sources (N, b1)
and (N, b2) producing bits h1, . . . , hN and a1, . . . , aN respectively. The inde-
pendence condition is defined by
P (h1, . . . , hN , a1, . . . , aN |k) = P (h1, . . . , hN |k)× P (a1, . . . , aN |k).
Then, the inner product y =
⊕N
i=1 hi · ai is an ′-free bit, that is 12 − ′ ≤
P (y|k) ≤ 1
2
+ ′, if
b1 + b2 ≥ N + 2 + 2 log2
1
′
.
We finish by stating the following amplification protocol. Let N denote
the number of iterations we perform.
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We begin with -free Santha-Vazirani source of randomness and tri-partite
quantum box, as described above. Then we use the SV source to generate a
sequence s of 2N bits to choose measurement settings for subsequent itera-
tions, and N bits h = (h1, · · · , hN) which will be needed to perform hashing .
We assume that the SV source and the quantum box are correlated only
through the variable e.
After these initial steps we perform N iterations to collect a sequence of
outcomes of the first party, a = (a1, · · · , aN).
When the statistics are collected, we estimate the average success proba-
bility. Let us denote the estimated (i.e. directly observed in this particular
sequence of iterations) average success probability by Pest. Let us define
5
(4.59) r(q,N) ≡
√
− ln(1− q)N− 12 .
At this stage we check the following condition:
(4.60) ηest ≡ g (, Pest − r(q,N)) < 1
1 + 2
− 1
2
.
Such a value can always be obtained in quantum mechanical experiments for
N large enough. One may check that from (4.60) it follows that
κ ≡ 1− log2
((
1
2
+ ηest
)−1(
1
2
+ 
)−1)
< 0.
If the condition (4.60) is satisfied, then we perform the hashing by calcu-
lating
(4.61) y =
N⊕
i=1
hiai.
The resulting bit y is then ′-free with ′ = 22+κN . It is easy to see that the
resulting ′ can be made arbitrarily close to 0 if N is large enough.
If the condition (4.60) is not satisfied, then we abort the protocol. Note
that the larger  the condition is more restrictive.
The reliability of this protocol is stated in the following theorem:
Theorem 4.9. For any 0 < ′ <  < 1
2
and 0 ≤ q < 1 there exists N such
that in the protocol presented above the bit y is ′-free with the probability at
least q when the condition (4.60) is satisfied.
For the proof we refer interested readers to our work, [139]. Note that the
protocol can still fail to amplify with probability 1−p although the condition
(4.60) is satisfied.
5The formula defined in (4.59) is used in an estimation method using Azuma-Hoeffding
theorem [94, 13].

CHAPTER 5
Interior point methods
In this chapter we provide an overview of issues related to interior point
methods (IPMs). We start with the historical overview of the development
of these methods, and discuss basic notions related to them. Then we move
to a discussion of the interior point algorithm in different variants.
In this chapter we widely use the notation stated in (1.1) by interchanging
matrix (X or Z) and vector (x or z) forms of variables.
5.1. An overview of interior point methods for semi-definite
programming
In this section we give a short overview of the development of interior
point methods. A more detailed treatment on this topic may be found in
[202, 68, 220, 84], and in [180] for the case of LP.
Nowadays it is difficult to imagine the field of optimization without interior
point algorithms. Nonetheless they had not played an important role before
1984 when a groundbreaking paper by Karmarkar [101] was published. The
revelation of the potential of IPM has been called a revolution in optimization
[220], and IPM is mentioned among the most important algorithms of all the
time [130]. Moreover, before 1984 there had been almost no connection
between linear and nonlinear programming [220]. IPM allowed to introduce
a unified framework for analysis of both linear and nonlinear problems [158].
5.1.1. A brief history of optimization. The modern history of lin-
ear optimization started during World War II, when the problem of optimal
resource management became crucial. The problem was solved in 1947 by
George Dantzig [54], when he proposed the simplex method. Although the
algorithm had exponential worst case complexity, it performed very efficiently
in practical problems. Roughly speaking, the idea of the simplex method is to
start at some vertex of the relevant convex polytope, and subsequently move
over to its extreme point. The problem with this method is that there exist
cases where the algorithm visits every vertex of the feasible region, leading
to exponential worst case complexity, like e.g. in the Klee-Minty problem
formulated in 1970 [106].
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During 1960s and 1970s the importance of the topic of computational com-
plexity increased, and thus scientists became concerned with finding polyno-
mial algorithms for different problems, since it was believed that an efficient
solution has to be polynomial.
The first polynomial method for LP was ellipsoid method invented by
Khachian in 1979 [104]. The problem is that this method is very slow in
practical problems. Thus, before 1984 there had existed two major meth-
ods for LP: one with the exponential worst case complexity but efficient in
practice, and an inefficient one with a polynomial complexity.
During 1960s in the field of nonlinear programming there was a practice to
convert constrained problems to unconstrained ones using the so-called barrier
methods [64]. By introducing a barrier function it is possible to define a so-
called central path, which is traversed using Newton’s method. Nevertheless,
the popularity of barrier methods decreased in 1970s.
The IPM revolution began when Karmarkar announced a method for LP
of polynomial complexity, which in contrast to the method of Khachian per-
formed well in practical cases. In the following year it was shown [77] that the
method was equivalent to a logarithmic barrier method applied to LP. More-
over, it was shown that IPM for LP is not worst than the simplex method in
terms of efficiency in practical problems.
The origin of the barrier methods from nonlinear optimization suggested
that IPM should be possible to be applicable to more general problems than
LP. An extremely important result of invention of IPM is the unification of
LP and nonlinear programming.
The next mile-stone in the history of IPM is the independent result of
Alizadeh [6] Nesterov and Nemirovskii [158, 157] of late 1980s, who extended
the scope of the method to a family of other convex optimization problems.
Nesterov and Nemirovskii showed that the key to applying IPM to convex
problems was the knowledge of a barrier which had a special property of self-
concordance. In addition, if the method is to find a practical application, the
first and second derivatives of the barrier have to be easily computable. The
theory developed by Nesterov and Nemirovskii was used by Vandenberghe and
Boyd [212]. It allowed them to apply the Gonzaga and Todd’s LP method
[85] to SDP problems.
In short, self-concordant barrier is a smooth convex function defined on
the interior of the relevant set. It tends to∞ as the boundary is approached,
and together with its derivatives it satisfies certain Lipschitz continuity condi-
tions. They showed that IPM can be applied to any set for which it is possible
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to formulate such a barrier. Fortunately, a relatively easily computable self-
concordant barrier is known for the case of SDP, namely
(5.1) F (X) ≡ − ln detX,
for X  0. A detailed modern introduction to self-concordant functions is
contained in [154]. In their further works, Nesterov and Todd [155, 156]
introduced and developed a notion of self-scaled barriers, which allow IPM
to take longer steps than simple self-concordant barriers.
Another important development in LP which was further applied in SDP
is the predictor-corrector (P-C) scheme [135]. This topic will be described in
more details further in sec. 5.2.3.
We have briefly mentioned the barrier IPM for SDP. From the point of
view of this work, the most important variant of IPM is the so-called primal-
dual interior point method. This method was introduced by Kojima et al. in
[108], and allowed for implementation on efficient LP solvers by Lustig et al.
[123, 124, 125, 126].
One of the most fascinating differences between IPM for LP and SDP
is the problem of search directions. We elucidate this topic in sec. 5.3. In
short the problem arises from the fact in LP the variables are scalars which
commute, but in SDP the variables are symmetric matrices which in general
do not commute.
5.1.2. Self-dual embedding. The self-dual embedding method for LP
has been introduced by Ye et al. [228, 227], and later generalized to other
problems [122]. We briefly describe this method since it is used in SeDuMi
solver [199, 198], which is one of two popular solvers we use in this work as
a reference.
The self-dual embedding is one of the ways to overcome the difficulty with
finding the initial solution for an SDP solver. The problem arises when a
variant of IPM which requires all iterates to be feasible is to be implemented.
Since this method is not used by the solver implemented in this work, we
only sketch it to allow understanding how SeDuMi solver works. We refer
interested readers to the description given in [199].
Roughly speaking, the idea is to embed the SDP problem into a larger
SDP problem, for which it is trivial to find an initially feasible solution. This
is done by introducing additional variables xe, ye, ze ∈ R+, whose values can
be calculated for some initial iterates X(0), y(0) and Z(0). Then it is possible
to construct a larger problem which has a solution allowing to approximate
the solution of the initial problem. This is done by re-normalizing the solution
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of the larger problem, namely
1
x∗e
(X∗, y∗, Z∗)
gives an approximate solution of the initial problem. Here (X∗, y∗, Z∗) are
the values obtained for the optimum of the larger problem.
5.1.3. Semi-definite programming solvers. We will briefly discuss
modern implementations of SDP solvers. We refer readers to [143] for a
comprehensive overview.
A standard choice for an SDP solver among the NPA community seems
[150, 151, 152] to be the SeDuMi solver [198, 199] created by Sturm and,
after his death, developed and maintained by Imre Polik. As mentioned
above, this solver implements self-dual embedding IPM.
Another SDP solver of particular interest is SDPT3 solver [210, 207]
implemented by Toh, Todd and Tutuncu. It implements infeasible primal-
dual IPM with NT and HKM search directions (see sec. 5.3 for the definition
of the search directions).
SeDuMi and SDPT3 are described in details in sec. 6.1, where their per-
formance is analyzed. Other examples of SDP solvers include CSDP [25] by
Borchers, DSDP [22], SDPA [73].
The choice of SeDuMi and SDPT3 as reference solvers further in this paper
is motivated in the case of SeDuMi by its popularity, and in the case of SDPT3
by its scientific importance reflected by the number of papers referring to its
mechanisms, and the number of their citations. At the moment of writing
this work, among the mentioned solver, these two were most cited.
5.2. Formulation of the primal-dual interior point algorithm
In this section we give an overview of working of a predictor-corrector
path-following interior point algorithm for SDP. For the sake of simplicity
we assume that the problem on the input of the algorithm has a feasible
optimal solution for which the strong duality condition (see Eq. 1.14) holds.
We expect the algorithm to output a solution which is (at least) close to
be feasible, and for which the gap, see sec. 1.2.3, between primal and dual
solutions do not exceed some threshold.
Recall from sec. 1.2.1 that an SDP problem is defined by a set of symmetric
matrices A1, . . . Am ∈ Rn×n, b ∈ Rm, and C ∈ Rn×n. Below we fix the
meaning of n and m, so that they refer to the definition of an SDP problem.
A crucial notion for path-following IPMs is the central path. This is a
set of solutions, (X, y, Z), parametrized by a non-negative variable ν, which
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satisfy (cf. Eqs (1.6) and (1.8))
X,Z  0,
Tr(AiX) = bi, for i = 1, · · · ,m
C −
m∑
i=1
yiAi = Z,
XZ = νI,
or, equivalently (see (1.10))
(5.2a) ATx = b
(5.2b) c−Ay = z,
(5.2c) XZ = νI,
together with X,Z  0.
From the strong duality, (1.14), we get that the optimal solution,
(X∗, y∗, Z∗),
has the property that it is on the central path at the point with ν = 0. The
idea of path-following IPM methods is to keep the iterates possibly close to
some point at the central path, with ν subsequently decreasing.
Using the conditions from (5.2a) and (5.2b) we get that the Newton step
(∆X,∆y,∆Z) is defined by the following conditions
(5.3)
AT∆x = rp,
A∆y + ∆z = rd.
If the method assumes that rp = rd = 0, then it is called feasible IPM, and
infeasible otherwise.
The most problematic is the condition imposed on the Newton step from
the condition in (5.2c). As mentioned above, the problem arises from the
fact that the matrices X(i) and Z(i) (where i stands for the current iteration)
possibly do not commute. For this reason the following form of conditions on
the target of the Newton step is imposed:
(5.4) Θν(X,Z) = O ∈ Rn×n,
where Θν(X,Z) is some symmetrization of XZ−νI (cf. Eq. (5.2c)) satisfying
Θν(X,Z) = Θν(X,Z)
T . The problem of choice of Θν(X,Z) is discussed
further in sec. 5.3. We also define
(5.5) θν(x, z) ≡ vec(Θν(X,Z)) ∈ Rn2 .
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5.2.1. The Newton step. From (5.4) we have the following constraint
for the Newton step:
E∆x+ F∆z = rc,
where
(5.6a) E ≡ ∂xθν(x, z) ∈ Rn2×n2 ,
(5.6b) F ≡ ∂zθν(x, z) ∈ Rn2×n2 ,
(5.6c)
Rc ≡ −Θν(X,Z) ∈ Rn×n,
rc ≡ vec(Rc) ∈ Rn2 .
This is a classical notation used in [204, 5, 203, 206, 210]. This together
with conditions (5.3) gives the following formula for the Newton step:
(5.7)
AT O OO A I
E O F
∆x∆y
∆z
 =
rprd
rc.
 .
If X,Z  0 and the so-called Monteiro-Zhang symmetrization is used, (5.18)
in sec. 5.3, then this system has a unique solution [195, 204]. The size of the
matrix occurring on left-hand-side (LHS) of (5.7) is (2n2 +m)× (2n2 +m).
A way of solving this equation with the Schur complement method is
described in sec. 5.4. By now it is enough to say that it allows to reduce
the size of the equation to m × m. Although this reduction allows to save
much of computations, but the creation of this complement is still one of the
most expensive operations in SDP iterations. Methods of computing it are
discussed in more detail in sec. 6.2.
In the simplest case, when no P-C is used, in each iteration one determines
the Newton direction solving (5.7). Afterward one needs to choose the step-
length, i.e. a pair of constants, α, β ∈ (0, 1] (we keep here the notation of
[204, 207]), such that
(5.8)
X + α∆X  0,
Z + β∆Z  0.
One may also impose additional constraint, e.g. concerning the distance
from the central path. We note here that the Newton’s method is used only
to establish the direction, but the iterative solver does not necessary take
the full Newton step. The issue of computing the step-length is discussed in
sec. 5.2.2.
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5.2.2. Step-lengths and the convergence of interior point meth-
ods. We will here describe methods of evaluation the step-length taken within
an iteration after the step direction has been evaluated.
Some implementations of IPM solvers take advantage of the so-called cen-
tral path neighborhood , which formalizes some notion of a distance of a solu-
tion (X, y, Z), not necessarily feasible, from the central path. Examples of
neighborhoods are given in [200, 201, 199]. Using suitable neighborhoods
many authors were able to prove some convergence results of particular vari-
ants of IPM. The algorithms differ not only in the choice of a neighborhood,
but also in the length of the steps, α and β, taken within it.
The bounds on the number of iterations are usually expressed for a given
neighborhood in terms of n being the size of the matrices describing the prob-
lem, and  expressing the required limit on the gap between primal and dual
solutions. In [201] the bound O
(√
n log 1

)
for a particular choice of neigh-
borhood is obtained. Similar bounds have been obtained by other authors
with different choices of neighborhood (see, e.g. [203] for overview). For
the proof of convergence the algorithms also require the starting point to be
contained within the neighborhood.
The topic of efficient evaluation of the step-length is covered in more
details in [205]. In particular, one may show that t being the solution of the
following problem defined by M and ∆M
maximize t
subject to M + t∆M  0
is given by the formula
(5.9) max
(
eig(C−T∆MC−1)
)
,
where C is the Cholesky decomposition of M . This gives a method for com-
puting the step-length, α and β. We have α = min(t, 1) with M = X and
∆M = ∆X, and similarly for β. In the case of OCTAVE [59] the eig function
is computed with DSYEV subroutine from LAPACK [8, 83].
We stress that since the proofs of convergence of IPM usually assume
that the steps are contained in some neighborhood of the central path, the
cost of dropping this assumption in some implementation is that there is no
warranty that the algorithm converges. Nonetheless, the cost of usage of the
neighborhood is the time of its computation, and the decrease of step-lengths.
For this reasons some solvers, e.g. SDPT3 [210], and the solver proposed in
chapter 6, PMSdp, decide not to impose any neighborhood restrictions on the
iterates.
We briefly mention other reasons why a practical implementation of IPM
may not find a solution. We distinguish the failure and the situation when
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the number of iteration has exceeded some limit imposed by a user or imple-
mentation. In the latter case it still may be possible that after some number
of iterations the specific problem would have converged. We observe that a
typical reason of failure is during the Schur complement matrix decomposi-
tion. This may occur when the iterates approach the optimal solution where
the primal variable and the dual slack are close to be orthogonal, Tr(XZ) ≈ 0.
In this case the Schur complement may become ill-conditioned.
5.2.3. Predictor-corrector method. The tests described in the intro-
duction to chapter 6 (see also appendices B, and C) indicates that the usage of
the P-C allows a significant performance improvement for most of the consid-
ered cases. The cost P-C is that in each iteration one has to solve the equation
for Newton step (5.7) twice. Nonetheless the LHS remains unchanged within
the single iteration, and thus if the Schur complement method or matrix
factorization is used, then it is enough to run it only once per iteration.
The first part of P-C is the calculation of the predictor direction (some-
times called an affine scaling direction [199]), which is an aggressive strategy
for moving along the central path. As the target for Newton step one sets
ν = 0 in (5.4), meaning that the predictor step tries to get close to the opti-
mal solution. Let (δX, δy, δZ) denote the predictor step with the step-length
given by αP and βP .
The predictor step is not actually performed, but used to derive a second-
order correction for the corrector (or centering direction). Let us define [204,
207])
(5.10) σ ≡
(
Tr ((X + αP δX)(Z + βP δZ))
Tr(XZ)
)expon used
,
where expon used is a variable whose value is determined with some algo-
rithm. (We follow here the naming convention of [207] to use the name
expon used for this variable, and expon for the related parameter of an algo-
rithm. See sec. 6.1.1 for more details.) Let us also define
(5.11) µ ≡ 1
n
Tr(XZ).
In the corrector part of the iteration one sets
(5.12) Rc,corr ≡ −Θ(σµ)(X,Z) + F (X,Z, δX, δZ)
(instead of (5.6c)) and solves (5.7) for the second time, with a different right-
hand-side (RHS). Here F (X,Z, δX, δZ) is some expression for the second
order correction (see sec. 6.5 for more details).
Let us denote the correctors direction as (∆X,∆y,∆Z), and let the step-
length be given by αC and βC . In the subsequent iterate the IPM algorithm
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sets
(5.13)
X := X + αC∆X,
y := y + βC∆y,
Z := Z + βC∆Z.
The algorithm stops when residual norms, P and D, and the gap |Tr(XZ)|,
see sec. 1.2.3, are all less than the specified threshold.
5.3. Search directions in interior point methods
As mentioned previously, there are many possible symmetrizations of the
expression XZ − νI. Here we describe three historically most important of
them, viz. AHO, HKM and NT. Most of the modern SDP solvers in the
overview by Mittelmann [143] use either HKM or NT. We refer readers to
[203] for a detailed survey of the topic of search directions.
5.3.1. AHO and HKM search directions. Let us consider the con-
dition in (5.2c), namely XZ = νI. Taking the step gives
(X + ∆X)(Z + ∆Z) = νI
or ignoring the second order term ∆X∆Z
∆XZ +X∆Z = νI−XZ.
We require the steps ∆X and ∆Z to be symmetric. From the second equation
in (5.3) it is clear that ∆Z is always symmetric (up to numerical precision).
Nonetheless, it may not be true for ∆X. For this reason there is a need for
a symmetrization of the equation (5.2c).
In [5] Alizadeh, Haeberly and Overton (AHO) introduced the following
natural symmetrization of (5.2c)
ΘAHOν (X,Z) ≡
1
2
(XZ + ZX) = νI.
Although historically important, this search direction is not currently used
by majority of SDP solvers, e.g. it has been removed from the recent imple-
mentations of SDPT3 [207].
The HKM direction has been introduced independently by Helmberg et
al. [91], Kojima et al. [109] and Monteiro [145]. This has a primal
ΘHKM,primalν (X,Z) ≡ Z
1
2XZ
1
2 = νI,
and a dual
ΘHKM,dualν (X,Z) ≡ X
1
2ZX
1
2 = νI
versions. This method is used by many modern solvers. Further in this work,
in chapter 6, we perform the performance profiling of this method.
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We briefly mention that many other directions exist [203], including for
example the XZ direction [35].
5.3.2. Nesterov-Todd search direction. The method developed by
Nesterov and Todd (NT) [155, 156] is of a particular interest, since the im-
plementation we propose in chapter 6 uses this direction. Its direct definition
is more involved than in the cases of AHO and HKM.
In their works Nesterov and Todd state the existence of the so-called
scaling point W , which is defined in terms of the self-scaled barrier of a
given convex set. Without going into details, their result states in particular
that there exists a unique PSD matrix W such that
(5.14) W−1XW−1 = Z.
Obviously we have equivalently
(5.15) WZW = X.
It can be shown with elementary operations that
(5.16) W = X
1
2
(
X
1
2ZX
1
2
)− 1
2
X
1
2 = Z−
1
2
(
Z
1
2XZ
1
2
) 1
2
Z−
1
2 .
Note that evaluation of a square root of a matrix is a relatively expensive
operation. Fortunately, as it is described later, there is no need to perform
this calculation when implementing the method.
The matrix W allows the following symmetrization of (5.2c):
1
2
(
W−
1
2XZ + ZXW−
1
2
)
= νW−1,
or, taking V ≡ W 12ZW 12 = W− 12XW− 12 ,
ΘNTν (X,Z) ≡ V 2 = νI.
The latter approach of the symmetrization is used in [201]. This form, called
the v-space approach, or v-linearization, gives the same search direction as
the original NT direction. We mention it, since one of the investigated solvers,
SeDuMi [198], uses this nomenclature.
A key reference for issues related to implementation of the NT search
direction is [204].
5.3.3. Monteiro-Zhang family of search directions. Let us describe
the following linear transformation introduced by Monteiro and Zhang [231,
147, 146] in 1998, which allows the formulation of the Monteiro-Zhang family
of search directions. This family includes the three mentioned directions,
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AHO, HKM and NT. This linear transformation is given by the following
formula
(5.17) HP (M) ≡ 1
2
(
PMP−1 + P−TMTP T
)
,
where P is an invertible matrix. Now we take
(5.18) Θν(X,Z) ≡ HP (XZ)− νI.
From (5.6a) and (5.6b) we get
Mat (E∆x) = 1
2
(
P∆XZP−1 + P−TZ∆XP T
)
and
Mat (F∆z) = 1
2
(
PX∆ZP−1 + P−T∆ZXP T
)
,
or equivalently
(5.19) E = P ⊗S
(
P−TZ
) ∈ Rn2×n2 ,
and
(5.20) F = (PX)⊗S P−T ∈ Rn2×n2 ,
where ⊗S is the symmetrized Kronecker product of two matrices, defined
in (1.2). The operators E and F act on the vector form of the step, ∆x and
∆z. Further in this work we will use this Kronecker product form.
One may check that using different choices of the invertible matrix P , it is
possible to obtain each of the discussed search directions, namely with P = I
we get AHO search direction, with P = Z
1
2 and P = X−
1
2 the primal and
dual HKM search directions.
One can show that if we take an invertible matrix P with a property that
P TP = W−1, then we obtain the NT search direction, see sec. 5.3.2. In
sec. 6.5.3, a method of evaluation of a matrix G such that
(5.21) GGT = W
is described. Thus we can take P = G−1.
5.4. The Schur complement equation
The Schur complement method is a well known method [230] which allows
to reduce a large system of equations to a smaller one, involving only a subset
of variables. For example, a matrix
M =
[
A B
C D
]
has the Schur complement given by A − BD−1C. The method requires the
submatrix D to be invertible. D also needs to be well-conditioned in order
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to give accurate results under finite-precision arithmetic. The method allows
us to solve the equation
M
[
x1
x2
]
=
[
y1
y2
]
solving two simpler equations:
(A−BD−1C)x1 = y1 −BD−1y2, and afterward
Cx1 +Dx2 = y2.
The reason why this method is useful is that one usually needs O(n3) oper-
ations to solve linear equation with n variables, and thus it is profitable to
decompose the initial equation into two smaller equations.
If we reorder the variables in (5.7), then we can obtain the following Schur
complement equation for ∆y [204]:
(5.22)
(ATE−1FA)∆y = rp +AT (E−1Frd − E−1rc) .
After evaluation of ∆y it is possible to get the values of ∆X and ∆Z.
Namely we have
(5.23) ∆Z = Rd −Mat (A∆y) ,
where Rd = Mat rd, and
(5.24) ∆X = Mat
(E−1(rc −F∆z)) .
Thus we are able to decompose the procedure of solving of (5.7) into three
steps. The advantage is the following. Using Schur complement method we
need to solve a smaller system of equation. The solution of a linear system of
k equations requires O(k3) floating point operations (FlOps). In the initial
system we have k = 2n2 +m, with n > m, and thus this requires O(n6) FlOps
to get the solution. On the other hand, the Schur complement equation has
size m, and requires only O(m3) FlOps. The calculation of (5.23) and (5.24)
are simple matrix-matrix and matrix-vector calculations on matrices of size
n× n described in sec. 6.5.
CHAPTER 6
Semi-definite programming solver for
Navascues-Pironio-Ac´ın problems
In this chapter we propose a special purpose SDP solver, further referred
to as PMSdp, intended to act with NPA problems with the performance better
than general solvers. There are a few methods of improving the performance
of an SDP solver if it is supposed to solve a limited set of problems.
The simplest way is to optimize the code by making some simplifications,
e.g. there is no need to diverge the problem depending upon conditions, if
these can be assumed to be fulfilled. The results presented in sec. 6.6 suggest
that this factor can have a very large impact on the performance.
Another obvious method to improve the performance of an SDP solver is
to choose the proper algorithm. Further in sec. 6.1 some conclusions regarding
the selection of the interior point method, including search direction and
algorithm parameters, are made. In this section we also give an overview
of the implementation of the three considered solvers, SDPT3, SeDuMi and
PMSdp.
A more involved way to ameliorate a solver is to take advantage of the
structure of the problem. This includes general techniques, like exploiting
the sparsity of matrices in [72], or reorganization of computations [206]. The
method proposed in sec. 6.2 deals with the utilization of the NPA matrix
structure in the calculation of the Schur complement matrix which is consid-
ered to take the most computational effort in IPM.
The topic of warm-start strategies in the context of IPM has been widely
studied in the case of linear programming. In the case where series of similar
problems of the same size are to be solved, one may use one of the iterates of
already solved instances as a starting point for another instance [229, 67, 97].
An overview of warm start strategies in the context of combinatorial optimiza-
tion problems for SDP is given in [62], nonetheless up to our knowledge the
problem for the general case has not been solved. Our method of choosing
an initial solution for NPA problems is presented in sec. 6.3.
The obstacles which occur in practical IPM solvers cover such problems
like ill-conditioning of the factorized matrices, or deterioration of step lengths.
Both problems can be overcome to some extent by the application of adequate
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perturbations to the current solution. Such a method is used in, e.g. SDPT3
[207]. The cost of the perturbation is a loss of feasibility of the solution in
the current iterate. Different strategies for choosing the criterion when to
apply a perturbation are discussed in Sec. 6.4.
We decided to divide the course of the discussion into separate, relatively
independent, topics. We hope that this form will be more useful for readers
interested in implementing an IPM solver. Although PMSdp works with
mixed LP-SDP problems (i.e. SDP problems with additional LP constraints),
in implementation discussion we concentrate on the SDP part, as this is more
specific for the considered issues.
Test specification
We have performed a series of performance tests using SeDuMi and SDPT3
solvers executed for different sets of parameters. The results are contained in
the appendix B and discussed among the sections below.
Let n denote the size of the SDP variable Γ in the considered problem, and
thus the length of the sequence used to formulate the considered hierarchy
level. Let m denote the number of linear constraint matrices of the problem,
i.e. the dimension of the dual variable.
Since this work concentrates on applications of the NPA method, we have
prepared a set of test cases which are examples of applications described in
chapter 4. These are given in problems (2.28), (2.29), (4.19), (4.20), (4.23)
and (4.25). We consider the cases regarding CHSH and I3322 Bell operators,
Hardy QKD and E0E1 protocol as smaller, whereas these regarding protocols
from BCn family and T3C as larger. The problems are summarized in tab. 6.1.
In sec. 6.1 we discuss also cases with higher hierarchy levels for problems of
maximization of CHSH an I3322.
Technology and test environment
The three solvers under comparison are toolboxes written as M-files in a
high-level language MATLAB with parts implemented in C and C++. The
latter are compiled to a binary form as MEX files with GCC 4.8.4 compilers.
MATLAB is an interpreted fourth-generation programming language used
for scientific and engineering purposes. The M-files are either script files or
function files. The MEX files, or MATLAB Executable files, are binary exe-
cutables callable from MATLAB. These files can be compiled from C, C++
or FORTRAN. The MEX files are dynamically linked subroutines loaded and
executed by the MATLAB interpreter. Each MEX file contains only one sub-
routine which can be called in the same way as built-in MATLAB subroutines.
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Table 6.1. NPA test cases. The sizes of mixed linear and
SDP parts of test cases. The nL column refers to the number
of linear constraints (each linear constraint introduces one ad-
ditional linear variable to the problem), and n column to the
size of an SDP variable (Note that in sec. 1.2.2 we have denoted
the size of SDP variable with nS instead of n.). The column m
refers to the dimension of the dual variable y. The last column
refers to the equation in the text in which the relevant problem
has been stated. All problems are formulated in the Almost
Quantum level of the NPA hierarchy.
nL n (SDP) m Eq.
CHSH 0 9 16 (2.28)
I3322 0 16 57 (2.29)
E0E1 2 9 16 (4.23)
Hardy 4 9 16 (4.19)
BC3 1 16 57 (4.20)
T3C 3 20 94 (4.25)
BC5 1 36 355 (4.20)
BC7 1 64 1281 (4.20)
It is a common practice in the field of High Performance Computing to write
the parts which are crucial from the point of view of efficiency as MEX files.
All tests have been performed on a machine equipped with Intel Core 2
Quad CPU Q9400@2.66GHz x 4, 15.5GiB RAM under Linux Ubuntu 14.04
in OCTAVE1 3.8.1 [59]. The times in tables are the execution times averaged
over 100 executions. The considered solvers do not use any randomization,
and thus the number of iterations does not change between different execu-
tions2.
6.1. Algorithm selection and specification of the solvers
We will now investigate which parameters are optimal for the problems
from the NPA method. We consider here two variants of interior point meth-
ods, an infeasible primal-dual interior point method implemented in SDPT3
and PMSdp solvers, and a self-dual embedding interior point method imple-
mented in SeDuMi.
1OCTAVE is an open source software with API compatible with MATLAB.
2The only place in which we use randomization is in creation of a warm-start solution
for PMSdp as described in sec. 6.3.2. Nonetheless the seed is constant, and thus the results
are the same for different execution.
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All three solvers can work with the mixed cone, which include problems
having many linear and SDP variables3. All of them are MATLAB packages
and implement parts of their subroutines as MEX files compiled to a binary
code to improve the performance.
As we have mentioned in sec. 5.2.2, if step lengths are taken within some
specified neighborhood of the central path, then one may prove that a solver
will always give a feasible solution (X, y, Z) with Tr(XZ) ≤  within a number
of steps polynomial in n and log 1

, if the solution exists. For example the
neighborhood used by SeDuMi guarantees convergence in O
(√
n log 1

)
steps.
On the other hand, both SDPT3 and PMSdp do not restrict their steps to any
neighborhood. In consequence these solvers are not guaranteed to converge.
The reason not to use neighborhood is that the solver takes larger steps, and
thus possibly achieves the result faster.
6.1.1. SDPT3 as an example of implementation of primal-dual
infeasible interior point method. SDPT3 is an example of an SDP solver
which does not employ the self-dual embedding techniques. Optionally it al-
lows a user to specify a warm-start solution. The solver performs infeasible
iterations till the desired feasibility and gap is achieved. The default stopping
condition is that both these values do not exceed 10−8. Under certain condi-
tions this solver performs some perturbations on the iterates; the algorithm
is very complicated, and includes many special cases.
The solver implements HKM and NT search directions. To calculate the
scaling point the solver used the method from (6.10).
This solver calculates the Schur complement with the method described
in sec. 6.2.3. It uses chol function from the API of MATLAB to factorize the
Schur complement matrix. The factors are used twice: first in the predictor
and then in the corrector step.
To calculate step lengths SDPT3 uses the Lanczos method of finding the
largest eigenvalues [205] in (5.9). The steps are not constrained to stay within
any neighborhood.
Recall from the (5.11), that we define
µ ≡ 1
n
Tr(XZ).
One of the input parameters of SDPT3 is expon used to calculate the value
of expon used in (5.10) with the following algorithm:
step pred← min(αP , βP )
3SeDuMi and SDPT3 allows the optimization over the so-called Lorentz, or second
order, convex cone (which is a particular case of SDP) which is beyond the scope of this
work.
6.1 Algorithm selection and specification of the solvers 137
if µ > 10−6 then
if step pred <
√
3
3
then
expon used← 1
else
expon used← max(expon, 3 · step pred2)
end if
else
expon used← max(1,min(expon, 3 · step pred2))
end if
The appendix B contains results of performance tests of SDPT3 solver on
test cases specified above. We discuss these results below.
6.1.1.1. Almost Quantum level. The general conclusion one can draw from
this performance data is the following. The HKM search direction seems to
be slightly more efficient than the NT search direction for small problems,
whereas the latter achieves a better performance for large problems.
For the majority of test cases it is profitable to use the predictor-corrector
scheme. Surprisingly this is not true for two test cases, viz. E0E1 and Hardy.
In these two cases still the predictor-corrector scheme reduced the number of
iterations needed to obtain the final result, but the execution time increased.
What is specific to these cases is that they involve more linear constraints
than other problems. It is important to note that both cases were not able
to attain the threshold of 10−8, which had to be increased to 10−5.
It is difficult to draw a conclusion with regard to the optimal value of the
parameter expon. For the smaller problems and BC3 and T3C the optimum
seems to be narrow at about 1.5 or 2, whereas BC5 and BC7 perform better
for values 1 or less.
To sum up, the only clear conclusion is that in most cases it is profitable
to use predictor-corrector method, whereas the impact of other factors is not
unequivocal.
6.1.1.2. High hierarchy levels. We draw more conclusions for the higher
hierarchy levels. In these cases the NT search direction performs much better
than HKM. The former attains the desired quality of the solution in about
1-3 iterations less that the latter and requires by 10-20% less CPU time. It is
highly profitable to use the predictor-corrector scheme. This allows to reduce
the iteration number and CPU time by about 30%.
Note that the level Q4 for I3322 HKM without P-C failed to give the
solution. On the other hand, levels Q10 and Q13 failed in most cases. This
supports the conclusion that the method used by SDPT3 can handle NPA
problems with n at most equal to about 250. The results also suggest that
the value m is less important.
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The reason why higher hierarchy levels fail to converge may be the fact
that for each NPA problem there exists a level of the hierarchy from which
the rank of the Γ matrix does not increase [151]. This leads to strongly
ill-conditioned iterates near the optimal solution, when the hierarchy level is
increased.
6.1.2. SeDuMi as an example of implementation of self-dual em-
bedding interior point method. In the appendix B the results of perfor-
mance tests are shown. The SeDuMi solver is an example of solver which
uses the self-dual embedding method (see sec. 5.1.2).
SeDuMi allows to use one of the following algorithms: a first-order wide re-
gion method, a centering-predictor-corrector algorithm with v-linearization4,
and a centering-predictor-corrector algorithm with xz-linearization.
There are three possibilities of step-length differentiation implemented in
SeDuMi, namely no differentiation, an algorithm with primal/dual step length
differentiation, and with an adaptive heuristic to control step differentiation.
The algorithm takes two parameters θ and β, which are wide region [200]
and neighborhood parameters. The detailed discussion of these notions is
beyond the scope of this work. We refer interested readers to [198] for details
(see sec. 5.2.2 for a brief overview). A strong dependence on the algorithm
parameters is observed.
6.1.2.1. Almost Quantum level. For almost all cases we observed that the
optimal selection of parameters is θ ≈ 0.7 and β ≈ 0.9. What is more, for
small values of these parameters many problems were not able to converge
within the iteration limit 150.
It is difficult to draw a conclusion with regards to the optimal step-length
differentiation method. In tab. 6.2 the optimal choices of each problem are
given. The only conclusion is that it is profitable to use some step differenti-
ation in SeDuMi.
The conclusion that the impact of step-length differentiations is not un-
equivocal is supported by the results contained in tab. 6.3. This table shows
the optimal linearization and step-length differentiation method for each
problem case.
From tab. 6.3 it is clear that the v-linearization is the optimal choice of
the algorithm for Almost Quantum SDP problems.
6.1.2.2. High hierarchy levels. In high hierarchy levels the optimal param-
eters in most cases are θ ≈ 1 and β ≈ 0.9 for the wide-region algorithm.
4Note that the term v-linearization refers in the case of SeDuMi to the NT direction
[201].
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Table 6.2. Optimal step-length differentiation strate-
gies of each of the testing problems for θ = 0.7 and β = 0.9.
The value 0 in the second column refers to the algorithm with-
out differentiation, the value 1 means the primal/dual step
length differentiation, and the value 2 means the adaptive
heuristic to control step differentiation. The values in brackets
mean that the choice is optimal in terms of the number of iter-
ations, but on the testing machine it was not optimal in terms
of CPU time.
step length diff. CHSH I3322 E0E1 Hardy BC3 T3C BC5 BC7
Wide-region 2 2 1 (1) 2 0 1 1
V-linearization 0 1 2 1 0 2 1 1
XZ-linearization 2 1 2 (1) 2 2 1 1
Table 6.3. Optimal algorithms. The optimal choice of
linearization and step-length differentiation method for test
problems. The value 0 in the second column refers to the
algorithm without differentiation, the value 1 means the pri-
mal/dual step length differentiation, and the value 2 means the
adaptive heuristic to control step differentiation. The optimal-
ity is in terms of the number of iteration (and in most cases
agrees with the optimal CPU time on the testing machine).
CHSH I3322 E0E1 Hardy BC3 T3C BC5 BC7
linearization V V V V V V or XZ V V
step length diff. 1 1 0 1 0 2 0 or 2 0 or 1
In the case of v-linearization algorithm the role of β is less important if θ is
not greater than about 0.25. Otherwise the method fails for higher hierarchy
levels.
For all high hierarchy level test cases the v-linearization method needed
the smaller number of iterations and CPU time, in all cases the wide region
algorithm was the least efficient choice. Moreover, the latter failed in all
tests in Q4 with I3322 test case. Nonetheless, one should note that also
v-linearization failed in some cases with large values of θ.
Similarly as in the case of Almost Quantum level, it is difficult to draw a
conclusion regarding the preferred step-length differentiation.
6.1.3. PMSdp solver. We decided to implement the primal-dual infea-
sible IPM, since there is no known method of finding a warm-start solution for
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the primal variable X (in the dual formulation of the NPA). The solver always
uses the warm-start technique described in sec. 6.3.2 for the dual variable y.
The above results regarding optimal parameter selection for SDPT3 and
SeDuMi suggest that for the NPA problems the NT search direction (or v-
linearization in the nomenclature of SeDuMi) achieves the best performance.
For this reason we have chosen PMSdp to implement this search direction.
We use (6.10) to calculate the scaling point.
Our implementation uses eig function from the API of MATLAB to cal-
culate the step-length using (5.9). We follow SDPT3 in the algorithm of
calculating σ for the corrector step, (5.10).
We use a method from sec. 6.2.4 to calculate the Schur complement. This
method is designed for the case of NPA problems. To factorize the Schur
complement we use chol function from the API of MATLAB.
The stopping criterion for a success is when both primal and dual infea-
sibilites, and the gap, are less than a threshold specified in the invocation.
The default value for both these thresholds is 10−8.
More implementation details are described in sec. 6.5.
6.2. The computation of the Schur complement and the structure
of NPA problems
The calculation of the Schur complement matrix (see secs 5.2.1 and 5.4) is
often considered to have the most significant computation cost when solving
an SDP problem [72, 206, 210, 199, 207]. For this reason it is the most
promising field for inventing a solution tailored for a particular need.
We start this section with a discussion of the structure of NPA matrices,
i.e. matrices occurring in the NPA method. We then move to methods of
calculation of the Schur complement matrix.
We give a discussion of two general approaches. These approaches take
the advantage of sparsity occurring in many SDP problems. Then a method
which uses the structure of NPA problems is introduced.
6.2.1. NPA problem matrices. We will now describe some obvious
properties of the NPA matrices.
Recall the constraints defining the NPA matrices given in (2.25). Let S˜ be
the set of indices of the given Γ matrix of size |S˜| = n. In the dual formulation
of a problem defined by the above condition, m is the number of algebraically
different (up to transposition) concatenations {O˜k}k∈{1,...,m} of sequences of
operators of the form
(6.1) O†iOj ≡ O˜k.
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From this we have that the Γ matrix is a linear combination of m matrices
Ai, and each of these matrices has entries from sets {0,−1}, so that each −Ai
becomes a binary matrix5 (see appendix A).
Another property of NPA matrices for a given problem is the fact that
these matrices are orthogonal. Moreover, each entry (k, l), k, l ∈ {1, · · · , n}
is different than 0 in at most one matrix.
As shown in tabs 2.3 and 6.4 the value of m grows significantly with the
hierarchy level, but slower than n2, and the NPA linear constraint matrices
{Ai} may be considered as sparse.
Table 6.4. Sizes of different hierarchy levels for I3322
problem (i.e. the scenario with binary outcomes, and two par-
ties with three settings each).
hierarchy level n m average density m-primal
Q2 28 154 0.196 629
Q3 88 868 0.112 6875
Q4 244 4492 0.075 55043
Q5 628 22180 0.056 372203
The above considerations were taken under the assumption that the NPA
problem is formulated in the dual form, (1.8). The reason for this choice
of formulation is that it has a much smaller value of m compared to primal
formulation, see tabs 2.3 and 6.4.
6.2.2. Formula for the Schur complement for the NT direction.
Recall from the (5.22) that the Schur complement is given by the following
formula
ATE−1FA.
First, let us show that for E and F defined by (5.19) and (5.20) for the
NT direction we have [204]
(6.2) E−1F = W ⊗S W.
In derivation we use the equalities W−1XW−1 = Z and GGT = W (see (5.14)
and (5.21)).
E (W ⊗S W ) =
(
G−1W
)⊗S (GTZW) = (G−1W)⊗S (GTW−1X) =(
G−1GGT
)⊗S (GTG−TX) = GT ⊗S (G−1X) =(
G−1X
)⊗S GT = F .
5Note the minus sign in front of Ai. It is placed to confirm the form of dual SDP
problems, (1.8).
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Thus the Schur complement B for the NT direction is given by
B ≡ ATW ⊗S WA.
From this we easily get
Bi,j = Tr(WAiWAj).
6.2.3. Exploiting sparsity in Fujisawa et al. In their paper, Fujisawa
et al. [72] consider methods of exploiting the sparsity of the problem matrices.
First, they perform reordering of {Ai} matrices. Let fi denote the number
of nonzero elements of matrix Ai. They prove that for the methods used in the
paper, the most effective is a reordering which has the property that fi occur
in a non-increasing order. Using the symmetry of the Schur complement B
only entries Bi,j for j ≥ i are evaluated directly.
Fujisawa et al. consider three different methods for computation of the
element Bi,j. The choice of the method depends on the sparsity of matrices
Ai and Aj.
For this work, the most interesting is the method when Ai and Aj are
very sparse. The method of computing the Schur complement which we use
in PMSdp is a modification of this case. The relevant formula is
(6.3) Bi,j =
n∑
a=1
n∑
b=1
n∑
c=1
n∑
d=1
(Ai)c,dWc,aWd,b(Aj)a,b.
Calculation of this formula requires (2fi + 1)fj multiplications.
6.2.4. Exploiting the structure of NPA problems. We will now
introduce our method of exploiting the structure of NPA matrices to compute
the Schur complement.
The presented method was proposed with a premise that it is possible to
use the specific properties of NPA matrices described in sec. 6.2.1 in order to
design a proper data structure which is suitable for calculations of the Schur
complement, and to implement a simple and fast kernel for this task.
The obvious choice for a binary sparse matrix storage format is to use
one of the existing formats, e.g. CRS (Compressed Row Storage) or COO
(COOrdinate list) [182]. The former uses less memory, and simplifies certain
operations, but for the task of fast iteration we decided to choose the latter one
which contains coordinates of all nonzero element of a matrix in an explicit
form.
Since the matrices under consideration are binary, there is no need to store
the values on the elements. Thus a matrix Ai is stored as an array of integer
values, expressing row and column coordinates of all nonzero elements. The
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kernel accesses these elements in a linear way, so to promote local memory
accesses we encode row and column coordinates alternately.
The implementations of SeDuMi and SDPT3 reduces the number of cal-
culations by using a symmetric representation of matrices, which reduced the
number of elements to be stored in a problem matrix by a factor of two.
This method stores only a half of the matrix with off-diagonal elements mul-
tiplied by
√
2 [204]. For this reason we decided not to take the advantage
of the symmetry, since it would require a different treatment of diagonal and
off-diagonal elements, which complicates the kernel.
The kernel implements the following algorithm. Let
Li = ((a1, b1), · · · , (afi , bfi))
be the array of elements of the matrix Ai, and
Lj =
(
(c1, d1), · · · , (cfj , dfj)
)
.
Using the formula by Fujisawa et al., (6.3) with NPA matrices, we have
(6.4) Bi,j = Tr(WAiWAj) =
fi∑
k=1
fj∑
l=1
Wcl,akWdl,bk .
We store the scaling point symmetric matrix W as a one-dimensional
array W˜ with subsequent elements. It is easy to see that, indexing from 0,
we have
Wi,j = Wj,i = W˜ [n · i+ j].
Thus, using the formula in (6.4) we get
Bi,j =
fi∑
k=1
fj∑
l=1
W˜ [n · ak + cl] · W˜ [n · bk + dl].
Let us consider the expression in the inner sum, namely
(6.5) s[k] ≡
fj∑
l=1
W˜ [n · ak + cl] · W˜ [n · bk + dl].
If we use the symmetry of Ai, we can reduce the number of calculations at a
cost of two additional condition expressions in the external loop. The value
of (6.5) is calculated only if ak ≤ bk. The values are summed with the weight
1 if ak = bk, and with the weight 2 if ak < bk.
The evaluation of n · ak and n · bk is performed in the external loop. Thus
each iteration requires one floating point operation, two integer additions,
two pointer iterations and two random memory accesses to W˜ . The testing
machine with Intel Core 2 Quad CPU Q9400 has 6 MB of L2 cache which
allows to store a matrix of sizes up to about 880× 880.
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6.3. Start strategies
We start the discussion of warm-start strategies for SDP-IPM with a de-
scription of a standard way of choosing the initial solution which does not take
into account the problem formulation, i.e. the so-called cold-start strategy
used by SDP solvers.
6.3.1. Cold-start in semi-definite programming solvers. The in-
vestigated solver SeDuMi starts with some solution within some neighborhood
of the central path [199] using self-embedding technique (see sec. 5.1.2). The
initial values of primal and dual SDP variable, X(0) and Z(0), are identity
matrices, and y(0) the zero vector of the relevant dimension. SeDuMi ap-
plies the self-embedding to construct a primal and dual feasible solution for a
larger problem, which will be used to approximate the solution of the stated
problem.
As a general rule for cold-start, in [72] it has been observed that it is
desirable for the initial iterate to have the magnitude of at least the same
order as the optimal solution. [207] discusses the following method of cold-
start used in SDPT3:
(6.6)
X(0) ≡ ξI,
Z(0) ≡ ηI,
and y(0) is the zero vector of the relevant dimension. ξ and η are given by the
following formulas
ξ ≡ max
(
10,
√
n, n max
i={1,··· ,m}
1 + |bi|F
1 + |Ai|F
)
,
η ≡ max
(
10,
√
n, |C|F , max
i={1,··· ,m}
|Ai|F
)
,
where the matrix norm | · |F is the Frobenius norm.
6.3.2. Warm-start strategy for NPA problems. We will now intro-
duce the proposed method of creating a starting point for an NPA problem.
Our aim is to construct an initial Γ matrix6, i.e. dual variables y0 and Z0.
We start with a method of construction for y0.
A simple way to construct a Γ matrix is to find some representation
including a state |ψ〉 (cf. Eq. (2.21)), and measurement operators for the
number of settings and outcomes specified by the considered setup. Let d
denote the dimension of this representation.
6A related issue of construction of a basis of moment matrices is discussed in [152].
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A natural choice for the state is the maximally entangled state of the
dimension d. The motivation is that for many Bell inequalities their maximal
violation is achieved with this state7. In case of maximally entangled qubits
(i.e. for d = 2) shared by two parties this state is represented by the following
density matrix
(6.7)

1
2
0 0 1
2
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
1
2
0 0 1
2
 ,
or |ψ〉 =
√
2
2
(| 0〉 ⊗ | 0〉+ | 1〉 ⊗ | 1〉).
The second step is a construction of measurement operators. For each
measurement setting of a party, these are represented by random orthogonal
vectors of dimension d. With such a representation it is easy to construct
sequences of measurement operators needed for a given NPA hierarchy level.
In order to improve the performance, we store an array containing results of
scalar products of the vectors representing measurements.
At this point it is easy to calculate a vector y˜ for a given state and mea-
surements. The values of entries occur directly in the Γ matrix, and can be
evaluated with y˜k = 〈ψ |O˜k|ψ〉, where O˜k is the representation of the relevant
sequence of measurement operators, see (6.1).
The representation of dimension d leads to the Γ matrix of rank d2. Since
the iterates have to be PSD matrices, such a matrix is not an appropriate
starting point for IPM. On the other hand, since the representation is gener-
ated randomly, and the convex combination of certificates is still a certificate,
we may repeat this procedure to obtain a certificate with a higher rank.
The more matrices in superposition are used, the more calculations are
needed. On the other hand, the starting point can be reused for other opti-
mization problems with the same setup and hierarchy level. We observe that
the superposition of about 25n different y˜ (obtained for random representa-
tions) is a good compromise between the time of creation and the quality of
a warm-start point.
Since we observed that for high hierarchy levels it is impossible to obtain a
full rank matrix, regardless of the number of certificates under superposition
(cf. sec. 4.2 in [151]), in order to get an initial PSD iterate, we add the
expression 0.00000001 · I to the certificate8.
7For almost forty years it was believed that the maximally entangled state reveals the
most no-local behavior. Ultimately it turned out that this is not true, see [137] for a
detailed discussion.
8The cost of this is that we lose the dual feasibility, and thus we have to use a primal-
dual infeasible IPM.
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Table 6.5. The time needed to create a warm-start so-
lution for different problems with superposition of 25n certifi-
cates.
problem CHSH I3322 E0E1 Hardy
creation time of y0 0.008 0.017 0.010 0.009
problem BC3 T3C BC5 BC7
creation time of y0 0.020 0.027 0.089 0.408
As the primal solution we take a simplified version of the expression
in (6.6), namely we take ξ = max (10,
√
n).
6.3.3. Warm-start in SDPT3 solver. The SDPT3 solver has an op-
tion of supplying the initial iterate. We have performed tests regarding the
impact of the warm-start strategy introduced in sec. 6.3.2 on the number
of iterations and CPU time needed by SDPT3. The results are shown in
appendix D.
The tests show that the warm-start strategy allows to improve both per-
formance indicators in cases with no or with one linear condition. In those
cases it allowed to gain a reduction by up to 5 iterations. The strategy seems
to perform best in the case of the NT direction, especially with P-C.
The method failed for E0E1 and T3C test cases with the HKM direction
without P-C.
Thus we draw a conclusion that the proposed warm-start strategy is bene-
ficial in a typical optimization scenario with simple constraints. The probable
reason why it is less efficient with many linear constraints is the following.
The creation of the initial solution takes into account only the NPA linear
constraints for SDP part, and thus the solutions can be still far from dual
feasibility in the LP cone.
6.4. Methods of perturbation
In this section we discuss methods of performing perturbations on the
iterates. The perturbation means that under certain conditions the current
iterates are slightly changed. The reason for performing such operations is
to prevent the solver from stalling in a point close to the boundary of the
PSD cone. The main premise of perturbation strategies is not to reduce the
number of iterations or CPU time, but to avoid failures.
We consider seven perturbation strategies described below. First, we spec-
ify for each strategy why we expected it to work for some encountered cases.
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Afterward we discuss the efficiency or inefficiency of each of them. We de-
cided to describe also those strategies which failed to meet their expectations,
so that this experience can be used for further improvements.
The expressions P and D are the primal and dual infeasibility norms,
calculated using (1.12) and (1.13) from sec. 1.2.1. Below tp means the thresh-
old for the acceptance of primal and dual infeasibility. tg is the threshold for
the acceptance of the gap.
Strategy 1. The first perturbation strategy perturbs the primal iterate
if the primal infeasibility is significantly lower that the gap, and similarly for
the dual iterate.
if gap > 100 · P then
X ← X + 0.01 · tp · I
end if
if P > 100 · D then
Z ← Z + 0.1 · tp · I
end if
The motivation for this strategy is to balance the improvements of the
gap and feasibility. We observed that the size of the gap is in most cases
the most problematic, namely the iterates relatively fast reach the feasibility
threshold, and most of the iterations are used to decrease the gap.
Strategy 2. Let us introduce variables notPertPrimal and notPertDual
initialized with values 0. They represent counters since the last perturbation
of either primal or dual iterate.
if gap > 100 · P and notPertPrimal > 1 then
X ← X + 0.01 · tp · I
notPertPrimal← 0
else
notPertPrimal← notPertPrimal + 1
end if
if P > 100 · D and notPertDual > 1 then
Z ← Z + 0.1 · tp · I
notPertDual← 0
else
notPertDual← notPertDual + 1
end if
The only difference in comparison with the previous strategy is that it
prevents performing a perturbation “too often”.
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Strategy 3. Let αC and βC denote the step-length of the corrector phase
(see sec. 5.2.3).
if αC > 0.9 then
X ← X + 0.01 · tp · I
end if
if βC > 0.9 then
Z ← Z + 0.1 · tp · I
end if
This strategy is intended to use these values as a heuristic that near the
current iterate the solver will not have any problems with improving the
primal and dual feasibility, therefore it may be profitable to change the point
with hope to improve the gap at the cost of feasibility.
Strategy 4. This strategy is an opposition of the previous strategy. The
motivation is to avoid stalling at a point in which the step-lengths are low.
if αC < 0.1 then
X ← X + P · I
end if
if βC < 0.1 then
Z ← Z + 10 · D · I
end if
In this strategy the size of the perturbation depends on the current primal
or dual feasibility. The reason for this choice is that such a perturbation
will keep the infeasibility at the same order, and thus will not disrupt the
current solution significantly. The dual perturbation is much stronger. This
is motivated by an observation that in most cases it is easier for the solver to
improve the dual feasibility.
Strategy 5. This strategy also depends on current feasibility. The mo-
tivation of this strategy is that if the primal or dual solution is by far better
than the threshold imposed by the stopping criteria, then a small perturbation
can potentially help to improve the step-length while keeping the feasibility
at the desired level.
if P < 0.01 · tp then
X ← X + 0.0002 · P · I
end if
if D < 0.01 · tp then
Z ← Z + 0.001 · D · I
end if
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Strategy 6. The most complicated of the considered strategies performs
a perturbation at most only at either primal or dual iterate.
if P > 100 · |rd| then
Z ← Z + 0.000000001 · I
else if gap > 100 · D then
Z ← Z + 0.000000001 · I
else if P > 0.1 and gap > 0.1 then
X ← X + 0.01 · I
else if gap > 1000 · P then
X ← X + 0.00000001 · I
end if
This method prefers a small perturbation on the dual iterate. The moti-
vation is that the dual infeasibility is easier to be reduced, whereas the dual
solution approaches the boundary when getting close to the optimal solution.
The aim of this small perturbation is to prevent the matrices from becom-
ing highly ill-conditioned (we observed the condition number at order of 1019
close to the optimal solution for some problems).
If this way of perturbation is not used, then perturbation on the primal
solution is considered. If both the gap and primal infeasibility are high, we
expect a primal perturbation not to harm the primal solution, but on the other
hand, we expect the perturbation to allow longer steps in further iterations.
In the case when the primal infeasibility is relatively small compared to
the gap, then it is expected that keeping the primal infeasibility small is less
profitable than a potential longer step-length in further iterations.
Strategy 7. The last simple strategy is simply the third conditional of
the previous strategy.
if P > 0.1 and gap > 0.1 then
X ← X + 0.01 · I
end if
6.4.1. Discussion of perturbation strategies. As noted in the be-
ginning of this section, the aim of perturbation strategies is not to improve
performance, but to prevent failures. This is confirmed by the results in ap-
pendix C, viz. in all cases in which the solver did not fail, the most efficient
was the solution without perturbations.
Test cases CHSH, BC3, T3C, BC5 and BC7 succeeded with all of the
perturbation strategies. Thus, we should look for a perturbation strategy
which is able to solve all cases with performance as good as possible.
Strategies 1 and 6 seem to be most reliable for cases E0E1 and Hardy,
these are the only strategies which were able to converge in both cases.
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In almost all cases strategy 3 was not able to converge. Thus, we conclude
that one should not perturb iterates when the step-length is large.
The only case in which strategy 2 is better than strategy 1 is I3322 with
expon = 3, for which the latter failed. Thus, it seems that there is no need
to limit the frequency of perturbations.
In all the cases strategy 5 performs better than strategy 4. Strategy
5 performs also better than strategy 7 in all but CHSH with expon = 4.
Moreover, it is able to attain the solution in cases when strategy 7 fails.
Let us concentrate on the cases with expon = 1, see tabs 6.6 and 6.7. In
sec. 6.6 we consider this case in more details. In this case strategy 1 is able
to converge in all considered situations. Unfortunately, when other strategies
produce results, they are in most cases better in terms of performance.
Table 6.6. The number of iterations and CPU time
for expon = 1 and different perturbation strategies for smaller
problems with PMSdp. Averaged over 100 executions.
CHSH I3322 E0E1 Hardy
pertubStrat iter. time [s] iter. time [s] iter. time [s] iter. time [s]
0 10 0.026 11 0.037 failed failed
1 11 0.028 11 0.038 33 0.091 26 0.074
2 11 0.028 11 0.038 exceeded 26 0.074
3 exceeded failed failed 26 0.073
4 10 0.026 11 0.037 failed failed
5 10 0.026 11 0.038 exceeded 27 0.07423
6 12 0.030 12 0.041 31 0.082 25 0.068
7 10 0.02645 11 0.037 failed failed
6.5. Implementation issues
In this section we discuss the implementation of PMSdp. The solver uses
the NT search direction. We start with a brief overview of the main sub-
routines of the solver, and then discuss the most important implementation
issues of the NT search direction.
The first element of the calculation of the NT direction is the scaling
operation. The issues related to this topic are discussed in sec. 6.5.3. We
note that our implementation calculates scaling matrices W , D, G and G−1
with the singular value decomposition (SVD) using (6.9).
The scaling matrices and the SDP problem definition are stored in the
dedicated format. We use the method described in sec. 6.2.4 in order to
calculate the Schur complement matrix, which is crucial for determining the
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Table 6.7. The number of iterations and CPU time
for expon = 1 and different perturbation strategies for larger
problems with PMSdp. Averaged over 100 executions.
BC3 T3C BC5 BC7
pertubStrat iter. time [s] iter. time [s] iter. time [s] iter. time [s]
0 13 0.04534 18 0.08065 15 0.22247 18 3.43399
1 13 0.04557 18 0.0808 16 0.23832 19 3.61991
2 13 0.04557 18 0.08079 16 0.23811 19 3.61916
3 exceeded exceeded exceeded exceeded
4 13 0.04567 19 0.08585 19 0.28443 23 4.37437
5 13 0.04686 18 0.08079 15 0.22411 18 3.41851
6 exceeded exceeded exceeded exceeded
7 13 0.04574 18 0.08124 15 0.22404 18 3.41714
Newton steps. The Schur complement is afterward factorized using Cholesky
factorization function chol. The factorized form is used twice to solve two
systems with different RHS.
6.5.1. PMSdp architecture overview. The main subroutine of the
PMSdp solver is the function solver NT PC which implements the NT
search direction with the predictor-corrector scheme. This function takes
as parameters structures stating the NPA problem as well as parameters
regarding the IPM algorithm, tp, tg, expon and the perturbation strategy, as
defined in sec. 6.4.
The function solver NT PC contains the main loop of the solver. The
loop continues until the condition
(6.8) P < tp ∧ D < tp ∧ gap < tg
is satisfied (i.e. both primal and dual infeasibility norms are below the value
tp, and the duality gap is less than tg), or until the maximal number of
iterations, 100, is exceeded.
The main loop consists of the following steps:
(1) Calculate scaling matrices W , D, G and G−1 with a function Scal-
ing implementing the method stated in (6.9) below.
(2) Calculate residuals, (1.11a) and (1.11b) with a function Residuals.
(3) Calculate the LHS of (5.7) using the method described in sec. 6.2.4
with a function LHS executing a MEX subroutine AWWA.
(4) Perform the Cholesky factorization using the built-in function chol.
(5) State the predictor equation with a function PredictorEqs.
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(6) Calculate the Newton step, (5.7), for the predictor with a function
NTDirection. The function NTDirection solves the Newton
step equation with a MEX subroutine mextriang.
(7) Calculate step lengths αP and βP for the predictor step with a func-
tion StepLengths using (5.9). The built-in function chol is used
for this purpose.
(8) State the corrector equation with a function CorrectorEqs.
(9) Calculate the Newton step for the corrector with the function NT-
Direction.
(10) Calculate step lengths αC and βC for the corrector with the function
StepLengths.
(11) Update the iterates X(i+1), y(i+1) and Z(i+1) with the corrector step.
(12) Calculate the norms P and D, and the gap with a function Eval-
Norms.
(13) If the condition in (6.8) is not satisfied, then perform perturbation on
the iterates using one of the strategies described in sec. 6.4; otherwise
leave the loop.
The function solver NT PC returns the value of the solution, the fi-
nal iterates and information about the execution including the number of
iteration used to calculate the solution and the following timing information:
• the total time of the Scaling function in all iterations,
• the total time of the formulation of the LHS in all iterations,
• the total time of the factorization of the LHS in all iterations,
• the total time of the predictor step calculation in all iterations,
• the total time of the corrector step calculation in all iterations, and
• the total time of execution.
6.5.2. Calculation of the search direction. The NT direction for the
step ∆y is calculated as the solution of the relevant (i.e. either predictor or
corrector) Schur complement equation. The steps for ∆Z and ∆X are cal-
culated with the formulas (cf. Eqs (5.23) and (5.24), and the implementation
of SDPT3)
∆Z ≡ Rd −Mat(A∆y)
and
∆X ≡ GRcGT −W∆ZW T .
The latter formula is obtained from (5.24) using (5.19) and (6.2).
The term Rc is calculated separately for predictor and corrector. For
predictor this is given by a simple formula, −D. The corrector’sRc calculation
is more complicated, as it requires the second order term, see Eq. (5.12). The
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first order expression is for this case σµD−1 − D. We follow the Mehrotra
[135] method as described in [204], Eq. (44).
In the case of predictor, the RHS of the Schur complement of (5.7) is
calculated with the following formula (cf. Eq. (5.22) and Eq.(36) in [204]):
RHSpred ≡ bT +AT · vec(WRdW ).
The RHS for the case of corrector is calculated with
RHScorr ≡ rp +AT · vec
(
WRdW −GRcGT
)
.
Since the expression vec(WRdW ) is used twice, it is stored to avoid the second
computation.
After updating the iterates with corrector’s steps, the norms are calculated
using (1.12) and (1.13). If these are below the defined threshold, then the
solver finishes successfully.
6.5.3. Factorization of the scaling point. The paper [204] discusses
the method of evaluation of G and W matrices. For the sake of completeness
of the description of the implementation of PMSdp, we provide here the
description of this method.
In this section X and Z refer to the values of primal and dual SDP vari-
ables at the current iteration.
Let L and R be the Cholesky factors of X and Z, viz. X = LLT and
Z = RRT . Let UDV T = RTL be the SVD decomposition of RTL. From this
it follows that UD2UT = RTXR and V D2V T = LTZL.
Recall the equation for the scaling point, W (Eq. (5.16)):
W = X
1
2
(
X
1
2ZX
1
2
)− 1
2
X
1
2 = Z−
1
2
(
Z
1
2XZ
1
2
) 1
2
Z−
1
2 .
We will prove two formulas for G satisfying (5.21). These are given by
(6.9) G = LV D−
1
2 ,
and
(6.10) G = R−TUD
1
2 .
We leave the proof to sections 6.5.3.1 and 6.5.3.2.
In order to compute L and R matrices, two Cholesky decompositions are
needed. Depending on the formula for G, either U or V matrix is needed,
together with the diagonal matrix D. Note that the SVD gives both U and
V , whereas these matrices can be obtained also with the eigenvalue decom-
position of RTXR and LTZL, respectively. The eigenvalue decompositions
give also the D matrix. The method with eigenvalue decomposition is less
stable, but requires less CPU time.
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6.5.3.1. The first formula for G. We will now prove that the formula
in (6.10) satisfies GGT = W .
One may show that Q ≡ L−1X 12 is an orthogonal matrix. We have
X
1
2ZX
1
2 = QTLTRRTLQ = QTV D2V TQ.
From this, we use the fact that Q and U are orthogonal to get(
X
1
2ZX
1
2
)− 1
2
= QTV D−1V TQ.
Now, using the formula for W from (5.16), namely
W = X
1
2
(
X
1
2ZX
1
2
)− 1
2
X
1
2 ,
we get
W = LV D−1V TLT = GGT ,
with G = LV D−
1
2 , which proves (6.9).
6.5.3.2. The second formula for G. Here we prove that G given in (6.9)
satisfies GGT = W .
It is possible to show that Q ≡ R−1S 12 is an orthogonal matrix. With this
we get, similarly to the case in sec. 6.5.3.1
W = Z−
1
2
(
Z
1
2XZ
1
2
) 1
2
Z−
1
2 = R−TUDUTR−1 = GGT ,
with G given by (6.10).
6.6. Performance analysis
In this section we analyze and compare the performance of SDPT3, SeDuMi,
and PMSdp.
6.6.1. Test parameters. For test cases of SeDuMi and SDPT3 we have
chosen the parameters which seemed to be optimal separately for each test
case. Because of the self-dual embedding method used by SeDuMi it was
difficult to modify the code so that it stopped when the desired quality is
achieved (i.e. the gap and infeasibility are low enough). Instead we run
test for SeDuMi, and after obtaining the solution we calculated the relevant
norms, see tab. 6.8. Afterward these parameters were given to both SDPT3
and PMSdp as tasks to be achieved (roughly speaking both solvers had to be
at least as good as SeDuMi).
If one of these solvers was not able to attain a given quality, we decreased
it (if it revealed to be better, we noted the better value), see tabs 6.9 and 6.10.
Nonetheless, the values were of the same order in all cases, so the performance
comparison can be considered as fair.
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Table 6.8. The parameters used by SeDuMi and the quality
of the solutions in the profiling test.
SeDuMi algorithm step.diff. θ β P gap
CHSH V 1 0.1 0.1 4.0E-011 -9.4E-009
I3322 V 2 0.1 0.1 6.5E-010 2.9E-009
E0E1 XZ 2 0.1 0.5 1.1E-008 -1.9E-005
Hardy XZ 0 0.25 0.1 4.0E-009 -1.1E-005
BC3 V 0 0.1 0.1 4.6E-010 4.9E-010
T3C XZ 0 0.1 0.5 9.9E-010 3.8E-010
BC5 V 2 0.25 0.5 2.3E-011 1.5E-010
BC7 V 2 0.25 0.9 1.4E-008 3.5E-008
Table 6.9. The parameters used by SDPT3 and the quality
of the solutions in the profiling test.
SDPT3 predcorr expon tp tg
CHSH 1 0.1 1.00E-011 2.00E-010
I3322 1 2 3.00E-010 2.80E-009
E0E1 0 0 1.20E-006 1.80E-005
Hardy 0 0.1 4.40E-006 1.00E-005
BC3 1 1.5 3.00E-010 4.00E-010
T3C 1 2 1.60E-010 2.50E-010
BC5 1 1.5 5.00E-010 3.00E-010
BC7 1 1.5 8.00E-010 3.00E-009
Table 6.10. The parameters used by PMSdp and the quality
of the solutions in the profiling test.
PMSdp expon perturb.strat. tp tg
CHSH 1 1 1.00E-011 2.00E-010
I3322 1 1 3.00E-010 2.80E-009
E0E1 1 1 1.00E-008 1.80E-005
Hardy 1 1 2.00E-009 1.00E-005
BC3 1 1 3.00E-010 4.00E-010
T3C 1 1 1.60E-010 2.50E-010
BC5 1 1 2.00E-011 1.40E-010
BC7 1 1 1.00E-010 3.00E-010
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The SDPT3 solver was supplied the same initial solutions as the one with
which PMSdp started, namely the one introduced in sec. 6.3.2. The SeDuMi
solver used its cold-start strategy, see sec. 6.3.1.
6.6.2. Comparison of the solvers. The execution profiles of the test
cases are shown in tabs 6.11, 6.12 and 6.13. In these profiles we have cho-
sen crucial operations and measured their execution time on a single CPU
using functions tic and toc in MATLAB. There is a direct relation between
profiled stages of SDPT3 and PMSdp. It is difficult to state such a relation
between all stages in SeDuMi and the other two solvers.
The profile stages in SDPT3 and PMSdp are scaling, LHS, the factor, the
predictor, and the corrector. The first refers to the creation of all scaling ma-
trices, as described in sec. 6.5. LHS is the creation of the Schur complement
matrix. The factor time refers to the time spent at Cholesky factorization.
The predictor and corrector refer to the operation of solving the Schur equa-
tion, determining the Newton direction and step-length.
The last column in lower parts of the tables shows the percentage of the
selected stages in the total execution time. This may be considered a measure
of the performance gain obtained due to simplifications of the code structure,
as mentioned in the introduction to this chapter. As expected, from this
point of view, PMSdp has the simplest code, and the major part of it is
concentrated in a few crucial operations.
Comparing the execution time, PMSdp outperforms both SeDuMi and
SDPT3 in all cases. In some cases it finds a solution of the desired quality
more than twenty times faster than SDPT3, and more than 5 times faster
than SeDuMi. On the other hand, SeDuMi in all but one cases required the
lowest number of iterations to converge. SeDuMi also executed faster than
SDPT3, with the exception for the largest test case with BC7.
In most cases of SDPT3, the most time consuming operation was the
LHS creation phase. On the other hand, in PMSdp this stage in most cases
takes only a small part of the computations. For test cases CHSH, I3322,
E0E1, Hardy, BC3 and T3C this stage is performed between 47 and 208 times
faster. Both implementations use MEX compiled files to calculate the Schur
complement. Thus we conclude, that the proposed method of computation
serves its purpose.
We finish this performance comparison with a brief discussion of one case
with a higher hierarchy level. Although in the majority of practical purposes
the Almost Quantum and Q2 levels are enough, it may be interesting to check
how the proposed method scales with hierarchy levels, and thus with the size
of the problem. As it can be seen from the tables in the appendix B, SDPT3
is more efficient than SeDuMi for high levels of the NPA hierarchy. For this
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Table 6.11. The profile of SeDuMi.
SeDuMi build [s] factor [s] pred. [s] corr. [s] neighborhood [s] total [s] iter.
CHSH 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.21 9
I3322 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.20 12
E0E1 0.01 0.07 0.06 0.10 0.02 0.36 23
Hardy 0.01 0.09 0.08 0.11 0.03 0.42 25
BC3 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.19 12
T3C 0.02 0.05 0.03 0.07 0.02 0.27 17
BC5 0.10 0.15 0.03 0.06 0.02 0.44 11
BC7 1.64 9.39 0.07 0.13 0.03 11.45 12
CHSH 4% 15% 8% 18% 9% 54%
I3322 4% 18% 11% 23% 8% 64%
E0E1 3% 19% 16% 27% 6% 71%
Hardy 3% 22% 18% 27% 6% 76%
BC3 5% 17% 12% 24% 10% 68%
T3C 7% 18% 12% 25% 7% 70%
BC5 23% 35% 6% 13% 5% 81%
BC7 14% 82% 1% 1% 0% 98%
Table 6.12. The profile of SDPT3.
SDPT3 scaling [s] LHS [s] factor [s] pred. [s] corr. [s] total [s] iter.
CHSH 0.02 0.13 0.00 0.14 0.16 0.67 17
I3322 0.02 0.46 0.00 0.12 0.14 0.92 14
E0E1 0.03 0.18 0.00 0.21 0.00 0.71 23
Hardy 0.04 0.20 0.00 0.24 0.00 0.81 26
BC3 0.03 0.57 0.00 0.16 0.18 1.18 17
T3C 0.03 1.05 0.01 0.18 0.20 1.74 19
BC5 0.05 0.07 0.08 0.23 0.26 1.04 20
BC7 0.10 1.10 2.79 0.67 0.66 5.99 24
CHSH 4% 19% 0% 20% 24% 67%
I3322 2% 50% 0% 13% 15% 80%
E0E1 5% 25% 0% 29% 0% 59%
Hardy 5% 25% 0% 29% 0% 59%
BC3 2% 48% 0% 13% 15% 79%
T3C 2% 60% 0% 10% 12% 84%
BC5 4% 7% 7% 22% 25% 66%
BC7 2% 18% 47% 11% 11% 89%
reason we only consider the profiles of SDPT3 and PMSdp in the comparison.
The profiles are shown in tab. 6.14. These profiles were created with Q4 level
of the NPA hierarchy using I3322 Bell operator, see tab. 6.4.
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Table 6.13. The profile of PMSdp.
PMSdp scaling [s] LHS [s] factor [s] pred. [s] corr. [s] total [s] iter.
CHSH 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.04 14
I3322 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.04 11
E0E1 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.09 33
Hardy 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.08 28
BC3 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.05 15
T3C 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.09 20
BC5 0.04 0.08 0.09 0.06 0.07 0.36 23
BC7 0.12 1.05 2.41 0.20 0.21 4.00 21
CHSH 11% 4% 1% 26% 35% 78%
I3322 14% 5% 2% 27% 34% 82%
E0E1 10% 4% 1% 28% 36% 79%
Hardy 10% 4% 1% 28% 36% 79%
BC3 14% 6% 2% 27% 34% 82%
T3C 14% 8% 4% 27% 33% 86%
BC5 11% 24% 25% 17% 18% 95%
BC7 3% 26% 60% 5% 5% 99%
Table 6.14. Comparison of the profiles of PMSdp and SDPT3
in the hierarchy level Q4 and I3322 Bell operator.
solver scaling [s] LHS [s] factor [s] pred. [s] corr. [s] total [s] iter.
PMSdp 3.0 63.1 91.5 4.2 4.8 169.7 22
SDPT3 2.0 60.9 92.0 5.4 5.3 168.5 23
These profiles show that in this case SDPT3 achieves a slightly better
performance than PMSdp. We conjecture that our implementation of the
method of calculation of the Schur complement matrix (the LHS column of
profiles) from sec. 6.2.4 scales with the size of the problem worse than the
method used by SDPT3. This result is confirmed by the data in tabs 6.12
and 6.13 showing that for the largest of considered problems, BC7, PMSdp
is only by about 1
3
-rd more efficient than SDPT3, and that the performance
gain at the LHS operation is in this case small.
CHAPTER 7
Summary
In this work we have discussed a number of issues concerning the semi-
definite optimization with interior point methods with applications to quan-
tum information protocols.
In the field of applications we have presented a new quantum key distri-
bution protocol with novel properties, a few device-independent and semi-
device-independent randomness expansion protocols, and answered the ques-
tion of amplification of arbitrary weak randomness with quantum devices. In
theory we developed a method which allows to construct SDP relaxations of
SDI problems using the NPA method.
We proposed several methods which can be used in the implementations
of solvers dealing with the NPA method of modeling the set of quantum prob-
abilities. These include a warm-start strategies for SDP solvers, a few per-
turbation methods with evaluation of their efficiency, and a specific-purpose
method of implementation of subroutines computing the Schur complements
for NPA problems.

APPENDIX A
Example of a simple NPA matrix
This is an example of A matrix for the dual formulation of Q1(2, 2|2, 2).
The LP part is omitted. The matrix is defined by (1.10), where each column
refers to one linear constraint matrix Ai, and entry of the dual variable yi.
The construction of this matrix is discussed in sec. 2.3.2.
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
−1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 −1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 −1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 −1 0 0 0
−1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
−1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 −1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 −1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 −1 0 0
0 −1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 −1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 −1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 −1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 −1 0
0 0 0 −1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 −1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 −1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 −1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 −1
0 0 0 0 0 0 −1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 −1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 −1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 −1
0 0 0 0 0 0 −1 0 0 0


APPENDIX B
Performance of SDPT3 and SeDuMi
In this appendix the results of performance tests of SDP solvers SDPT3
and SeDuMi are contained.
The tables referring to SDPT3 contain the numbers of iterations and
timing for different test cases depending on three parameters: the search
direction (either HKM or NT), the usage or not of predictor-corrector, and
the value of expon.
For the case of SeDuMi, the tables refer to the following algorithms:
the first-order wide region method, the centering-predictor-corrector algo-
rithm with v-linearization, and the centering-predictor-corrector algorithm
with xz-linearization. The value 0 in the second column refers to the algo-
rithm without differentiation, the value 1 means the primal/dual step length
differentiation, and the value 2 means the adaptive heuristic to control step
differentiation. θ and β are wide region and neighborhood parameters.
For each problem set the number of iterations and the execution time is
given. The results are discussed in chapter 6.
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Table B.1. Performance of SDPT3 (1). The table shows
the number of iterations and the execution time on SDPT3 of
Almost Quantum for CHSH, I3322, E0E1 and Hardy problem
sets. Averaged over 100 executions.
CHSH I3322 E0E1 Hardy
HKM/NT P-C expon iter. time [s] iter. time [s] iter. time [s] iter. time [s]
HKM no 0 17 0.45 21 1.12 26 0.76 26 0.76
HKM no 0.01 17 0.46 21 1.12 26 0.76 26 0.76
HKM no 0.1 17 0.46 21 1.11 26 0.76 26 0.76
HKM no 0.5 17 0.46 21 1.11 26 0.76 26 0.76
HKM no 1 17 0.45 21 1.11 26 0.76 26 0.76
HKM no 1.5 17 0.46 21 1.11 26 0.76 26 0.76
HKM no 2 17 0.46 21 1.11 26 0.76 26 0.76
HKM no 2.5 17 0.45 21 1.12 26 0.76 26 0.76
HKM no 3 17 0.45 21 1.11 26 0.76 26 0.76
HKM no 4 17 0.46 21 1.12 26 0.76 26 0.76
HKM no 8 17 0.45 21 1.11 26 0.76 26 0.76
HKM yes 0 12 0.44 14 0.88 24 0.95 20 0.79
HKM yes 0.01 12 0.44 14 0.88 24 0.94 20 0.79
HKM yes 0.1 12 0.44 14 0.88 24 0.95 20 0.80
HKM yes 0.5 12 0.44 14 0.87 24 0.94 20 0.79
HKM yes 1 12 0.44 14 0.88 24 0.94 20 0.79
HKM yes 1.5 12 0.44 13 0.81 23 0.90 21 0.84
HKM yes 2 12 0.43 14 0.87 24 0.95 22 0.88
HKM yes 2.5 13 0.47 14 0.88 24 0.95 22 0.87
HKM yes 3 14 0.51 12 0.75 24 0.95 21 0.83
HKM yes 4 14 0.51 14 0.87 24 0.95 22 0.87
HKM yes 8 13 0.48 15 0.94 24 0.94 23 0.91
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Table B.2. Performance of SDPT3 (1). The table shows
the number of iterations and the execution time on SDPT3 of
Almost Quantum for CHSH, I3322, E0E1 and Hardy problem
sets. Averaged over 100 executions.
CHSH I3322 E0E1 Hardy
HKM/NT P-C expon iter. time [s] iter. time [s] iter. time [s] iter. time [s]
NT no 0 17 0.48 19 1.02 26 0.79 23 0.70
NT no 0.01 17 0.48 19 1.02 26 0.79 23 0.71
NT no 0.1 17 0.49 19 1.02 26 0.80 23 0.70
NT no 0.5 17 0.48 19 1.02 26 0.79 23 0.71
NT no 1 17 0.48 19 1.02 26 0.79 23 0.70
NT no 1.5 17 0.48 19 1.02 26 0.79 23 0.70
NT no 2 17 0.48 19 1.02 26 0.79 23 0.70
NT no 2.5 17 0.48 19 1.01 26 0.79 23 0.71
NT no 3 17 0.48 19 1.02 26 0.80 23 0.71
NT no 4 17 0.48 19 1.02 26 0.79 23 0.70
NT no 8 17 0.48 19 1.03 26 0.80 23 0.70
NT yes 0 12 0.47 13 0.84 23 0.97 22 0.93
NT yes 0.01 12 0.46 13 0.84 23 0.96 22 0.93
NT yes 0.1 12 0.47 13 0.84 23 0.97 22 0.93
NT yes 0.5 12 0.47 13 0.84 23 0.96 22 0.92
NT yes 1 12 0.47 13 0.84 23 0.96 22 0.94
NT yes 1.5 12 0.47 13 0.84 23 0.97 22 0.94
NT yes 2 12 0.47 12 0.78 23 0.96 22 0.93
NT yes 2.5 12 0.47 13 0.84 23 0.97 22 0.92
NT yes 3 12 0.46 14 0.91 23 0.97 22 0.92
NT yes 4 13 0.50 14 0.90 23 0.97 22 0.92
NT yes 8 14 0.54 14 0.91 23 0.97 22 0.92
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Table B.3. Performance of SDPT3 (2). The table shows
the number of iterations and the execution time on SDPT3 of
Almost Quantum for BC3, T3C, BC5, and BC7 problem sets.
Averaged over 100 executions.
BC3 T3C BC5 BC7
HKM/NT P-C expon iter. time [s] iter. time [s] iter. time [s] iter. time [s]
HKM no 0 21 1.17 30 2.34 30 1.06 36 7.71
HKM no 0.01 21 1.17 30 2.34 30 1.06 36 7.71
HKM no 0.1 21 1.17 30 2.34 30 1.06 36 7.70
HKM no 0.5 21 1.16 30 2.34 30 1.06 36 7.71
HKM no 1 21 1.16 30 2.35 30 1.05 36 7.73
HKM no 1.5 21 1.17 30 2.34 30 1.06 36 7.72
HKM no 2 21 1.17 30 2.35 30 1.04 36 7.72
HKM no 2.5 21 1.16 30 2.34 30 1.04 36 7.72
HKM no 3 21 1.17 30 2.34 30 1.05 36 7.73
HKM no 4 21 1.16 30 2.34 30 1.04 36 7.69
HKM no 8 21 1.17 30 2.34 30 1.05 36 7.70
HKM yes 0 12 0.79 17 1.50 17 0.83 20 4.80
HKM yes 0.01 12 0.80 17 1.50 17 0.84 20 4.80
HKM yes 0.1 12 0.80 17 1.50 17 0.84 20 4.79
HKM yes 0.5 12 0.79 17 1.51 17 0.84 20 4.78
HKM yes 1 12 0.79 17 1.51 17 0.83 20 4.76
HKM yes 1.5 13 0.86 16 1.42 17 0.84 21 5.00
HKM yes 2 13 0.85 16 1.42 18 0.88 20 4.77
HKM yes 2.5 13 0.86 17 1.51 18 0.88 21 4.98
HKM yes 3 13 0.86 17 1.51 19 0.93 21 4.98
HKM yes 4 14 0.93 17 1.50 19 0.93 20 4.78
HKM yes 8 14 0.93 17 1.51 19 0.92 21 5.02
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Table B.4. Performance of SDPT3 (2). The table shows
the number of iterations and the execution time on SDPT3 of
Almost Quantum for BC3, T3C, BC5, and BC7 problem sets.
Averaged over 100 executions.
BC3 T3C BC5 BC7
HKM/NT P-C expon iter. time [s] iter. time [s] iter. time [s] iter. time [s]
NT no 0 19 1.06 27 2.09 27 1.00 36 7.64
NT no 0.01 19 1.07 27 2.10 27 1.00 36 7.65
NT no 0.1 19 1.07 27 2.10 27 1.00 36 7.64
NT no 0.5 19 1.07 27 2.10 27 1.00 36 7.65
NT no 1 19 1.07 27 2.09 27 1.00 36 7.64
NT no 1.5 19 1.07 27 2.10 27 1.00 36 7.64
NT no 2 19 1.06 27 2.09 27 0.99 36 7.64
NT no 2.5 19 1.06 27 2.10 27 1.00 36 7.65
NT no 3 19 1.06 27 2.10 27 1.01 36 7.64
NT no 4 19 1.06 27 2.09 27 1.00 36 7.65
NT no 8 19 1.06 27 2.09 27 1.00 36 7.64
NT yes 0 13 0.88 17 1.52 16 0.85 19 4.56
NT yes 0.01 13 0.88 17 1.51 16 0.84 19 4.57
NT yes 0.1 13 0.88 17 1.52 16 0.84 19 4.57
NT yes 0.5 13 0.89 17 1.52 16 0.85 19 4.57
NT yes 1 13 0.89 17 1.52 16 0.84 19 4.57
NT yes 1.5 12 0.82 17 1.52 16 0.85 19 4.56
NT yes 2 13 0.88 16 1.43 16 0.85 19 4.58
NT yes 2.5 13 0.89 17 1.52 16 0.85 19 4.58
NT yes 3 13 0.88 17 1.53 16 0.85 20 4.81
NT yes 4 13 0.89 17 1.52 17 0.89 19 4.56
NT yes 8 13 0.88 17 1.53 17 0.90 20 4.79
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Table B.5. High NPA hierarchy levels in SDPT3 (1).
The table shows the performance of the SDPT3 solver on I3322
problem case in Q2, Q3, Q4 and Q5. For the level Q5 the solver
was not able to attain the desired quality of solutions.
Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5
HKM/NT predcorr expon iter. time [s] iter. time [s] iter. time [s] iter. time [s]
HKM no 0.01 27 2.98 36 5.80 failed failed
HKM no 0.1 27 3.01 36 5.77 failed failed
HKM no 0.5 27 3.02 36 5.76 failed failed
HKM no 1 27 3.02 36 5.74 failed failed
HKM no 1.5 27 3.00 36 5.77 failed failed
HKM no 2 27 2.98 36 5.71 failed failed
HKM no 2.5 27 3.01 36 5.69 failed failed
HKM no 3 27 2.99 36 5.75 failed failed
HKM no 4 27 2.98 36 5.75 failed failed
HKM no 8 27 2.96 36 5.77 failed failed
HKM yes 0.01 16 1.90 24 4.41 26 216 failed
HKM yes 0.1 16 1.92 24 4.45 26 216 failed
HKM yes 0.5 16 1.96 24 4.47 26 216 failed
HKM yes 1 16 1.91 24 4.50 26 216 failed
HKM yes 1.5 16 1.91 23 4.22 25 208 failed
HKM yes 2 15 1.81 24 4.40 25 208 24 14845
HKM yes 2.5 15 1.79 24 4.39 25 210 failed
HKM yes 3 17 2.04 24 4.39 24 200 23 14207
HKM yes 4 16 1.94 24 4.38 24 199 23 14176
HKM yes 8 17 2.03 24 4.45 24 199 failed
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Table B.6. High NPA hierarchy levels in SDPT3 (1).
The table shows the performance of the SDPT3 solver on I3322
problem case in Q2, Q3, Q4 and Q5. For the level Q5 the solver
was not able to attain the desired quality of solutions.
Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5
HKM/NT predcorr expon iter. time [s] iter. time [s] iter. time [s] iter. time [s]
NT no 0.01 25 2.67 34 5.03 37 263 failed
NT no 0.1 25 2.68 34 5.04 37 262 failed
NT no 0.5 25 2.69 34 5.04 37 263 failed
NT no 1 25 2.68 34 5.04 37 263 failed
NT no 1.5 25 2.68 34 5.04 37 262 failed
NT no 2 25 2.67 34 5.05 37 263 failed
NT no 2.5 25 2.68 34 5.04 37 263 failed
NT no 3 25 2.68 34 5.05 37 263 failed
NT no 4 25 2.70 34 5.09 37 263 failed
NT no 8 25 2.67 34 5.15 37 262 failed
NT yes 0.01 16 1.88 23 4.10 25 183 22 12281
NT yes 0.1 16 1.88 23 4.12 25 182 22 12306
NT yes 0.5 16 1.89 23 4.04 25 183 22 12310
NT yes 1 16 1.90 23 4.10 25 182 22 12312
NT yes 1.5 15 1.77 22 3.91 24 175 23 12773
NT yes 2 15 1.78 22 3.87 24 175 22 12331
NT yes 2.5 16 1.90 22 3.86 23 168 22 12286
NT yes 3 16 1.89 23 4.04 23 168 22 12163
NT yes 4 16 1.89 23 4.03 23 168 failed
NT yes 8 16 1.89 23 4.05 24 176 failed
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Table B.7. High NPA hierarchy levels in SDPT3 (2).
The table shows the performance of the SDPT3 solver on CHSH
problem case in Q5, Q10, and Q13.
Q5 Q10 Q13
HKM/NT predcorr expon iter. time [s] iter. time [s] iter. time [s]
HKM no 0.01 23 1.89 failed failed
HKM no 0.1 23 1.86 failed failed
HKM no 0.5 23 1.85 failed failed
HKM no 1 23 1.86 failed failed
HKM no 1.5 23 1.85 failed failed
HKM no 2 23 1.84 failed failed
HKM no 2.5 23 1.84 failed failed
HKM no 3 23 1.84 failed failed
HKM no 4 23 1.86 failed failed
HKM no 8 23 1.86 failed failed
HKM yes 0.01 15 1.38 18 36.3 18 228
HKM yes 0.1 15 1.40 18 36.3 18 226
HKM yes 0.5 15 1.39 18 36.3 18 226
HKM yes 1 15 1.39 18 36.3 18 226
HKM yes 1.5 18 1.68 17 34.2 18 226
HKM yes 2 18 1.67 17 34.2 19 239
HKM yes 2.5 18 1.67 20 40.5 18 226
HKM yes 3 19 1.77 17 34.2 failed
HKM yes 4 20 1.85 17 34.2 19 239
HKM yes 8 20 1.85 17 34.3 19 239
NT no 0.01 21 1.62 failed failed
NT no 0.1 21 1.63 failed failed
NT no 0.5 21 1.62 failed failed
NT no 1 21 1.63 failed failed
NT no 1.5 21 1.62 failed failed
NT no 2 21 1.62 failed failed
NT no 2.5 21 1.62 failed failed
NT no 3 21 1.63 failed failed
NT no 4 21 1.62 failed failed
NT no 8 21 1.62 failed failed
NT yes 0.01 17 1.55 failed 19 132
NT yes 0.1 17 1.56 failed 19 131
NT yes 0.5 17 1.56 failed 19 132
NT yes 1 17 1.56 failed 19 133
NT yes 1.5 17 1.57 20 25.1 19 131
NT yes 2 16 1.48 17 21.2 18 124
NT yes 2.5 failed 19 23.6 failed
NT yes 3 14 1.29 20 25.1 failed
NT yes 4 14 1.28 failed failed
NT yes 8 14 1.29 failed failed
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Table B.8. The first-order wide region method in
SeDuMi with the first-order wide region method al-
gorithm (1). The table shows the number of iterations and
the execution time on SeDuMi of Almost Quantum for CHSH,
I3322, E0E1 and Hardy problem sets when the first-order wide
region method algorithm is used. Averaged over 100 executions.
CHSH I3322 E0E1 Hardy
step. diff. θ β iter. time [s] iter. time [s] iter. time [s] iter. time [s]
0 0.1 0.1 91 1.24 87 1.32 exceeded exceeded
0 0.1 0.5 91 1.16 78 1.21 exceeded exceeded
0 0.1 0.9 91 1.17 78 1.21 exceeded 144 2.29
0 0.25 0.1 55 0.74 58 0.94 exceeded exceeded
0 0.25 0.5 38 0.50 43 0.72 136 2.06 125 2.14
0 0.25 0.9 38 0.54 39 0.61 102 1.55 91 1.58
0 0.7 0.1 27 0.38 38 0.62 87 1.27 85 1.31
0 0.7 0.5 16 0.21 24 0.37 77 1.14 75 1.17
0 0.7 0.9 16 0.21 20 0.33 41 0.60 41 0.61
0 1 0.1 24 0.34 31 0.49 71 1.00 72 1.12
0 1 0.5 20 0.28 25 0.40 37 0.53 53 0.78
0 1 0.9 18 0.23 18 0.28 30 0.41 28 0.41
1 0.1 0.1 89 1.14 106 1.71 exceeded exceeded
1 0.1 0.5 94 1.19 96 1.57 exceeded exceeded
1 0.1 0.9 92 1.16 92 1.51 exceeded exceeded
1 0.25 0.1 57 0.75 70 1.13 exceeded exceeded
1 0.25 0.5 40 0.54 47 0.75 117 1.98 114 2.03
1 0.25 0.9 40 0.52 42 0.71 94 1.55 94 1.64
1 0.7 0.1 27 0.40 38 0.68 80 1.25 83 1.38
1 0.7 0.5 16 0.23 24 0.40 55 0.88 64 1.20
1 0.7 0.9 16 0.21 20 0.34 40 0.64 38 0.62
1 1 0.1 24 0.36 30 0.51 70 1.09 72 1.21
1 1 0.5 19 0.27 25 0.40 36 0.56 56 1.05
1 1 0.9 17 0.22 18 0.31 29 0.45 27 0.43
2 0.1 0.1 92 1.22 108 1.72 exceeded exceeded
2 0.1 0.5 88 1.14 86 1.36 exceeded exceeded
2 0.1 0.9 88 1.19 89 1.44 exceeded 143 2.39
2 0.25 0.1 54 0.71 82 1.32 exceeded exceeded
2 0.25 0.5 41 0.52 44 0.70 113 1.87 118 2.09
2 0.25 0.9 40 0.51 41 0.69 89 1.37 89 1.58
2 0.7 0.1 27 0.39 36 0.55 81 1.25 84 1.37
2 0.7 0.5 16 0.22 23 0.37 60 0.91 66 1.16
2 0.7 0.9 14 0.18 20 0.32 41 0.62 40 0.62
2 1 0.1 24 0.35 30 0.49 71 1.10 72 1.18
2 1 0.5 18 0.25 25 0.41 36 0.56 58 1.00
2 1 0.9 18 0.22 18 0.28 28 0.39 28 0.41
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Table B.9. The first-order wide region method in
SeDuMi with the centering-predictor-corrector algo-
rithm with v-linearization (1). The table shows the num-
ber of iterations and the execution time on SeDuMi of Almost
Quantum for CHSH, I3322, E0E1 and Hardy problem sets when
the centering-predictor-corrector algorithm with v-linearization
is used. Averaged over 100 executions.
CHSH I3322 E0E1 Hardy
step. diff. θ β iter. time [s] iter. time [s] iter. time [s] iter. time [s]
0 0.1 0.1 10 0.14 12 0.19 29 0.43 27 0.42
0 0.1 0.5 10 0.14 12 0.19 29 0.42 27 0.42
0 0.1 0.9 10 0.14 12 0.19 29 0.43 27 0.42
0 0.25 0.1 10 0.14 12 0.19 29 0.42 28 0.44
0 0.25 0.5 10 0.14 12 0.19 29 0.42 27 0.42
0 0.25 0.9 10 0.14 12 0.19 29 0.43 27 0.42
0 0.7 0.1 21 0.34 32 0.57 127 2.40 119 2.27
0 0.7 0.5 10 0.15 12 0.21 21 0.37 21 0.40
0 0.7 0.9 9 0.14 12 0.21 20 0.35 21 0.40
0 1 0.1 64 1.09 108 2.11 exceeded exceeded
0 1 0.5 21 0.35 24 0.52 37 0.73 53 1.06
0 1 0.9 18 0.30 18 0.41 26 0.47 24 0.46
1 0.1 0.1 9 0.15 12 0.20 26 0.39 25 0.40
1 0.1 0.5 9 0.14 12 0.21 26 0.39 25 0.40
1 0.1 0.9 9 0.14 12 0.21 26 0.39 25 0.40
1 0.25 0.1 9 0.14 12 0.21 27 0.42 25 0.40
1 0.25 0.5 9 0.15 12 0.20 27 0.41 25 0.40
1 0.25 0.9 9 0.15 12 0.21 27 0.42 25 0.40
1 0.7 0.1 16 0.29 20 0.40 126 2.53 140 2.87
1 0.7 0.5 11 0.19 11 0.24 21 0.40 20 0.41
1 0.7 0.9 11 0.20 11 0.22 20 0.37 20 0.39
1 1 0.1 61 1.11 108 2.25 exceeded exceeded
1 1 0.5 27 0.51 23 0.51 28 0.55 43 0.93
1 1 0.9 18 0.29 18 0.40 25 0.49 25 0.53
2 0.1 0.1 12 0.17 12 0.19 26 0.37 26 0.41
2 0.1 0.5 12 0.17 12 0.19 26 0.38 26 0.41
2 0.1 0.9 12 0.18 12 0.19 26 0.38 26 0.42
2 0.25 0.1 12 0.17 12 0.19 26 0.38 27 0.42
2 0.25 0.5 12 0.17 12 0.19 26 0.37 26 0.42
2 0.25 0.9 12 0.17 12 0.19 26 0.37 26 0.42
2 0.7 0.1 18 0.30 21 0.39 123 2.44 144 2.94
2 0.7 0.5 14 0.22 12 0.23 21 0.38 21 0.43
2 0.7 0.9 9 0.15 13 0.25 19 0.34 21 0.41
2 1 0.1 61 1.09 107 2.21 exceeded exceeded
2 1 0.5 22 0.39 24 0.59 27 0.53 38 0.86
2 1 0.9 18 0.28 18 0.41 25 0.46 24 0.46
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Table B.10. The first-order wide region method in
SeDuMi with centering-predictor-corrector algorithm
with xz-linearization (1). The table shows the number of
iterations and the execution time on SeDuMi of Almost Quan-
tum for CHSH, I3322, E0E1 and Hardy problem sets when the
centering-predictor-corrector algorithm with xz-linearization is
used. Averaged over 100 executions.
CHSH I3322 E0E1 Hardy
step. diff. θ β iter. time [s] iter. time [s] iter. time [s] iter. time [s]
0 0.1 0.1 14 0.20 15 0.27 25 0.37 25 0.41
0 0.1 0.5 14 0.20 15 0.28 25 0.37 25 0.42
0 0.1 0.9 14 0.20 15 0.28 25 0.37 25 0.41
0 0.25 0.1 14 0.20 15 0.28 25 0.38 25 0.41
0 0.25 0.5 14 0.20 15 0.28 25 0.38 25 0.42
0 0.25 0.9 14 0.20 15 0.28 25 0.38 25 0.41
0 0.7 0.1 12 0.20 14 0.30 28 0.48 29 0.53
0 0.7 0.5 12 0.19 15 0.33 24 0.43 25 0.48
0 0.7 0.9 12 0.20 15 0.33 24 0.42 25 0.48
0 1 0.1 20 0.35 37 0.72 38 0.73 101 2.03
0 1 0.5 18 0.30 19 0.39 27 0.49 25 0.49
0 1 0.9 17 0.27 18 0.37 27 0.48 25 0.48
1 0.1 0.1 14 0.22 16 0.27 24 0.39 24 0.43
1 0.1 0.5 14 0.23 16 0.28 24 0.40 24 0.43
1 0.1 0.9 14 0.21 16 0.28 24 0.39 24 0.43
1 0.25 0.1 14 0.23 16 0.28 24 0.40 24 0.43
1 0.25 0.5 14 0.22 16 0.27 24 0.39 24 0.43
1 0.25 0.9 14 0.23 16 0.27 24 0.39 24 0.43
1 0.7 0.1 11 0.20 15 0.32 29 0.59 31 0.69
1 0.7 0.5 11 0.19 13 0.27 23 0.45 24 0.52
1 0.7 0.9 12 0.21 13 0.26 23 0.44 24 0.50
1 1 0.1 20 0.37 35 0.75 38 0.77 101 2.19
1 1 0.5 19 0.35 19 0.41 26 0.51 27 0.61
1 1 0.9 16 0.26 18 0.38 26 0.52 24 0.48
2 0.1 0.1 15 0.23 14 0.23 23 0.36 25 0.43
2 0.1 0.5 15 0.24 14 0.22 23 0.36 25 0.43
2 0.1 0.9 15 0.23 14 0.23 23 0.35 25 0.43
2 0.25 0.1 15 0.23 14 0.23 23 0.35 25 0.42
2 0.25 0.5 15 0.23 14 0.22 23 0.35 25 0.42
2 0.25 0.9 15 0.23 14 0.23 23 0.35 25 0.43
2 0.7 0.1 12 0.21 14 0.31 28 0.48 29 0.57
2 0.7 0.5 11 0.19 13 0.26 23 0.42 25 0.51
2 0.7 0.9 11 0.19 13 0.26 22 0.38 25 0.51
2 1 0.1 20 0.38 36 0.74 38 0.77 101 2.15
2 1 0.5 18 0.31 19 0.45 26 0.47 25 0.50
2 1 0.9 17 0.27 18 0.37 25 0.45 24 0.46
174 Performance of SDPT3 and SeDuMi
Table B.11. The first-order wide region method in
SeDuMi with the first-order wide region method algo-
rithm (2). The table shows the number of iterations and the
execution time on SeDuMi of Almost Quantum for BC3, T3C,
BC5 and BC7 problem sets when the first-order wide region
method algorithm is used. Averaged over 100 executions.
BC3 T3C BC5 BC7
step. diff. θ β iter. time [s] iter. time [s] iter. time [s] iter. time [s]
0 0.1 0.1 83 1.12 135 1.96 96 3.68 101 100.44
0 0.1 0.5 86 1.17 104 1.50 80 3.03 84 81.99
0 0.1 0.9 86 1.17 104 1.50 83 3.11 88 86.31
0 0.25 0.1 58 0.83 90 1.36 56 2.14 70 68.94
0 0.25 0.5 38 0.53 61 0.91 41 1.56 55 54.11
0 0.25 0.9 37 0.49 56 0.83 40 1.52 49 49.16
0 0.7 0.1 33 0.47 60 0.92 35 1.37 46 45.53
0 0.7 0.5 21 0.31 46 0.70 26 1.00 35 34.43
0 0.7 0.9 20 0.29 26 0.38 21 0.81 24 23.32
0 1 0.1 29 0.43 51 0.78 31 1.22 43 42.62
0 1 0.5 25 0.37 34 0.52 28 1.08 35 34.49
0 1 0.9 19 0.27 22 0.33 20 0.75 22 21.34
1 0.1 0.1 90 1.31 129 1.97 108 4.23 122 122.50
1 0.1 0.5 72 1.05 107 1.66 93 3.59 94 94.26
1 0.1 0.9 72 1.03 92 1.39 86 3.40 96 96.81
1 0.25 0.1 71 1.06 88 1.46 62 2.43 86 86.35
1 0.25 0.5 38 0.59 58 0.94 46 1.79 55 53.45
1 0.25 0.9 38 0.57 55 0.87 45 1.76 46 44.56
1 0.7 0.1 30 0.49 57 0.94 37 1.49 47 45.51
1 0.7 0.5 20 0.31 47 0.77 22 0.87 31 29.78
1 0.7 0.9 19 0.30 26 0.42 20 0.81 22 20.89
1 1 0.1 29 0.48 51 0.85 32 1.29 43 41.72
1 1 0.5 23 0.36 40 0.66 29 1.15 31 29.76
1 1 0.9 18 0.27 23 0.38 20 0.78 0 0.00
2 0.1 0.1 83 1.24 149 2.38 95 3.67 103 100.45
2 0.1 0.5 78 1.11 105 1.60 85 3.23 82 80.77
2 0.1 0.9 78 1.12 126 1.98 96 3.64 80 77.94
2 0.25 0.1 52 0.76 87 1.43 56 2.15 68 66.38
2 0.25 0.5 37 0.53 62 0.99 41 1.57 53 51.61
2 0.25 0.9 37 0.53 57 0.91 41 1.58 46 44.39
2 0.7 0.1 30 0.46 59 0.95 37 1.46 46 44.41
2 0.7 0.5 21 0.31 43 0.67 26 1.00 34 32.85
2 0.7 0.9 19 0.28 27 0.41 21 0.82 24 22.73
2 1 0.1 29 0.46 51 0.82 32 1.26 43 41.86
2 1 0.5 23 0.36 40 0.65 28 1.10 31 29.84
2 1 0.9 18 0.25 22 0.34 21 0.80 23 21.88
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Table B.12. The first-order wide region method in
SeDuMi with the centering-predictor-corrector algo-
rithm with v-linearization (2). The table shows the num-
ber of iterations and the execution time on SeDuMi of Almost
Quantum for BC3, T3C, BC5 and BC7 problem sets when the
centering-predictor-corrector algorithm with v-linearization is
used. Averaged over 100 executions.
BC3 T3C BC5 BC7
step. diff. θ β iter. time [s] iter. time [s] iter. time [s] iter. time [s]
0 0.1 0.1 12 0.18 18 0.28 11 0.44 12 11.08
0 0.1 0.5 12 0.19 18 0.28 11 0.44 12 11.06
0 0.1 0.9 12 0.19 18 0.29 11 0.44 12 11.03
0 0.25 0.1 12 0.19 18 0.28 11 0.44 12 11.13
0 0.25 0.5 12 0.18 18 0.28 11 0.44 12 11.16
0 0.25 0.9 12 0.19 18 0.28 11 0.44 12 11.08
0 0.7 0.1 22 0.40 78 1.51 19 0.81 21 20.12
0 0.7 0.5 11 0.19 18 0.33 12 0.51 12 11.24
0 0.7 0.9 11 0.19 17 0.31 15 0.64 12 11.13
0 1 0.1 88 1.67 exceeded 92 4.15 111 110.07
0 1 0.5 30 0.55 34 0.67 33 1.48 35 34.17
0 1 0.9 19 0.34 21 0.40 23 1.02 24 23.06
1 0.1 0.1 12 0.20 18 0.31 11 0.46 12 11.13
1 0.1 0.5 12 0.19 18 0.30 11 0.46 12 11.12
1 0.1 0.9 12 0.20 18 0.30 11 0.46 12 11.14
1 0.25 0.1 12 0.20 18 0.31 11 0.46 12 11.18
1 0.25 0.5 12 0.20 18 0.30 11 0.46 12 11.31
1 0.25 0.9 12 0.19 18 0.31 11 0.46 12 11.16
1 0.7 0.1 21 0.41 82 1.70 20 0.89 19 18.29
1 0.7 0.5 11 0.21 17 0.34 11 0.49 12 11.33
1 0.7 0.9 11 0.20 16 0.34 11 0.49 12 11.20
1 1 0.1 88 1.78 exceeded 93 4.37 112 114.87
1 1 0.5 25 0.50 32 0.68 35 1.60 37 36.19
1 1 0.9 19 0.37 20 0.41 24 1.07 24 23.16
2 0.1 0.1 12 0.19 17 0.29 11 0.45 12 11.09
2 0.1 0.5 12 0.19 17 0.29 11 0.45 12 11.14
2 0.1 0.9 12 0.19 17 0.28 11 0.45 12 11.01
2 0.25 0.1 12 0.19 17 0.28 11 0.45 12 11.16
2 0.25 0.5 12 0.19 17 0.28 11 0.44 12 11.16
2 0.25 0.9 12 0.19 17 0.28 11 0.46 12 11.11
2 0.7 0.1 22 0.41 77 1.61 19 0.83 21 20.62
2 0.7 0.5 11 0.19 17 0.33 11 0.48 12 11.57
2 0.7 0.9 12 0.23 16 0.31 15 0.65 12 11.52
2 1 0.1 87 1.72 exceeded 93 4.31 112 112.80
2 1 0.5 30 0.59 34 0.71 34 1.55 38 37.91
2 1 0.9 19 0.34 21 0.42 23 1.02 24 23.92
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Table B.13. The first-order wide region method in
SeDuMi with the centering-predictor-corrector algo-
rithm with xz-linearization (2). The table shows the num-
ber of iterations and the execution time on SeDuMi of Almost
Quantum for BC3, T3C, BC5 and BC7 problem sets when the
centering-predictor-corrector algorithm with xz-linearization is
used. Averaged over 100 executions.
BC3 T3C BC5 BC7
step. diff. θ β iter. time [s] iter. time [s] iter. time [s] iter. time [s]
0 0.1 0.1 15 0.24 17 0.27 14 0.57 16 15.44
0 0.1 0.5 15 0.24 17 0.27 14 0.57 16 15.56
0 0.1 0.9 15 0.24 17 0.27 14 0.57 16 15.21
0 0.25 0.1 14 0.22 17 0.27 14 0.56 16 14.93
0 0.25 0.5 16 0.26 17 0.27 14 0.57 16 15.47
0 0.25 0.9 16 0.26 17 0.27 14 0.57 16 15.47
0 0.7 0.1 13 0.24 18 0.32 14 0.60 16 15.71
0 0.7 0.5 13 0.24 17 0.32 14 0.61 15 14.68
0 0.7 0.9 14 0.25 16 0.29 14 0.61 15 14.58
0 1 0.1 32 0.61 67 1.34 57 2.58 89 87.74
0 1 0.5 20 0.37 22 0.44 21 0.94 22 21.80
0 1 0.9 18 0.32 20 0.37 19 0.83 20 19.41
1 0.1 0.1 15 0.25 18 0.31 15 0.62 16 15.51
1 0.1 0.5 15 0.25 18 0.31 15 0.61 16 15.25
1 0.1 0.9 15 0.25 18 0.32 15 0.62 16 15.52
1 0.25 0.1 15 0.25 18 0.31 15 0.61 16 15.52
1 0.25 0.5 15 0.25 18 0.32 15 0.62 16 15.50
1 0.25 0.9 15 0.25 18 0.31 15 0.62 16 15.45
1 0.7 0.1 13 0.26 21 0.43 14 0.62 17 16.48
1 0.7 0.5 12 0.23 17 0.35 13 0.59 14 13.16
1 0.7 0.9 13 0.25 17 0.35 13 0.56 15 14.75
1 1 0.1 32 0.65 65 1.37 59 2.76 87 85.63
1 1 0.5 20 0.40 23 0.48 21 0.96 22 21.95
1 1 0.9 18 0.34 19 0.38 18 0.81 20 19.08
2 0.1 0.1 15 0.24 17 0.28 14 0.58 16 15.49
2 0.1 0.5 15 0.24 17 0.29 14 0.58 16 15.46
2 0.1 0.9 15 0.24 17 0.28 14 0.58 16 14.94
2 0.25 0.1 15 0.24 17 0.29 14 0.57 16 14.96
2 0.25 0.5 16 0.27 17 0.29 14 0.58 16 15.06
2 0.25 0.9 16 0.26 17 0.29 14 0.57 16 14.97
2 0.7 0.1 13 0.25 18 0.33 14 0.61 16 15.06
2 0.7 0.5 12 0.22 16 0.30 14 0.61 15 14.12
2 0.7 0.9 13 0.25 16 0.31 14 0.61 15 14.07
2 1 0.1 32 0.64 68 1.39 57 2.64 89 87.57
2 1 0.5 20 0.39 21 0.44 21 0.94 21 20.18
2 1 0.9 18 0.33 20 0.38 20 0.88 20 19.03
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Table B.14. High NPA hierarchy levels in SeDuMi
(wide region). The table shows the performance of the
SeDuMi solver on CHSH and I3322 problem cases in high NPA
hierarchy levels. The execution of I3322 inQ4 failed in all cases.
The first-order wide region method has been used.
step. diff. θ β I3322 in Q2 I3322 in Q3 CHSH in Q5 CHSH in Q10
iter. time [s] iter. time [s] iter. time [s] iter. time [s]
0 0.1 0.1 97 1.85 122 36.2 55 1.72 69 53.0
0 0.1 0.5 91 1.69 97 28.4 59 1.81 61 46.5
0 0.1 0.9 91 1.68 97 28.0 59 1.80 61 46.6
0 0.25 0.1 78 1.50 88 25.6 36 1.11 37 28.3
0 0.25 0.5 53 0.99 69 20.2 33 1.01 38 29.1
0 0.25 0.9 49 0.93 55 16.1 33 1.03 35 26.7
0 0.7 0.1 48 0.89 75 21.9 32 1.04 35 27.6
0 0.7 0.5 37 0.68 64 18.6 25 0.79 28 21.8
0 0.7 0.9 25 0.47 48 14.0 19 0.59 19 14.4
0 1 0.1 44 0.85 120 35.3 29 0.94 38 29.6
0 1 0.5 31 0.59 47 13.6 27 0.86 29 22.4
0 1 0.9 21 0.39 32 9.2 20 0.60 20 15.0
1 0.1 0.1 100 1.95 115 33.4 70 2.15 83 63.5
1 0.1 0.5 111 2.19 100 28.9 84 2.55 84 64.4
1 0.1 0.9 144 2.71 101 29.1 103 3.09 84 64.0
1 0.25 0.1 84 1.74 86 25.0 40 1.27 44 33.9
1 0.25 0.5 56 1.07 68 19.9 39 1.25 39 29.9
1 0.25 0.9 52 1.00 56 16.1 35 1.12 37 28.3
1 0.7 0.1 47 0.94 68 19.7 32 1.08 42 32.6
1 0.7 0.5 36 0.68 56 16.2 23 0.77 27 20.9
1 0.7 0.9 24 0.46 39 11.3 20 0.66 24 18.5
1 1 0.1 43 0.88 113 33.0 30 1.02 37 29.4
1 1 0.5 33 0.64 43 12.4 26 0.86 30 23.6
1 1 0.9 20 0.39 30 8.6 18 0.57 20 15.3
2 0.1 0.1 97 1.88 119 34.4 62 1.96 65 48.8
2 0.1 0.5 127 2.39 94 27.2 72 2.20 57 43.1
2 0.1 0.9 145 2.68 99 28.7 72 2.19 58 43.8
2 0.25 0.1 83 1.65 82 23.9 36 1.14 38 29.1
2 0.25 0.5 55 1.06 63 18.5 36 1.11 39 29.8
2 0.25 0.9 51 0.97 53 15.3 36 1.12 36 27.4
2 0.7 0.1 46 0.90 66 19.1 31 1.00 34 26.6
2 0.7 0.5 35 0.66 57 16.5 24 0.76 28 21.7
2 0.7 0.9 24 0.46 39 11.4 20 0.63 20 15.3
2 1 0.1 43 0.86 111 32.9 30 0.99 39 30.7
2 1 0.5 30 0.61 43 12.6 27 0.86 29 22.6
2 1 0.9 21 0.41 28 8.2 20 0.61 20 15.3
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Table B.15. High NPA hierarchy levels in SeDuMi.
The table shows the performance of the SeDuMi solver
on CHSH and I3322 problem cases in high NPA hierarchy
levels. The centering-predictor-corrector algorithm with v-
linearization has been used.
I3322 in Q2 I3322 in Q3 I3322 in Q4 CHSH in Q5 CHSH in Q10
step diff. θ β iter. time [s] iter. time [s] iter. time [s] iter. time [s] iter. time [s]
0 0.1 0.1 14 0.29 19 5.6 18 869 12 0.42 12 9.6
0 0.1 0.5 14 0.29 19 5.6 18 870 12 0.41 12 9.6
0 0.1 0.9 14 0.30 19 5.5 18 876 12 0.41 12 9.7
0 0.25 0.1 14 0.29 19 5.6 18 873 12 0.41 12 9.6
0 0.25 0.5 14 0.29 19 5.6 18 876 12 0.41 12 9.6
0 0.25 0.9 14 0.29 19 5.5 18 873 12 0.41 12 9.7
0 0.7 0.1 52 1.23 139 43.6 failed 20 0.76 25 22.1
0 0.7 0.5 14 0.31 30 9.1 failed 13 0.47 14 12.0
0 0.7 0.9 14 0.32 19 5.6 22 1110 12 0.44 14 12.1
0 1 0.1 140 3.34 150 45.7 failed 92 3.75 102 93.9
0 1 0.5 39 0.92 101 31.0 failed 30 1.20 43 38.8
0 1 0.9 19 0.44 37 11.3 failed 25 0.98 27 24.1
1 0.1 0.1 14 0.29 17 4.9 18 889 12 0.43 14 11.5
1 0.1 0.5 14 0.29 17 4.9 18 879 12 0.42 14 11.4
1 0.1 0.9 14 0.29 17 4.9 18 877 12 0.41 14 11.4
1 0.25 0.1 14 0.29 17 4.9 18 879 12 0.42 14 11.4
1 0.25 0.5 14 0.29 17 5.0 18 885 12 0.42 14 11.4
1 0.25 0.9 14 0.29 17 4.9 18 864 12 0.42 14 11.4
1 0.7 0.1 49 1.21 110 33.8 failed 18 0.72 17 14.4
1 0.7 0.5 13 0.31 28 8.4 failed 12 0.45 13 11.4
1 0.7 0.9 13 0.31 18 5.3 19 943 12 0.45 13 11.2
1 1 0.1 137 3.44 150 45.7 failed 93 3.93 102 96.3
1 1 0.5 38 0.96 100 30.4 failed 36 1.47 32 29.2
1 1 0.9 18 0.46 26 7.9 failed 25 0.99 22 19.7
2 0.1 0.1 13 0.27 17 4.9 18 869 12 0.41 13 10.5
2 0.1 0.5 13 0.27 17 4.8 18 871 12 0.42 13 10.5
2 0.1 0.9 13 0.27 17 4.9 18 872 12 0.42 13 10.5
2 0.25 0.1 13 0.26 17 4.8 18 864 12 0.41 13 10.5
2 0.25 0.5 13 0.26 17 4.8 18 874 12 0.42 13 10.6
2 0.25 0.9 13 0.27 17 4.8 18 867 12 0.42 13 10.6
2 0.7 0.1 49 1.20 121 37.1 failed 18 0.70 23 20.2
2 0.7 0.5 13 0.31 28 8.4 failed 12 0.45 12 10.3
2 0.7 0.9 13 0.30 19 5.6 21 1014 12 0.45 12 10.3
2 1 0.1 137 3.41 150 45.6 failed 93 3.90 102 95.5
2 1 0.5 38 0.94 93 28.5 failed 29 1.17 46 41.6
2 1 0.9 18 0.43 33 9.9 failed 26 1.04 26 23.2
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Table B.16. High NPA hierarchy levels in SeDuMi
(xz-linearization). The table shows the performance of the
SeDuMi solver on CHSH and I3322 problem cases in high NPA
hierarchy levels. The centering-predictor-corrector algorithm
with xz-linearization has been used. Levels Q2, Q3 and Q4
refer to I3322, and levels Q5 and Q10 to CHSH.
I3322 in Q2 I3322 in Q3 I3322 in Q4 CHSH in Q5 CHSH in Q10
step diff. θ β iter. time [s] iterations time [s] iter. time [s] iter. time [s] iter. time [s]
0 0.1 0.1 15 0.31 18 5.1 19 916 14 0.46 16 13.0
0 0.1 0.5 15 0.32 18 5.1 19 911 14 0.46 16 13.0
0 0.1 0.9 15 0.31 18 5.1 19 908 14 0.46 16 13.0
0 0.25 0.1 15 0.31 18 5.1 19 905 14 0.47 16 13.0
0 0.25 0.5 15 0.32 18 5.1 19 918 14 0.46 16 13.0
0 0.25 0.9 15 0.32 18 5.1 19 916 14 0.46 16 13.0
0 0.7 0.1 17 0.39 23 6.7 25 1222 15 0.57 17 14.8
0 0.7 0.5 15 0.36 18 5.3 19 915 13 0.49 16 13.9
0 0.7 0.9 15 0.35 18 5.4 19 908 13 0.50 16 13.8
0 1 0.1 95 2.25 150 45.2 failed 63 2.57 73 67.4
0 1 0.5 20 0.47 27 8.2 failed 19 0.76 20 18.0
0 1 0.9 19 0.44 22 6.6 23 1109 18 0.67 18 15.6
1 0.1 0.1 16 0.33 17 4.9 19 912 15 0.54 16 13.2
1 0.1 0.5 16 0.33 17 4.9 19 923 15 0.55 16 13.4
1 0.1 0.9 16 0.33 17 4.9 19 911 15 0.54 16 13.3
1 0.25 0.1 16 0.33 17 4.9 19 914 15 0.55 16 13.3
1 0.25 0.5 16 0.33 17 4.9 19 908 15 0.54 16 13.4
1 0.25 0.9 16 0.34 17 4.9 19 908 15 0.54 16 13.3
1 0.7 0.1 16 0.39 22 6.5 24 1163 15 0.56 18 15.1
1 0.7 0.5 16 0.38 18 5.3 20 960 16 0.57 17 14.4
1 0.7 0.9 17 0.37 18 5.3 19 916 12 0.48 14 12.4
1 1 0.1 87 2.16 150 45.7 failed 59 2.52 72 68.0
1 1 0.5 21 0.53 25 7.6 failed 19 0.80 20 18.2
1 1 0.9 19 0.47 20 6.0 23 1124 18 0.70 18 15.9
2 0.1 0.1 16 0.33 18 5.2 19 915 14 0.48 16 13.0
2 0.1 0.5 16 0.33 18 5.2 19 917 14 0.48 16 13.0
2 0.1 0.9 16 0.33 18 5.2 19 913 14 0.47 16 13.0
2 0.25 0.1 16 0.33 18 5.2 19 910 14 0.48 16 13.0
2 0.25 0.5 16 0.33 18 5.2 19 911 14 0.47 16 13.0
2 0.25 0.9 16 0.33 18 5.2 19 914 14 0.47 16 13.0
2 0.7 0.1 17 0.41 23 6.8 25 1226 14 0.53 17 14.5
2 0.7 0.5 14 0.32 17 5.0 19 924 13 0.50 16 13.3
2 0.7 0.9 15 0.36 18 5.4 19 931 13 0.51 16 13.3
2 1 0.1 87 2.15 150 45.7 failed 62 2.61 73 68.5
2 1 0.5 21 0.52 26 7.9 failed 19 0.77 19 17.2
2 1 0.9 19 0.45 21 6.3 23 1118 18 0.68 17 14.9

APPENDIX C
Performance of NPA-solver
The PMSdp tests are performed with different choices of parameters expon
and perturbation strategies (0 means no perturbations). In all cases the
stopping condition was that the gap and infeasibilites are not larger that
10−8; only for cases E0E1 and Hardy the gap had to be less than 2 · 10−5.
A case is considered to be failed if an error, e.g. in Cholesky factorization
occurred, and to exceed after reaching more that 100 of iterations.
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Table C.1. Performance of NPA-solver (1a). The table shows the perfor-
mance of the special purpose NPA-solver in CHSH, I3322, E0E1 and Hardy problems
in the Almost Quantum level of the NPA hierarchy. Averaged over 100 executions.
parameters CHSH I3322 E0E1 Hardy
expon pertub. str. iter. time iter. time iter. time iter. time
0 0 10 0.03 11 0.04 failed failed
0 1 11 0.03 11 0.04 33 0.09 26 0.07
0 2 11 0.03 11 0.04 exceeded 26 0.07
0 3 exceeded failed failed 26 0.07
0 4 10 0.03 11 0.04 failed failed
0 5 10 0.03 11 0.04 exceeded 27 0.07
0 6 12 0.03 12 0.05 31 0.09 25 0.07
0 7 10 0.03 11 0.04 failed failed
0.5 0 10 0.03 11 0.04 failed failed
0.5 1 11 0.03 11 0.04 33 0.09 26 0.07
0.5 2 11 0.03 11 0.04 exceeded 26 0.07
0.5 3 exceeded failed failed 26 0.07
0.5 4 10 0.03 11 0.05 failed failed
0.5 5 10 0.03 11 0.04 exceeded 27 0.07
0.5 6 12 0.03 12 0.05 31 0.08 25 0.07
0.5 7 10 0.03 11 0.05 failed failed
1 0 10 0.03 11 0.04 failed failed
1 1 11 0.03 11 0.04 33 0.09 26 0.07
1 2 11 0.03 11 0.04 exceeded 26 0.07
1 3 exceeded failed failed 26 0.07
1 4 10 0.03 11 0.04 failed failed
1 5 10 0.03 11 0.04 exceeded 27 0.07
1 6 12 0.03 12 0.04 31 0.08 25 0.07
1 7 10 0.03 11 0.04 failed failed
1.5 0 10 0.03 11 0.04 failed failed
1.5 1 10 0.03 12 0.04 32 0.09 25 0.07
1.5 2 10 0.03 failed exceeded 25 0.07
1.5 3 exceeded failed failed 25 0.07
1.5 4 10 0.03 11 0.04 failed failed
1.5 5 10 0.03 11 0.04 exceeded 28 0.08
1.5 6 11 0.03 failed 30 0.09 24 0.07
1.5 7 10 0.03 failed failed failed
2 0 10 0.03 11 0.04 failed failed
2 1 10 0.03 11 0.04 37 0.10 27 0.07
2 2 10 0.03 11 0.04 exceeded 26 0.07
2 3 exceeded failed failed 26 0.07
2 4 10 0.03 11 0.04 failed failed
2 5 10 0.03 11 0.05 failed 29 0.08
2 6 11 0.03 11 0.04 35 0.10 25 0.07
2 7 10 0.03 11 0.04 failed failed
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Table C.2. Performance of NPA-solver (1b). The table shows the perfor-
mance of the special purpose NPA-solver in CHSH, I3322, E0E1 and Hardy problems
in the Almost Quantum level of the NPA hierarchy. Averaged over 100 executions.
parameters CHSH I3322 E0E1 Hardy
expon pertub. str. iter. time iter. time iter. time iter. time
2.5 0 11 0.03 12 0.04 failed failed
2.5 1 11 0.03 12 0.05 29 0.08 26 0.07
2.5 2 12 0.03 13 0.05 exceeded 26 0.07
2.5 3 exceeded failed failed 26 0.07
2.5 4 11 0.03 12 0.05 failed failed
2.5 5 11 0.03 12 0.05 failed 29 0.08
2.5 6 13 0.03 failed 36 0.10 26 0.07
2.5 7 11 0.03 12 0.05 failed failed
3 0 11 0.03 failed failed failed
3 1 11 0.03 failed 29 0.08 26 0.07
3 2 12 0.03 13 0.05 exceeded 26 0.07
3 3 exceeded failed failed 26 0.07
3 4 11 0.03 failed failed failed
3 5 11 0.03 13 0.05 failed 28 0.08
3 6 12 0.03 failed 33 0.09 27 0.07
3 7 11 0.03 13 0.05 failed failed
3.5 0 13 0.03 12 0.05 failed failed
3.5 1 13 0.03 12 0.05 33 0.09 27 0.07
3.5 2 13 0.03 12 0.05 exceeded 27 0.07
3.5 3 exceeded failed failed 28 0.08
3.5 4 13 0.04 12 0.04 failed failed
3.5 5 13 0.04 12 0.04 failed 31 0.08
3.5 6 13 0.04 15 0.05 36 0.10 25 0.07
3.5 7 13 0.04 13 0.05 failed failed
4 0 13 0.04 13 0.05 failed failed
4 1 13 0.04 14 0.05 37 0.10 31 0.08
4 2 13 0.04 13 0.05 30 0.08 27 0.07
4 3 exceeded failed failed 27 0.07
4 4 13 0.03 13 0.05 exceeded failed
4 5 13 0.04 13 0.05 failed 30 0.08
4 6 14 0.04 failed 34 0.09 26 0.07
4 7 13 0.04 13 0.05 failed failed
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Table C.3. Performance of NPA-solver (2a). The table shows the perfor-
mance of the special purpose NPA-solver in BC3, T3C, BC5, and BC7 problems in the
Almost Quantum level of the NPA hierarchy. Averaged over 100 executions.
parameters BC3 T3C BC5 BC7
expon pertub. str. iter. time iter. time iter. time iter. time
0 0 13 0.05 18 0.09 15 0.24 18 3.46
0 1 13 0.05 18 0.08 16 0.26 19 3.64
0 2 13 0.04 18 0.08 16 0.26 19 3.64
0 3 exceeded exceeded exceeded exceeded
0 4 13 0.04 19 0.09 19 0.31 23 4.42
0 5 13 0.05 18 0.08 15 0.24 18 3.47
0 6 exceeded exceeded exceeded exceeded
0 7 13 0.05 18 0.08 15 0.24 18 3.46
0.5 0 13 0.05 18 0.08 15 0.24 18 3.46
0.5 1 13 0.05 18 0.08 16 0.26 19 3.72
0.5 2 13 0.05 18 0.08 16 0.26 19 3.66
0.5 3 exceeded exceeded exceeded exceeded
0.5 4 13 0.05 19 0.09 19 0.31 23 4.43
0.5 5 13 0.05 18 0.08 15 0.24 18 3.48
0.5 6 exceeded exceeded exceeded exceeded
0.5 7 13 0.05 18 0.08 15 0.23 18 3.47
1 0 13 0.05 18 0.08 15 0.24 18 3.49
1 1 13 0.05 18 0.08 16 0.26 19 3.66
1 2 13 0.05 18 0.08 16 0.26 19 3.73
1 3 exceeded exceeded exceeded exceeded
1 4 13 0.04 19 0.09 19 0.31 23 4.56
1 5 13 0.05 18 0.09 15 0.24 18 3.48
1 6 exceeded exceeded exceeded exceeded
1 7 13 0.04 18 0.08 15 0.24 18 3.47
1.5 0 13 0.04 17 0.08 15 0.24 18 3.49
1.5 1 13 0.05 17 0.08 15 0.24 18 3.48
1.5 2 13 0.05 17 0.08 15 0.24 18 3.45
1.5 3 exceeded exceeded exceeded 18 3.45
1.5 4 13 0.04 18 0.08 19 0.30 22 4.21
1.5 5 13 0.05 17 0.08 15 0.24 18 3.44
1.5 6 14 0.05 22 0.10 16 0.26 18 3.47
1.5 7 13 0.05 17 0.08 15 0.24 18 3.47
2 0 13 0.05 17 0.08 15 0.24 18 3.46
2 1 13 0.05 17 0.08 15 0.24 18 3.46
2 2 13 0.05 17 0.08 15 0.24 18 3.46
2 3 exceeded exceeded exceeded exceeded
2 4 13 0.04 18 0.08 18 0.29 22 4.23
2 5 13 0.05 17 0.08 15 0.25 18 3.46
2 6 14 0.05 19 0.09 16 0.26 19 3.65
2 7 13 0.04 17 0.08 15 0.24 18 3.46
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Table C.4. Performance of NPA-solver (2b). The table shows the perfor-
mance of the special purpose NPA-solver in BC3, T3C, BC5, and BC7 problems in the
Almost Quantum level of the NPA hierarchy. Averaged over 100 executions.
parameters BC3 T3C BC5 BC7
expon pertub. str. iter. time iter. time iter. time iter. time
2.5 0 13 0.05 17 0.08 16 0.26 18 3.46
2.5 1 14 0.05 17 0.08 16 0.25 19 3.65
2.5 2 14 0.05 18 0.08 16 0.26 18 3.54
2.5 3 exceeded 27 0.12 exceeded exceeded
2.5 4 13 0.05 18 0.08 18 0.29 22 4.23
2.5 5 13 0.05 17 0.08 16 0.25 18 3.46
2.5 6 14 0.05 19 0.09 17 0.27 19 3.65
2.5 7 13 0.05 17 0.08 16 0.25 18 3.46
3 0 13 0.05 18 0.08 16 0.25 18 3.46
3 1 14 0.05 18 0.08 16 0.26 19 3.65
3 2 14 0.05 18 0.09 16 0.26 19 3.65
3 3 exceeded 19 0.09 exceeded exceeded
3 4 13 0.05 18 0.08 19 0.31 22 4.24
3 5 13 0.05 18 0.08 16 0.25 18 3.45
3 6 15 0.05 20 0.09 16 0.25 19 3.64
3 7 13 0.05 18 0.08 16 0.26 18 3.44
3.5 0 13 0.05 18 0.08 16 0.26 18 3.44
3.5 1 14 0.05 18 0.09 16 0.26 19 3.64
3.5 2 14 0.05 18 0.09 16 0.26 19 3.66
3.5 3 exceeded 27 0.13 exceeded exceeded
3.5 4 13 0.05 19 0.09 19 0.30 22 4.24
3.5 5 13 0.05 18 0.08 16 0.26 18 3.47
3.5 6 15 0.05 20 0.09 17 0.27 19 3.66
3.5 7 13 0.05 18 0.08 16 0.26 18 3.46
4 0 14 0.05 18 0.08 16 0.26 18 3.46
4 1 14 0.05 18 0.08 16 0.25 18 3.46
4 2 14 0.05 18 0.08 16 0.25 18 3.56
4 3 exceeded 27 0.12 exceeded exceeded
4 4 14 0.05 19 0.09 18 0.29 22 4.24
4 5 14 0.05 18 0.08 16 0.25 18 3.46
4 6 15 0.05 20 0.09 17 0.28 19 3.65
4 7 14 0.05 18 0.08 16 0.26 18 3.46

APPENDIX D
Impact of initial solution on SDPT3
Table D.1. The impact of supplying initial iterates for
SDPT3 in CHSH, I3322, E0E1 and Hardy problems in the Al-
most Quantum level of the NPA hierarchy for HKM search
direction.
parameters CHSH I3322 E0E1 Hardy
PC expon iter. time iter. time iter. time iter. time
no 0 -2 -1% -2 -9% failed 4 22%
no 0.01 -2 -12% -2 -10% failed 4 24%
no 0.1 -2 -12% -2 -9% failed 4 20%
no 0.5 -2 -12% -2 -9% failed 4 18%
no 1 -2 -12% -2 -9% failed 4 17%
no 1.5 -2 -12% -2 -8% failed 4 18%
no 2 -2 -13% -2 -9% failed 4 21%
no 2.5 -2 -12% -2 -9% failed 4 19%
no 3 -2 -11% -2 -8% failed 4 17%
no 4 -2 -13% -2 -9% failed 4 17%
no 8 -2 -12% -2 -9% failed 4 16%
yes 0 -1 -7% -2 -15% -3 -11% 0 1%
yes 0.01 -1 -10% -2 -13% -3 -11% 0 1%
yes 0.1 -1 -10% -2 -14% -3 -11% 0 0%
yes 0.5 -1 -10% -2 -14% -3 -11% 0 1%
yes 1 -1 -10% -2 -14% -3 -9% 0 2%
yes 1.5 -2 -17% 0 0% -2 -2% -1 -5%
yes 2 -1 -8% -1 -7% -3 -5% -1 -4%
yes 2.5 -3 -23% -1 -8% -3 -7% -1 -4%
yes 3 -3 -23% 2 16% -2 -5% 0 2%
yes 4 -4 -29% 1 8% -3 -9% 0 2%
yes 8 -3 -24% 0 1% -2 -4% -1 -2%
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Table D.2. The impact of supplying initial iterates for
SDPT3 in BC3, T3C, BC5 and BC7 problems in the Almost
Quantum level of the NPA hierarchy for HKM search direction.
parameters BC3 T3C BC5 BC7
PC expon iter. time iter. time iter. time iter. time
no 0 -1 -4% failed -5 -19% -1 -2%
no 0.01 -1 -4% failed -5 -19% -1 -2%
no 0.1 -1 -4% failed -5 -19% -1 -2%
no 0.5 -1 -3% failed -5 -18% -1 -2%
no 1 -1 -4% failed -5 -17% -1 -2%
no 1.5 -1 -5% failed -5 -19% -1 -3%
no 2 -1 -5% failed -5 -17% -1 -2%
no 2.5 -1 -4% failed -5 -17% -1 -2%
no 3 -1 -5% failed -5 -17% -1 -2%
no 4 -1 -4% failed -5 -17% -1 -2%
no 8 -1 -4% failed -5 -18% -1 0%
yes 0 1 9% 0 1% -1 -7% -1 1%
yes 0.01 1 7% 0 1% -1 -9% -1 1%
yes 0.1 1 9% 0 1% -1 -7% -1 -2%
yes 0.5 1 9% 0 0% -1 -8% -1 -3%
yes 1 1 10% 0 0% -1 -7% -1 1%
yes 1.5 1 7% 1 7% -1 -7% -1 3%
yes 2 1 9% 1 7% -2 -12% 0 8%
yes 2.5 1 9% 0 0% -2 -11% -1 5%
yes 3 1 9% 0 1% -3 -16% -1 2%
yes 4 0 1% 1 7% -3 -15% 0 4%
yes 8 1 8% 1 7% -3 -15% -1 0%
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Table D.3. The impact of supplying initial iterates for
SDPT3 in CHSH, I3322, E0E1 and Hardy problems in the Al-
most Quantum level of the NPA hierarchy for NT search direc-
tion.
parameters CHSH I3322 E0E1 Hardy
PC expon iter. time iter. time iter. time iter. time
no 0 -4 -22% 0 0% -1 -4% 3 14%
no 0.01 -4 -25% 0 0% -1 -4% 3 14%
no 0.1 -4 -25% 0 0% -1 -1% 3 13%
no 0.5 -4 -25% 0 0% -1 3% 3 13%
no 1 -4 -25% 0 0% -1 2% 3 14%
no 1.5 -4 -23% 0 0% -1 3% 3 14%
no 2 -4 -24% 0 1% -1 5% 3 12%
no 2.5 -4 -25% 0 0% -1 2% 3 14%
no 3 -4 -24% 0 0% -1 0% 3 14%
no 4 -4 -23% 0 0% -1 -1% 3 12%
no 8 -4 -25% 0 0% -1 -5% 3 13%
yes 0 -1 -9% -2 -14% -2 -5% -1 -3%
yes 0.01 -1 -9% -2 -15% -2 -6% -1 -4%
yes 0.1 -1 -10% -2 -15% -2 -8% -1 -4%
yes 0.5 -1 -10% -2 -15% -2 -6% -1 -3%
yes 1 -1 -9% -2 -15% -2 -7% -1 -6%
yes 1.5 -1 -10% -2 -14% -2 -8% 0 -2%
yes 2 -1 -11% -1 -8% -1 -3% 0 -1%
yes 2.5 -1 -10% -1 -7% -1 -2% 0 1%
yes 3 0 0% -1 -7% 0 3% 0 4%
yes 4 0 -1% -1 -7% 0 4% 0 0%
yes 8 0 -1% 0 -1% -1 -1% 0 0%
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Table D.4. The impact of supplying initial iterates for
SDPT3 in BC3, T3C, BC5 and BC7 problems in the Almost
Quantum level of the NPA hierarchy for NT search direction.
parameters BC3 T3C BC5 BC7
PC expon iter. time iter. time iter. time iter. time
no 0 -1 -4% -2 -7% -3 -12% -2 -4%
no 0.01 -1 -6% -2 -7% -3 -13% -2 -3%
no 0.1 -1 -6% -2 -7% -3 -13% -2 -4%
no 0.5 -1 -5% -2 -7% -3 -12% -2 -5%
no 1 -1 -5% -2 -7% -3 -11% -2 -5%
no 1.5 -1 -4% -2 -7% -3 -12% -2 -3%
no 2 -1 -4% -2 -7% -3 -12% -2 -5%
no 2.5 -1 -5% -2 -7% -3 -12% -2 -6%
no 3 -1 -5% -2 -7% -3 -12% -2 -6%
no 4 -1 -4% -2 -7% -3 -12% -2 -5%
no 8 -1 -5% -2 -7% -3 -11% -2 -6%
yes 0 -1 -6% -1 -6% -1 -8% -2 -8%
yes 0.01 -1 -6% -1 -5% -1 -7% -2 -4%
yes 0.1 -1 -7% -1 -5% -1 -8% -2 -4%
yes 0.5 -1 -8% -1 -5% -1 -8% -2 -5%
yes 1 -1 -7% -1 -5% -1 -7% -2 -3%
yes 1.5 0 2% -1 -6% -1 -6% -2 -2%
yes 2 -1 -6% 1 7% -1 -7% -1 0%
yes 2.5 0 0% 0 1% -1 -8% -2 -7%
yes 3 1 9% 0 0% -1 -7% -4 -13%
yes 4 0 1% 0 0% -2 -12% -3 -12%
yes 8 0 2% 0 0% -2 -13% -4 -16%
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